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Abstract
African Bargaining Power:
On The Origins Of Strong Investment Deals With China
Christina Elisabeth Seyfried
2021
This dissertation investigates how African governments strategize around private Chinese
capital. How much bargaining power do individual African countries have with private Chinese
investors? What factors influence countries’ strategies around this type of investment? Under what
conditions do governments ask private Chinese investors to contribute to developing local content
(ownership and employment)? How do these Chinese investors react to stricter regulations? And
finally, and most importantly, is there more to gain for some African partners in this relatively new
relationship with China?
Most development scholars accept what I call a “Weak Bargaining Power Narrative” about
the African region – that due to small factor endowments and political instability, African governments
continue to face intense intra-continental competition and a severe lack of choice between multiple
investors. As a result, governments must remove regulations, including local participation
requirements, in order to attract any kind of foreign investment. Surprisingly then, we observe that
some African countries like Ethiopia with relatively lower bargaining power – with bargaining power
defined here by economic and political structural variables that are less replaceable by exit options for
the investor – ask private Chinese investors to contribute more to developing local content than some
African countries with relatively higher bargaining power like Nigeria, and that these Chinese investors
tend to in fact accept these stricter deals.
What explains this inconsistency? This project develops a new explanation - that the topreceiving countries of private Chinese investments seemingly paradoxically have significant bargaining

power due to changes in the global economic and political environment, but that this bargaining power
is not always reflected in the deal quality negotiated across the continent. I further argue that
commonly cited variables such as corruption or economic ideology are insufficient direct causal
explanations of the variation that we observe across government strategies. Instead, this project shows
that before such factors come into play, some African governments are more aware of their bargaining
power with private Chinese investors than others.
The argument is based on the findings from two conjoint experiments in Nigeria and 218
interviews with government officials and private Chinese companies across five case studies that are
among the top-receivers of Chinese investments. Overall, I show that perhaps counterintuitively,
governments in competitive democracies (e.g. Nigeria and Kenya) have lower perceptions of
bargaining power because parties’ short-term ruling horizons as well as stronger historical
relationships to the West have led negotiators to receive inaccurate information about their bargaining
power with private Chinese players. In addition, the de-centralized nature of these competitive
democracies - with de-centralization defined by weak parties and/or de facto weak centralized
institutions - has also incentivized different domestic actors to compete for foreign investments across
federal ministries and between federal and subnational levels rather than to share information on
investment inflows and work on a common strategy. The ruling government is then unable to collect
accurate information on investment inflows, which in turn influences their perceptions on bargaining
power to be lower than their actual bargaining power.
In contrast, governments in one-party dominant systems or authoritarian regimes with longterm ruling horizons (e.g. Ethiopia or Tanzania) have higher perceptions of bargaining power because
parties’ long-term ruling horizons as well as closer relationships to the East led negotiators to receive
more information on Chinese investment patterns and to test stricter local content policies.
Additionally, the centralized nature of these regimes – with centralization defined by strong parties

and/or de facto strong centralized institutions – has enabled ruling powers to control the system and
gather information on Chinese investment inflows that in turn influenced perceptions on bargaining
power to match their actual bargaining power.
Finally, South Africa is a hybrid case with a one-party dominant system and de facto centralism
but closer relations to the West, where the government has learned from experience that companies
interacting with the government will follow its B-BBEE regulations but also where Western economic
thought has led the government to deem their bargaining leverage with private Chinese players that
do not interact with the government to be low.
The main contribution of this piece is the finding that several African governments can in fact act
as price setters around local participation with private Chinese investors, and that perceptions of
bargaining power fundamentally matter for investment deal outcomes. Questions such as: “Will China
exploit or develop Africa?” are therefore misguided. Instead, this project illustrates that whatever
China-Africa story will be told in the future fundamentally also depends on what stories individual
African governments choose to write - as they do have space here to be narrators.
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CHAPTER 1: AFRICAN BARGAINING POWER –
AN INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
Imagine that four development experts sit at a round table and discuss how African countries
could not only attract larger amounts of foreign investments but also request more local benefits from
investors for their economies. The first one to speak is a dependency theorist: “The problem is that
African countries are weaker members of a capitalist world order and getting structurally exploited by
the West. No investments, skills or technology will come unless the stronger members of the Global
North deliberately start to share them.” The second expert, a neoclassical economist, interrupts:
“Investments, skills and technology transfers will eventually flow in but they can’t be forced now.
Countries need to continue to deregulate, privatize and liberalize. They must make their countries
more attractive to investors.” The third one, a poverty trap specialist, speaks up: “No, the key issue
really is that many countries in the African region have such weak institutions that even with reforms,
no investor will want to come. And because there is no capital coming in, they can also not build
stronger institutions. So, all that can really help us to break that cycle is foreign aid.” Finally, the fourth
one - an experimentalist - concludes: “That also means we need to get rid of poverty first that exists
due to market imperfections and government failure. So, let’s focus on identifying causes of poverty
at the micro-level, estimate the effects of different policies, then evaluate their cost effectiveness and
take it from there.”
What the four experts have in common is that they all essentially portray the majority of African
countries as price takers. Many are too poor to attract significant amounts of foreign capital needed
for growth, and there are too plenty of them offering similar factor endowments. There are also simply

too many endemic economic and political issues at the micro-and macro-level that need to be solved
first in order to appeal to investors that are interested in high returns and political stability. So, many
of these African governments ultimately have to agree to whatever deals potential trade and
investment partners ask for if the region’s goal is to attract foreign capital and develop.
This sentiment is also visible in the questions that China-Africa scholars have asked on the
relatively new relationship between Africa and China. For example, is China solely interested in oil
and other natural resources? Will China trap African countries in debt? Is China only bringing in
Chinese workers and exploiting the region? Or will Chinese companies in fact introduce
manufacturing and develop Africa? This one-sided perspective on China’s strategy points towards a
view in literature and policy-making that the African region is a rather passive, single unit that can
essentially only be a price taker of global economic and political power dynamics. Many African
countries can consequently only through goodwill of an external player either stay behind or prosper.
This project strongly questions this perspective and posits that current debates around “Will China
develop or exploit Africa?” are misguided. Instead, and going back to the initial question of the four
development experts, I show that due to a recent shift in global economic and political power
dynamics, there exists in fact significant space for several African governments to request more local
benefits from private Chinese investors only incorporated in Africa, which have been rapidly rising in
numbers on the continent. I further provide evidence that within the cases studied here, authoritarian
and one-party dominant states like Ethiopia or Tanzania have already started to use their bargaining
power more effectively than competitive democracies like Nigeria or Kenya to ask for human capital
and technology transfers, and I detail the reasons as to why that is the case. The evidence provided
suggests that whatever China-Africa story will be told in the future fundamentally also depends on
what stories individual African governments choose to write - as they do have space here to be
narrators.

2

That countries once deemed “price takers” did ultimately write their own development strategies
is visible from other examples, like most famously, from China itself. From today’s perspective, it may
seem a bit difficult to believe that before China’s market reforms started in 1978, its economy actually
performed worse than those of the African region. China’s GDP/capita was less than one-third of
the average in Sub-Saharan African countries. In fact, in 1980, only Guinea-Bissau and Uganda’s
GDP/capita were lower than China’s. Like many countries in the African region, China had high birth
and death rates, low primary school enrolment, and very little infrastructure. Yet, fast forward 40 years,
the picture has changed dramatically: China is now the world’s second largest economy and the world's
fastest-growing consumer market. In 2018, per capita income in the Sub-African region ($1,589.2) was
only about a sixth of that in China ($9,770.8), with only Equatorial Guinea, Mauritius and the
Seychelles’ economies performing better than China’s.1
Surely, in the late 1970s, development experts had also knocked on China’s doors and offered
their advice. Neoliberal economists tout China’s market-oriented reforms post-1978 and the
establishment of property rights that attracted foreign investment as responsible for its long-term
growth (e.g. Zitelmann 2019). State-centered scholars stress the autonomy of the Chinese government
and its strong involvement in the economy that welcomed foreign investors to certain sectors as the
key to development (e.g. Yao 2010, Oi 1992). Finally, a third approach combines the neoliberal and
the developmental model to argue that a right mix of the two led to China’s growth (e.g. Montinola et
al. 1995).
China certainly worked hard on providing a conducive environment for growth. But there is
something that these debates on China’s enabling policy environment overlook: While China did listen
to some advice from development experts, the government also maintained a set of equity caps, joint

World Bank estimates 2018; please see Figure 1 in the Appendix for an illustration with 2016 data when Mauritius’
GDP/capita was still below China’s GDP/capita.
1
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ventures restrictions, and Chinese national leadership requirements that in fact impose significant
costs on investors and that have been exceptional across countries’ FDI regimes.2 Yet, despite these
costs, China has been boasting the largest amount of FDI inflows of all developing countries since
1996 (UNCTAD 2020). Why was China able to impose such restrictions without losing out on
valuable foreign capital? Investors must have been willing to take on the costs of domestic revenue
mobilization and developing local content in exchange for China’s cheap labor in the manufacturing
sector and, more recently, for a large consumer market. Simply put, China possessed bargaining power
with Western investors.
And China actively used this power to induce growth and structural transformation at a pace
that has been unparalleled in the world. In fact, China’s economy had grown so fast that it had amassed
large amounts of foreign reserves by 2000 and decided to invest the money abroad, including in the
African region. And its involvement on the continent over the past two decades has certainly been
impressive: In 2018 alone, China and Africa traded a grand volume of US $185 billion. Between 2003
and 2018, Chinese FDI stocks in Africa increased from US $0.49 billion to US $46 billion, and from
2000 to 2018, China extended US $148 billion in loans to Africa.3 These financial contributions have
certainly been driven by geopolitical considerations, but also reflect China’s growing demand for
resources (e.g. oil, gas, copper or uranium) and export markets, as well as a push for Chinese infant
corporations to expand overseas. With a significant slow-down in U.S. involvement in Africa over the
past years,4 China is already Africa’s most important trading partner, and set to overall become the
continent’s most important economic partner in the near future.

As Ramamurti (2001) writes: “First, although FDI policies in developing countries have changed from being restrictive
to being more liberal, there are still significant barriers to trade and inward FDI in de-veloping countries, e.g., in the case
of large projects or in sectors such as ser-vices. Second, at any given time, the FDI policies of some developing countries
will be less liberal than those of others, China being the prime example of a country that successfully courted FDI in the
1980s and 1990s despite quite re-strictive FDI policies” (pg. 27).
3 All listed figures were obtained from the Johns-Hopkins University China-Africa Research Initiative (CARI) Database
on Trade, Aid and Investment.
4 Please see Figure 2 in the Appendix.
2
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Certainly, the amount that China has invested on the African continent appears still very small
compared to Western financial involvement. Yet, no other foreign player has increased their
investment interest in the African region so rapidly and so consistently over the past two decades.
China’s growing investment presence may therefore only signal the start of a larger expansionary quest.
In addition, the number of private Chinese investors in particular has exponentially increased on the
continent. While scholars and journalists have begun to study the effects of Chinese investments in
Africa (e.g. Chen et al. 2018, Bräutigam et al. 2014), the dynamics behind the adoption of deals
between African governments and Chinese players5 – let alone private Chinese investors - have received
scant attention. Private Chinese investors that are only incorporated in Africa as a subgroup have
predominantly economic motivations and are less guided by the Chinese government’s political
strategy in the region (e.g. Feng and Pilling 2019, McKinsey 2017, Sun 2017). They are therefore easier
to study separately from Chinese state-owned enterprises. In order to fill the gap in literature, this
project consequently purposefully focuses on private Chinese players and analyzes whether their
behavior simply overlaps with other private Western players in Africa, or whether there is something
different about China’s domestic realities and foreign diplomatic strategy that translates into more
leverage for some African countries with private Chinese companies than literature has traditionally
suggested.
How have different African governments met foreign investors - including private Chinese
ones - with their foreign direct investment regulations, and how varied have these approaches been
over time? Starting with Hall and Soskice (2001), the Varieties of Capitalism literature has been
primarily designed with a view to developed economies, with very limited applicability to the African
context. A few studies have attempted to identify to which extent varieties of capitalism imported

Important exceptions include Soulé (2019), who focuses on negotiations around infrastructure loans in West Africa,
and Mohan and Lampert (2013), who also call for more scholarship on African agency in China-Africa studies.
5
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from colonial powers have fashioned today’s African economies (e.g. Vogel 2011). Indeed, during the
Cold War, different ideologies from Marxism, socialism and capitalism spread the African continent
and influenced growth trajectories. This was documented for example by Crawford (1982), who
studied ideological importance for the performance of African states in economic growth, distribution,
self-reliance, human dignity, participation and societal capacity. Bates (1981)’s work on inefficient state
intervention in the agricultural sector in tropical Africa then led to increasingly louder calls to
“deregulate, privatize, and liberalize.” With the end of the Cold War that further symbolized a victory
of democracy and market capitalism, structural adjustment programs finally spread through the
African region in the 1980s and 90s. Overall, this may have therefore created a general impression that
the way capitalism has been practiced in Africa today has been rather homogenous across individual
countries.
Interestingly, however, and against the prevalent advice from Western development experts, some
African countries did in fact develop capitalist regimes that meet foreign investors, including private
Chinese ones, more aggressively than others, especially since the start of the 21st century. For example,
the Ethiopian government formulated an Industrial Policy Strategy (IPS) in 2002, and as part of its
Investment Proclamation, asked for local content requirements in the manufacturing industries and
imposed limits in the employment of foreign staffers (excluding managerial positions), where foreign
companies must provide a succession plan for foreign employees by Ethiopian nationals in addition
to training programs. While Tanzania started to borrow from the IMF in the mid-1980s and the first
market-oriented investment code was introduced in June 1990, its foreign investment policy
framework has remained relatively strict and become increasingly aggressive on raising revenue, on
hiring of Tanzanians and on protecting and growing local industries since the election of President
John Magufuli in 2015. Or, South Africa’s Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE)
regulations around black ownership and employment are yet another example that emerged out of a
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need to rectify the racial inequalities that Apartheid had produced up until the 1990s, and that are still
strictly enforced with domestic and foreign companies today. These cases suggest that developing
countries can also pick “varieties of capitalism” as part of their overall development strategy that have
been underexplored by the traditional Varieties of Capitalism literature.
I define the quality of investment deals by the degree to which they address the transfer of
economic rent from foreign investment to domestic factors of production and consumption
(following Globerman and Shapiro (1998) who only focus on production). In particular, I consider all
policies that address domestic revenue mobilization and developing local content such as ownership,
employment, taxes, license fees, or property rights, among other variables. Figure 1 shows the scores
from the “Deal Quality Index” that I develop in Chapter 2. It illustrates that there was substantial
variation in the aggressiveness of FDI regimes in 2012 across the African continent, with higher scores
indicating more aggressive policies, and lower scores indicating more investor-friendly policies.
As a response to both the emerging presence of private Chinese players in Africa and an
increasing variation in FDI policy strategies on the African continent, this project asks: How much
bargaining power do African economies have today with this relatively new player? What explains
variation in government strategies around private Chinese capital? And finally, could some African
governments be asking more from private Chinese investors than the traditional development theories
outlined in the introduction suggest? This project aims to answer these three questions.
The central argument is the following: First, due to significant global political and economic
changes, several African economies have more bargaining power with private Chinese players than
existing literature is suggesting. Africa is often called “the world’s last region to industrialize” (e.g. Sun
2017), and there is certainly still a significant amount of money to make from structural
transformation, with particularly high profitability for first-comers. In addition, over the past two
decades, the African region has also gained significant value as a market place for Chinese companies
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Figure 1: Deal Quality Index6

that are leaving China out of overcapacity concerns. This is similar to China’s attractiveness to Western
investors starting in the 1970s that has only recently been tailing off due to an increase in China’s labor
prices. The second part of the project then aims to contribute to the understanding of the root causes
of development by examining how five African governments (Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania and
South Africa) that are among the top-receivers of Chinese investment strategize around private

The Deal Quality Index only captures formal FDI policies in the year 2012. Figure 1 shows that in 2012, Tanzania is
ranked lower in the index than Nigeria. Yet, Tanzania’s score would in 2020 be higher following President Magufuli’s
election and the implementation of stricter local content policies thereafter. In addition, my interview evidence shows that
the Tanzanian government tends to enforce stricter case-by-case conditions on investors. Chapter 4 describes in detail
Tanzania’s FDI regulations in 2020. Chapter 5 and 6 then hone in on the reasons as to why both formal policies and caseby case deals in countries like Ethiopia and Tanzania appear to be more aggressive around local participation, compared
to countries like Nigeria or Kenya.
6
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Chinese capital. I thereby for the first time describe and analyze the political economy around national
foreign investment policies and investment deal negotiations to better understand the role of power
relationships for the resulting quality of deals.
I posit that perceptions on bargaining power fundamentally matter for the resulting deal
quality that we observe across the African continent. I propose the following new typology (Table 1)
on the relationship between bargaining power, perceived bargaining power, and deal quality. Countries
either have weak, medium, strong or very strong bargaining power depending on their relative
structural economic and political attractiveness to private Chinese investors. Countries’ bargaining
power will be higher when their structural economic and political endowments are less replaceable by
exit options for Chinese investors, e.g. when countries have a comparative advantage in large stocks
of productive labor, technology, infrastructure, natural resources and large consumer markets as well
as display politically favorable background conditions. It is important to note that I classify relatively
larger economies among the 15 top-receivers7 of Chinese investments to have either “strong” or “very
strong bargaining power.” Countries like South Africa or Nigeria, who receive more absolute Chinese
investments and whose share of Chinese investments of total GDP is lower (1.87% and 0.65%,
respectively) should have even higher bargaining power than countries like Ethiopia, Tanzania and
Kenya that receive relatively less Chinese investments and where the share of Chinese investments of
total GDP is higher (3.14% and 2.44% and 2.23% respectively).8 This is because it is not only
important how much investments matter to both the African and the Chinese side, but also the
difference of what player they are more important to (Hirschman 1958). If the amount of Chinese
investments relative to total GDP is small, it matters less for economic development, and African
countries should have even more bargaining leverage with China.

7
8

Based on 2017 Johns-Hopkins University CARI investment data.
Based on 2018 Johns-Hopkins University CARI investment data and 2018 GDP (World Bank estimates) figures.
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Table 1: Actual and Perceived Bargaining Power
Weak
Perceived
Bargaining
Power
e.g. Gabon

Medium
Perceived
Bargaining
Power
_

Strong
Perceived
Bargaining
Power
_

Very Strong
Perceived
Bargaining Power

Medium
Bargaining
Power

e.g. Mauritius

e.g. Ghana

_

_

Strong
Bargaining
Power

e.g. Kenya

e.g. Congo,
Democratic
Republic

e.g. Ethiopia,
Tanzania,
Zimbabwe,
Algeria

_

Very Strong
Bargaining
Power

e.g. Nigeria,
Egypt

e.g. South Africa

_

_

Weak
Bargaining
Power

_

I argue that private Chinese investors are more likely to agree to strong deals if countries’
added value is high and they are less replaceable by exit options. Whether governments negotiate
strong or weak deals with private Chinese investors then depends on their perceived bargaining power.
All else equal, governments that do not think they could ask for local value-adding requirements will
be less likely to do so than governments that view such requirements as part of their policy options.
Overall, this typology also suggests that in many cases, private Chinese investors would agree to
stronger deals if African partners asked for them.
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At the same time, this project is not meant to show that updating African governments about their
true bargaining power will necessarily lead to better deals. After learning about their true power, they
could for example still choose to be corrupt, or not invest resources in negotiation capacity for
different reasons. Yet, the project is meant to challenge the assumption that African governments
always have perfect knowledge of their bargaining power, and that more commonly cited variables
such as corruption or ideology are the direct driving forces of weak deals.
This project focuses on Nigeria, South Africa, Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania, which are all
among the top-159 receivers of private Chinese investments and have strong or very strong bargaining
power. While China has invested in 51 out of 54 countries, the top-15 receivers of Chinese investments
still account for 77.510 percent of total investments. Despite the magnitude of investment deals
negotiated in these countries, literature has little grasp on Chinese investments in Africa,11 let alone on
the negotiation processes around investment deals that are often signed behind closed doors.
Understanding how African leaders from top-receiving nations think about negotiating with Chinese
investors is therefore especially important to capture and describe for the first time governments’ logic
around a substantial amount of investment deal negotiations on the African continent.
I conducted 218 interviews with government officials and Chinese companies across the five
African case studies over the course of 15 months between 2018-2020 and designed and implemented
two complementary conjoint experiments with the Nigerian federal and Lagos State government and
Chinese companies in Lagos and Ogun State in the Spring and Summer of 2020. The results of the
research demonstrate that there are three components, which determine governments’ perceptions of
bargaining power: first, the extent to which countries have been exposed to local participation policies
before; second, the extent to which the Weak Bargaining Power Narrative has penetrated their

Based on 2017 Johns-Hopkins University CARI investment data.
Ibid.
11 For example see Bräutigam et al. 2015, who called literature on Chinese investments at best “thin” (pg.2).
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countries; and third the extent to which countries are able to collect information about the amount of
Chinese investments flowing into their economies. If conceptualized as a game, I demonstrate that
the first two questions concern information that political actors receive about the game, while the
third one is about incentives to share or not to share information with other political actors within the
game.
Overall, I show that perhaps counterintuitively, competitive democracies (e.g. Nigeria and
Kenya) have lower perceptions of bargaining power because parties’ short-term ruling horizons as
well as stronger historical relationships to the West have led negotiators to receive inaccurate
information about their bargaining power with private Chinese players. In addition, the de-centralized
nature of these competitive democracies - with de-centralization defined by weak parties and/or de
facto weak centralized institutions - has also incentivized different domestic actors to compete for
foreign investments across federal ministries and between federal and subnational levels rather than
to share information on investment inflows and work on a common strategy. The ruling government
is then unable to collect accurate information on private Chinese investment inflows, which in turn
influences their perceptions on bargaining power to be lower than their actual bargaining power.
In contrast, one-party dominant systems or authoritarian regimes with long-term ruling
horizons (e.g. Ethiopia or Tanzania) have higher perceptions of bargaining power with private Chinese
investors because parties’ long-term ruling horizons as well as closer relationships to the East led
negotiators to receive more information on private Chinese investment patterns and to test stricter
local content policies. Additionally, the centralized nature of these one-party dominant systems or
authoritarian regimes – with centralization defined by strong parties and/or de facto strong centralized
institutions – has enabled ruling powers to control the system, manage the bureaucracy and gather
information on Chinese investment inflows that in turn influenced perceptions on bargaining power
to match their actual bargaining power.
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I classify South Africa is a hybrid case with a one-party dominant system and de facto
centralism but closer relations to the West, where the government has learned from experience that
companies interacting with the government will follow its B-BBEE regulations but also where
Western economic thought has led the government to deem their bargaining leverage with private
Chinese players that do not interact with the government to be low.
1.1.1

Defining Private Chinese Direct Investments in Africa

In this project, the term “foreign direct investment”, also for the purposes of readability simply
called “investment” or “FDI”, is used to denote any capital movements in which an entity from one
country directly controls the enterprise in another country in which the investment is made. This
definition is based on a famous body of literature that emerged from Hymer’s (1960) seminal work
on international operations of firms, in which he coined the term “direct investment” to make a
distinction from “foreign portfolio investments” that do not require direct control and that are also
excluded in the analysis here. Following the definition of the International Monetary Fund, a direct
investment is treated here as a relationship in which the investor owns at least 10 percent of the
ordinary shares or voting power of an enterprise abroad.12
I purposefully focus only on Chinese investments - as opposed to Chinese loans and trade - in
Africa. China-Africa studies often analyze Chinese loans, grants and investments together under the
umbrella terms “Chinese development finance”, “financial support” or “aid”,13 or focus
predominantly on trade or loans.14 This is because China as a non-OECD member is not bound to
report its official aid, and Chinese engagement in Africa is therefore often more opaque than Western

E.g. please see International Monetary Fund (2003).
Please see, for example, the approach taken by the China AidData Initiative Research Lab at the College of William &
Mary.
14 Please see, for example, the heavy focus on trade and loans in the Johns-Hopkins University CARI databases and
publications.
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ones. This has led the media and data collection initiatives to sometimes conflate and confound
different forms of Chinese engagement in Africa. In addition, the Chinese government itself promotes
a holistic cooperation with Africa. For example, at the triennial Forums on China-Africa Cooperation
(FOCAC), China has consistently offered grant, loans and investment packages that suggest the
existence of one bundled development strategy. Finally, China is Africa’s largest trading partner and
is already competing with the World Bank in loan volume in the African region, while Chinese
investments are still a relatively small part of China’s overall engagement in Africa. As a result, a whole
strand of literature is concerned with Chinese and Western infrastructure loans to Africa, perhaps
most famously with infrastructure deals, and the origins and implications of deal conditions in Chinese
contracting work around these infrastructure projects (e.g. Soulé 2019). In contrast, academic literature
focused on Chinese investment in Africa is at best “thin” (Bräutigam et al. 2015, pg. 2).
While at first glance understandable, the current focus on Chinese trade and loans, with only a
relatively small emphasis on investments, turns out to be problematic for several reasons for the
analysis proposed here. While the largest investors in Africa are still the United States, the United
Kingdom and France, Chinese investments in Africa have grown by the largest amount15 among
foreign investors as part of the third and emergent phase of Chinese interaction with the African
region.16 Analyzing consequences of this rise for African development is therefore substantively
interesting. Secondly, while it is the case that the Chinese government often bundles its economic
cooperation with African countries,17 Chinese investments increasingly come unbundled due to the
recent rise of private Chinese companies in Africa (e.g. Feng and Pilling 2019, Sun 2017). We should

Comparison between Johns-Hopkins University China-Africa Research Initiative data and UNCTAD Investment
Statistics data between 2003 - 2017.
16 The first phase followed the Bandung Conference of Non-Aligned Nations in 1955 when China provided political aid
and assistance until the end of the Cold War. The second phase started in the mid-1990s, when China’s trade with Africa
increased, and large and predominantly state-owned enterprises arrived in Africa as investors and contractors in
infrastructure projects (Kaplinsky and Morris 2009).
17 Please see, for example, Kaplinski and Morris (2009a), who study the distinctive features of large scale state-owned
Chinese investors, whose investments are closely bundled with aid and trade.
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therefore also pay particular attention to the characteristics of these “unbundled” investments to
understand their impact on African development. Finally, motivations of the Chinese government
behind extending a grant/loan versus investment even within bundles still substantially differ. In
particular, loan decisions are fundamentally about what political and economic gains can be extracted
from the credit terms themselves; whereas foreign investment decisions are based on what gains can
be extracted from an entity’s structure and revenues in another country. The latter decision is
fundamentally about benefits and costs that arise from operating in a specific market. Since this study
is primarily concerned with local benefits, making a distinction here is necessary.
A growing body of literature distinguishes between different forms of Chinese FDI. Kaplinsky
and Morris (2009) suggest four ideal types of overlapping Chinese investors in Sub-Saharan Africa:
central government SOEs, provincial government SOEs, private sector incorporated in China, and
private sector incorporated in Sub-Saharan Africa only. My interviews with all sub-types confirm He
and Zhu (2018)’s findings that Chinese companies in Africa are heterogeneous in their motivations
and behavior: SOEs are generally operating under strong control of the Chinese central or provincial
governments, and are driven by economic incentives but also the diplomatic relationship between the
respective African country and China. As a result, they do not necessarily prioritize profit
maximization and tend to be allowed to operate at razor thin margins. In contrast, big private
companies (e.g. Huawei) that are incorporated in China tend to be mostly driven by economic
incentives, aim to compete with Western big private companies in Africa but due to their size and
profile, still cannot completely eschew Chinese government’s directives.
Finally, there is a last and rapidly growing subset that this project focuses on: private Chinese
companies incorporated in the African region only, exclusively driven by economic incentives and
able to keep a low profile (e.g. Feng and Pilling 2019, Sun 2017). They are generally located in the
manufacturing and service sectors, and typically enter African markets through one of two channels:
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Chinese workers would travel to Africa through a Chinese state-owned enterprise and later venture
off to start their own companies in search for larger profits. Or, private entrepreneurs in China would
contact their friends in existing private Chinese companies that have already settled in an African
country and ask them where to invest. This decision-making process is surprisingly quite independent
of the political strategy of the Chinese government. McKinsey (2017) estimates that there were more
than 10,000 Chinese-owned firms operating in Africa in 2016, of which 90% are private.
Despite the growing presence of this new player, scholarship has very little grasp on the political
response of African governments to these new companies. In order to fill this gap, I include in this
study all capital flows of these Chinese private entities that invest across all sectors in all forms,
including the opening of a subsidiary or associate company in an African country, acquiring a
controlling interest in an existing African company, or establishing a merger or joint venture with an
African company. Understanding what relationships governments engage in with these relatively new
players on the continent and how these relationships could be optimized for the African side is the
core task of this project.
1.1.2

Defining the Bargaining Framework

Why are private foreign investors interested in developing economies? Neoclassical growth theory
assumes that developing countries should grow at a faster rate than developed ones. As Gerschenkron
(1962) famously noted, this is because developing countries have an “advantage of backwardness” they can import technology, industry and institutions at low risk and costs; have low capital-labor
ratios, which should increase the return on investment holding everything else constant; and can sell
products on the domestic and global market. This translates into cheap production and access to new
markets, which are highly lucrative for investors who want to gain advantage over their competitors
(e.g. Boddewyn and Brewer 1994).
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On the other hand, governments have incentives to provide at least a minimum level of economic
growth and employment to their population as means of gaining “consent from the governed” (e.g.
Lipset 1983, Dahl 1971 and Locke 1689). Given their low stocks of technology and capital, however,
developing countries are often unable to kickstart any “catch-up” growth without external sources of
capital (e.g. Sachs et al. 2004). Foreign investment is therefore an attractive solution to supplement
domestic savings; to access new export markets; and to induce technology and human capital
development that arise from technological transfers and trainings (e.g. UNCTAD 1995, Stopford and
Strange 1991).
The bargaining framework used to advance the central argument of this project accounts for both
bargaining over entry and bargaining over exit negotiations between foreign investors and host
governments as well as a plurality of sub- and supranational actors on each side of the negotiation
table. This decision is empirically motivated by global changes in the nature of investment negotiations
over the past two decades. Following the Washington Consensus and the advice for economic
liberalization in the 1980s and 90s, many countries successively eliminated FDI restrictions regarding
screening or performance requirements, ownership restrictions and licensing agreements featuring
technology transfer (UNCTAD 2000). As a result, one strand of literature suggests that formal noncooperative bargaining models over entry, most famously the obsolescing bargain model (OBM), have
become outdated (e.g. Eden and Molot 2002), especially in the high-technology manufacturing sector
(Dunning 1998, Vernon 1998, Weigel et al. 1997). This implies that countries and foreign companies
today would mostly engage in cooperative bargaining, with the government prioritizing a successful
investment outcome to imposing restrictions on foreign investors and risking a no-deal outcome.
At the same time, in the early 2000s, some countries did return to more restrictive FDI policies,
for example in the extractive industries. This includes nationalization or an increase in taxation or
royalties (UNCTAD 2012). In addition, as was the case in Zimbabwe in 2008, countries can also
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decide to suddenly impose local participation requirements such as 51% local ownership on foreign
investors, which then translates into a bargain over firms’ decisions to exit or to keep operating.
Another important consideration is that the national state is certainly not a monolithic entity in
investment negotiations. Supranational institutions - through international standards or informal
norms – as well as subnational entities such as state, regional or local actors also have the ability to
influence outcomes. Since I study African countries with different background characteristics, it is
important to use a framework that is variable on the numbers of actors on each side.
The Two-Tier Bargaining Model (Ramamurti 2001), which has also been used by Li et al. (2013)
to study Chinese investments in Tanzania, offers some insights into how to think about investment
negotiations but suffers two central limitations that this project aims to overcome. First, the Two-Tier
Bargaining Model is useful to explain why FDI host countries have become MNC-friendly in the
1990s by suggesting that FDI macro-rules are directly negotiated between home and host governments
and indirectly determined through bargaining at international institutions such as the World Bank, the
IMF and the WTO (tier 1). Tier 1 then heavily affects micro-negotiations between multinational
corporations and host governments (tier 2) and has heavily limited the bargaining space of host
governments. At the same time, the model fails to explain why some countries have resisted the
liberalization trend, or reversed the trend in later years. In particular, the fact that some African
countries reversed policies in the early 2000s and then again after the financial crisis in 2008 seems
puzzling.
Second, and relatedly, while the model allows for more actors on the international level, it treats
the host country as a relative black box.18 For example, Li et al. (2013) study investment deals in the
natural resources sector in Tanzania and shine light on the negotiation strategies of multiple Chinese
actors. The authors find that at least in the natural resource sector in Tanzania, Chinese actors engage
18

Although it is important to note that the model does include local firms.
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in a Modified 1-Tier Bargaining Model. In this model, the home country government (China)
represents the collective interests of Chinese companies in negotiations with the host country
government (Tanzania). For Chinese firms, this attenuates political risks because the Chinese
government has more financial resources than individual firms; and because the Chinese government
is able to develop a “relational”, long-term exchange partnership with the African partner that protects
Chinese firms against expropriation. The authors theorize that in other sectors with lower political
risk, or in countries with stronger economic development, Chinese investors will fall back to
Ramamurti’s (2001) two-tier bargaining model.
But what about Tanzania’s decision-making progress? The Two-Tier and the Modified 1-Tier
Bargaining Model both undertheorize the importance of collaboration that takes place among and
between government agencies that may play an important role for the host country’s overall
negotiation strategy in tier-1 and tier-2. Opening this “black box” may help scholars to understand the
reverse trends in FDI policies observed in some countries since the 2000s.
As a result, this study expands the Two-Tier Bargaining Model by another dimension, the
“enabling environment” (Figure 2). A few scholars, notably Mohan and Lampert (2013), have started
to focus on the importance of “African agency” in China-Africa relations, which is now more
formalized here. This new bargaining model lends itself as a suitable theoretical framework to explain
existing theories on African bargaining power as well as to advance my own one in subsequent sections
of this chapter. I keep the framework proposed here on purpose open and flexible. I will use its
flexibility to present different hypotheses and causal mechanisms proposed in literature that put weight
on different components in the framework, and that may explain why some African countries
negotiate stronger deals than others with Chinese investors. The following sections detail the
definitions of “bargaining power”, “enabling environment” and “deal quality”.
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Figure 2: “Enabling Environment” - Bargaining Model

Foreign Government
Direct:
Indirect:
Bilateral relations
World Bank
IMF
WTO etc.
Tier-1 Bargaining

FDI Host Government

Foreign Companies

Adapted from Ramamurti (2001) - Two Tier
Bargaining Model and Li et al. (2013) Modified 1-Tier Bargaining Model
1.1.3 Bargaining Power
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External:
-Historical
relationship to
the foreign
government/to
the BrettonWoods
Institutions

Tier-2 Bargaining

Enabling Environment:
Internal:
-Economic Ideology
-Corruption/accountability
and relationship to voters
or local interest groups
-Centralization and number of
players
-Institutional strength and
policy flexibility

Bargaining power is often loosely defined as the relative ability of parties in a situation to exert
influence over each other. However, bargaining literature is conflicted on what exactly determines this
relative ability. As a consequence, scholars often conflate structural factors, bargaining techniques and
resulting policies meant to attract investment into an overall term that is hard to define or measure.19
Responding to this inconsistency, I make an important distinction between bargaining power, the
enabling environment, and deal quality. Bargaining power is based on economic and political factor
endowments that stand out as relatively rare and are therefore less replaceable by exit options for the
investor. The enabling environment is concerned with the political economy around these economic
and political factor endowments. Finally, the outcome variable deal quality describes the resulting
formal policies and informal agreements. Deal quality should in theory be a reflection of
countries’ relative bargaining power. Yet, I argue that this is not always the case due to the enabling
environment, the political economy, in deal negotiations.
I define bargaining power as the relative structural attractiveness of a market to the investor. This
attractiveness is purely based on countries’ economic factor endowments as well as political structural
variables that are importantly not controllable by the state, relatively sticky over time and less
replaceable by exit options on the investor side. This value will be higher when countries can offer
larger stocks of productive labor, technology, infrastructure, natural resources, large consumer
markets as well as when they display politically favorable background conditions.
I assume that the stronger the bargaining power of the African government, the more likely
investors will want to sign a deal and are willing to carry costs, including of domestic revenue and
participation restrictions, if required by the government. As outlined in the introduction, that firms

For example, see Nebus and Rufin (2010), who ground actors' bargaining influence in a network on actors' basis of
power, network position, bargaining outcome preferences, and motivation to influence bargaining, while Eden, Lenway
and Schuler (2005) distinguish between potential (based on relative resources) and actual bargaining power (based on
economic, political and institutional constraints).
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will be more willing to carry these costs in exchange for higher prospective returns is also reasonable
given empirical examples from East Asia, and as described in the introduction, in particular from
China itself.
1.1.4

Enabling Environment

As Figure 2 shows, the enabling environment is about the political economy around these
economic factor endowments that may influence bargaining outcomes. In theory, countries could
simply adjust their investment-related policies (deal quality) depending on their factor endowments
(bargaining power). Yet, I argue that the relationship is mediated by the enabling environment that
influences deal quality outcomes, and that may or may not be conducive for countries to realize or act
upon their bargaining power with different types of investors.
The definition of “enabling environment” employed here includes both external and internal
variables: Externally, the historical relationship to different players in the international system may
matter. The Two-Tier Bargaining Model highlights these external factors by including the influence
of the international foreign investment regime. It also implies that these external variables necessarily
limit the power of any internal factors.
In contrast, this project purposefully also shines light on the domestic political economy around
foreign investment negotiations and how it interacts with international factors. Internally, for example,
how may economic ideology shape countries strategies around foreign investment? If
countries’ ideologies are more closely embedded in the international capitalist system, they may tend
to follow the advice of Bretton-Woods institutions more closely than those that have a more leftist
ideologies, which also influences the relationship with foreign investors. Or, how does accountability
and the relationship to voters or domestic interest groups affect government officials’ decisions to
demand stricter regulations around local participation? If government officials are corrupt or do not
believe that getting better deals for their population will influence their re-elections, they may not
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prioritize local participation in their deal demands with foreign companies, even if they had the
bargaining power to do so.
Or, what role does the degree of centralization within the state, the number of actors involved in
the negotiations, how they cooperate or compete with each other on each side, and well-coordinated
versus badly-coordinated teams that induce (or fail to induce) free flows of information about sources
of bargaining power play? This could influence what information hosts governments receive from the
international system on their bargaining power, or on the amount of foreign investment pouring in,
how they think about the concept of local participation in general, and how they overall assess their
bargaining power. Finally, how may institutional strength and policy flexibility limit or expand the
bargaining space with foreign investors? If countries have strong bargaining power with one type of
investor (e.g. Chinese ones) but not with all of them (e.g. U.S. investors), they may choose one strategy
for the dominant investor that is also influencing the predominant global economic system and, if
their institutions are strong and allow for little informal policy flexibility, they may have to apply the
weaker strategy to all types of investors, even if one type of investor was willing to agree to stronger
deals. All these variables may ultimately either enable or prevent governments from asking for stronger
deals around local revenue and participation with foreign investors.
1.1.5

Deal Quality
As mentioned earlier, structural endowments, bargaining techniques and policies meant to

attract investment are often conflated into an overall concept of “bargaining power”. Yet, it is
important to note that structural variables and policies are distinct in nature; while the former are
relatively fixed, governments can adjust the latter ones as a response to host countries’ structural
endowments. As a result, deal quality is the central outcome variable.
Throughout this project, I define the quality of investment deals by the degree to which they
address the transfer of economic rent from foreign investment to domestic factors of production and
23

consumption (following Globerman and Shapiro (1998) who only focus on production). In particular,
I consider all policies that address domestic revenue mobilization and developing local content such
as ownership, employment, taxes, license fees or property rights, among other variables.20
Investment deals with Western investors, let alone with private Chinese investors in Africa, are
extremely opaque. As a result, I first use national policies as an approximation to investment deal
quality to calculate an investment deal index in Chapter 2 that I then complement with evidence in
Chapter 5 and 6 from interviews with various government officials on how foreign policies and caseby-case deal conditions tend to overlap or diverge.
As Figure 1 has shown, some African countries impose relatively few constraints on foreign
investors across sectors (e.g. Nigeria or Kenya) while others are slightly more restrictive (e.g. South
Africa), and again others have been in the driving seats of the China-Africa investment relationship
(e.g. Ethiopia) or have increasingly become more aggressive (e.g. Tanzania). Understanding theories
on the political economy around investment negotiations is part of the next section.
1.2

The Weak Bargaining Power Narrative About Africa – A Lack of Exit Options

1.2.1

Overview

As the roundtable discussion in the introduction of the chapter meant to demonstrate, the dominant
academic discourse on foreign investment in Africa suggests that most African governments should
have very limited bargaining power to exert influence over the conditions of deals with foreign
investors. A brief historical overview shows that foreign investment in Africa is indeed a relatively
recent phenomenon, has been largely driven by former colonial powers and remains scarce. Under
colonialism, investments were primarily made to extract natural resources and labor from African
colonies as well as to build and maintain local institutions that facilitate this export. A first global wave
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of foreign direct investment into colonies emerged at the turn of the 20th century, slowed down during
the First World War and continued thereafter with a focus on colonial trade (Buelens and Marysse
2006). After political independence, several African leaders - beginning in Kenya, Zimbabwe,
Tanzania, Zambia, and Nigeria in the early 1960s - sought to become independent from the West
through rapid industrial development following the advice of several dependency theorists to invest
in local production of goods (e.g. Wallerstein 1974, Rodney 1972, Prebisch 1949 and Singer 1949).
But the suggested economic recipe of import substitution policies without a clear export strategy
failed, and many countries were therefore left in even poorer conditions and dependence on the West
(e.g. Bruton 1998). Most investment flows to Africa at the time originated from former colonial
powers, the Soviet Union and China, and were politically motivated in order to keep alliances (to the
U.S. or the Soviet Union; and after the Sino-Soviet split also to the Non-Aligned Movement) during
the Cold War.
As a response to the oil and debt crises, multiple economic depressions, and stagflation in the 1970s
in several developing economies across the world, the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund intervened to implement structural adjustment programs, which included stabilization (e.g.
balance of payment and budget deficit reductions) and long-term adjustment policies (e.g.
liberalization and privatization). Countries were required to implement these policies in order to obtain
new loans or to lower interest rates on existing ones. As part of the trend of economic liberalization
across national economies in the 1980s, development countries also gradually removed restrictions on
inward foreign FDI such as screening or performance requirements, ownership restrictions and
licensing agreements featuring technology transfer (UNCTAD 2000). Yet, these measures did still not
lead to a significant increase in Western investment to Africa.
At the turn of the millennial, Sachs (2004) famously called for a shift from private to public
investment and aid because the African region was still not competitive enough to attract significant

25

amounts of private capital or from various sources. This was because several African economies were
caught in a “poverty trap” (consisting of capital traps, saving traps and demographic traps) that has
led to an equilibrium of both weak institutions and weak economic growth. Several scholars later
criticized Sachs’ call for aid and argued that there has been weak evidence for a positive causal relation
between aid and development, and that negative effects of aid for governance and dependence overall
outweighed its benefits (e.g. Deaton 2013, Moyo 2009 and Easterly 2006). It remains the case,
however, that compared to other developing regions, Africa has received the least amount of foreign
investment inflows since the 1990s.
In the early 2010s, a new wave of economic thought, “experimental economics” (most famously
Banerjee and Duflo 2011), emerged as a response to the aid versus investment debate between Jeffrey
Sachs and William Easterly. Rather than tackle poverty with grand national one-size-fits-all policies,
randomized impact evaluation should help us to better identify economic and political obstacles at the
micro-level and create situation-specific policy solutions to slowly reduce poverty and kickstart
growth. But even then, the assumption has generally been that there are endemic issues that need to
be overcome first in order to become more attractive to foreign capital, and to set countries on a path
of longer-term development.
Overall, all theories highlight high entry barriers to foreign investors and lead to two outcomes
that disadvantage the African side: First, many countries in the African region still faces a lack of
significant foreign investment flows pouring in from various sources. As a result, there is often no or
little competition on the investor side, which overall raises the cost of being selective as governments.
Second, African economies compete in an environment with plenty countries that offer similar “added
values”; investors’ costs of replacing one country with another one that offers a better deal are
consequently low. Overall, these two factors describe what I call here the Weak Bargaining Power
Narrative – they force governments to act as deal takers and lead to a race to the bottom, with
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countries with the most open economies having the best chances of attracting foreign investors. In
other words, when the ability to offer unique goods, fiscal incentives, or political stability to attract
FDI to host countries is limited, but when investors are already hesitant to enter, the only way of
luring them is then the removal of demands and policy restrictions.
1.2.2 Empirical Inconsistencies
How does the Weak Bargaining Power Narrative hold up empirically for U.S. and Chinese
investment patterns on the African continent? Figure 3 shows that, as expected, more than 75% of
U.S. investment stocks in Africa in 201221 were concentrated in five countries, and distributed across
27 out of 54 (0.50%) countries overall. In addition, over the last two decades, U.S. investment flows
have been highly irregular and do not follow a clear upward pattern (Figure 1, Appendix). These data
largely confirm the Weak Bargaining Power Narrative – that most African countries will have to act
as price takers if they want to attract any U.S. investment.
But what about Chinese FDI? In stark contrast to U.S. investment stocks, a look at Chinese
investment patterns across the African continent shows that the predictions of the Weak Bargaining
Power Narrative oddly diverge here from empirical evidence. While Chinese investments in Africa are
still small in absolute terms, they have risen by far the most rapidly over the past two decades, have
been surprisingly steady since 2003 with an upward sloping trend line (Figure 1, Appendix) and are
significantly more widely and evenly spread across the continent. Except to e-Swatini, Burkina Faso
and Somalia, Chinese investors had an investment presence in all countries on the African continent
in 201222 (Figure 4, 51 countries in total). And the share of total Chinese investment in Africa outside
of the top-five recipients increased from42 percent in 2003 to 55 percent in 2017.23
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Figure 3: U.S. Investment Stocks in Africa, 201224

Figure 4: Chinese Investment Stocks in Africa, 201225
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This implies that Chinese FDI stocks are also becoming more diversified across Africa. In addition,
China has especially heavily invested in countries from which the West has so far shied away. Six
(Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zambia, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia and the Republic of Congo)
of the top-15 Chinese investment destinations rank at the bottom of U.S. investments in Africa. The
same patterns appear to hold for private Chinese investors, who are widely spread across countries
and sectors on the continent (Figure 3, Appendix). Why do Chinese investors enter so many African
markets that appear to be so unattractive to U.S. investors? The Weak Bargaining Power Narrative
hinges on a few assumptions about investors, type of growth models, and the benefits and costs that
are associated with entering and operating in developing markets but that may not hold anymore for
all investors on the African continent today. The first assumption that the Weak Bargaining Power
Narrative makes is that foreign investors are homogenous in their preferences, specifically in the types
of markets they are looking to enter, and that African countries have such low bargaining power that
if they imposed any restrictions on foreign investors, the costs to investors would always outweigh the
benefits. But with the emergence of South-South cooperation, an increasing number of investors
originates from environments that have very different economic and political realities to the West.
How does this affect their motivations, preferences and cost-benefit rationale when seeking to invest
abroad? Put differently, and as Figure 4 suggests, what if for a subset of investors, the benefits actually
outweigh the costs in more African countries than previously assumed?
Relatedly, the second assumption is that foreign investors are hesitant to enter African economies
because their stocks of human capital and technology are low and cannot be accumulated short-term
(as assumed by exogenous growth models). Yet, as outlined earlier, developing countries have an
advantage of “catch-up growth” (Gerschenkron 1962). As a result, and again as Figure 4 suggests, it
is not clear that we always deal with investors who choose a narrative of “We are going to invest in
country X although there is nothing there” or rather follow a strategy of “We are going to enter country
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X because there is nothing there (yet)” in the hope of large future returns. Perhaps the most famous
example that the Weak Bargaining Power Narrative has failed to explain is the rise of China itself,
where – as mentioned in the introduction – foreign investors poured in starting in the 1980s despite
low stocks of human capital and technology, and significant policy barriers to entry.
These considerations raise important challenges to scholars who argue that countries with so called
unfavorable background characteristics should always get rid of policy restrictions for foreign
investors. Below, I challenge this assumption and offer a new explanation – the “Power of Weak
Economies Theory.” The theory aims to explain the empirical observations around Chinese
investments in the African region observed in Figure 4 that do not match theoretical predictions of
the Weak Bargaining Power Narrative.
1.3

Towards A New Perspective – The Power of Weak Economies in Africa

1.3.1

Overview

When thinking about African development, it is worthwhile to look back at how China - in the
mid-1970s poorer than most African countries at the time - was able to overcome the poverty trap
that Sachs (2004) describes as the key impediment for African development today.
As mentioned in the introduction, operating in China’s political environment was extremely difficult,
especially in the beginning. China had just emerged out of a period of immense conflict, was
agricultural and even poorer than the African region. Its human capital and technology stocks were
low, and its institutions were weak. But as Ang (2016) puts it in her response to Sachs’ poverty trap
idea, institutional and economic development in China were in fact co-evolutionary: China harnessed
its weak institutions to achieve growth, which in turn developed stronger institutions that were then
used to maintain growth. This implies that in the beginning of China’s “reform and opening up”, weak
institutions forced foreign investors to rely on personal relationships and trust to mitigate
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expropriation risks. On top of that, since its economic opening in 1978, China has been implementing
a strict Foreign Investment Catalogue, which outlines industry sectors that are open to foreign
investment but subject to equity caps, joint ventures restrictions, and Chinese national leadership
requirements. Up to today, foreign investors complain about China’s strict policies, which has also
been one of the reasons of the ongoing trade war with the United States.
Why then were investors still willing to buy into this? Steven Chapman, Group Vice President at
Cummins, a multinational engine producer, summarized in a lecture26 at the School of Management
at Yale University in 2018 the reasons as to why the company entered the Chinese economy and built
a Joint-Venture soon after its opening in 1978: “The Joint-Venture requirements were initially forced.
But it was the only way for us to get market share, so it was the right financial incentive.” This implies
that the benefits from entering the Chinese market simply outweighed the costs imposed by the
Chinese government on the firm. And Cummins was not alone with its plan to expand to China - the
country has been boasting the largest amount of FDI inflows of all developing countries since 1996.
Why was China able to impose such restrictions without losing out on valuable foreign capital?
Simply put, China possessed bargaining power. Only because China’s economy was the poorest in the
world, its cheap labor, potential to industrialize and enormous future consumer market also rendered
China the most luring investment destination at the time. And China actively used this power to
“force” investors to contribute to building local human capital and technology, which induced growth
and structural transformation that has been unparalleled in the world.
This implies that in order to harness weak institutions and set countries on the development path
that Ang describes, governments need a minimum level of bargaining power with foreign investors.
In the late 20th century, China, compared to the rest of the world, possessed significant bargaining
power with the West because it was poor and the cheapest country to outsource production to from
26
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the West. But due to China’s steep learning curve, China has now itself been transitioning towards a
consumer economy that is looking for a steady resource of raw material and cheap labor.
As a result, the first central hypothesis is the following: I posit that African governments have
substantive bargaining power regarding local participation requirements with private Chinese players
in their countries. This is due to China’s current economic transformation that has saturated the
Chinese market, and because the African region has many pockets where industrialization has been
underexplored. These motivations influence the two central impediments of African regions to attract
investment – there is now less of an undersupply of investors as well as less need for intra-continental
competition for Chinese capital among African countries. I discuss premise, assumptions and logic of
the theory in the next sections.
1.3.2

Premise and Assumptions

The premise of the argument advanced here is that governments of developing countries need the
support of investors to induce economic growth; and in return, investors need labor and/or land for
their capital to become productive. Foreign investors and governments together can increase overall
output. To what extent each actor benefits from the relationship is dependent on government policies.
Respective levels of bargaining power between governments and foreign investors are consequently
relevant when assessing the impact of foreign investment on countries’ growth and development.
The first assumption is that economic growth is the result of endogenous forces. Exogenous
growth models assume that output is determined by exogenously given forces, for example the savings
rate (Harrod–Domar model), the stock of technology (Solow model) or both stock of technology and
human capital (Mankiw, Romer and Weil Model). The last model is often used to explain why
developing countries do not receive enough foreign investments - it is because their human capital
and technology stocks, exogenously given, are low. At the same time, starting with Romer’s (1986)
seminal work, development literature began to acknowledge that endogenous forces, including
32

investments in human capital and technology (e.g. Ortigueira and Santos 1997, Rebelo 1991 and Lucas
1988), do matter for growth. As a result, I also assume that investments in human capital, innovation,
and knowledge contribute to growth.
The second assumption is that policies matter for technology spillovers and human capital
development. Neoclassical models tend to assume that foreign investments add to local development
organically through market forces (e.g. Lim 2001, Blomström et al. 2000). However, the composition
of the workforce, management and ownership certainly matter for who captures the benefits and
development outcomes, and it is not always clear from empirical evidence how local human capital
and technology can in fact grow in developing countries without a coherent government strategy to
leverage this capital and the potential resources it entails (e.g. Chen et al. 2016; Osabutey 2013).
The host countries’ added value is land and labor, and the foreign investor contributes capital.
However, while desirable for increasing output, it is not immediately clear who would pay for
developing local technology and human capital. Host countries could invest in education and trainings
but they often have restricted financial means so that their policy space around education is limited.
Foreign investors on the other hand lack incentives to building local human capital if cheaper options
are available. The main motivations for foreigners investing in emerging markets are market access,
cheap unskilled labor and natural resources. At the same time, in environments with low stocks of
human capital and technology, it may often be less costly to import skilled labor than to train them
locally.
Perhaps a classic example are light manufacturing businesses in East Asia that moved from country
to country starting in the late 1980s up to today, depending on wherever labor was the cheapest. While
workers benefitted in the short-term from employment, even the factory buildings were often flexible
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enough to be folded up and taken to the next country.27 China was therefore extremely aggressive in
requiring Joint-Venture agreements, local employments and training to ensure that foreign companies
helped to build local capacity before moving elsewhere.
The third assumption is that governments have credible commitment issues with foreign investors,
and that foreign investors want to minimize re-negotiation risks, which can both be solved by creating
mutual dependencies, e.g. through local participation. As governments, how can you provide enough
commitment to foreign investors so that they would enter, but not too much that they have a free
hand to do as they please? And as investors, how do you negotiate deals to minimize the re-negotiation
risk, i.e. that the government does not later decide to open up negotiations again once capital has
already been moved to the country? By creating mutual dependencies, e.g. through ownership or
employment requirements, both issues can be mediated. For example, establishing a Joint-Venture
between a local and a foreign firm with 50:50 ownership creates more mutual dependencies than a
40:60 division, where the partner with 60% ownership maintains the upper hand. Another example is
that of a foreign company that focuses on engine production and of local truckers that are responsible
for distribution, where both sides need and depend on each other.
The fourth and final assumption is that companies’ willingness to enter such mutual dependencies,
e.g. through local participation, depends on whether overall benefits outweigh overall costs on both
sides. Governments should have at least minimum incentives to push for local participation. At the
same time, developing countries operate in a competitive environment with other countries offering
e.g. similar raw material or comparably cheap labor. As a result, governments have to weigh their
options when designing policies that are meant to maximize foreign company buy-in. In particular, a
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central question becomes: Under what conditions do foreign investors agree to contribute to human
capital and technology transfers if they want to enter and stay in a specific market?
1.3.3

Bargaining Power – A Question of Relative Benefits and Costs

Based on Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s (forthcoming) transformative work on the illusion of
power in negotiation, I assume that governments and foreign investors are in a perfectly symmetric
bargaining position over the output that they can create together minus the sum of the outputs that
each actor can create individually. A toy example illustrates this: If A can by herself create output of
the size 1, and B can by herself create output of the size 2 [both values reflecting each player’s Best
Alternatives to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA)], and if A and B can together create output of size
9, they have equal bargaining power over the pie of size 6 [pie = total value with deal – (A’s BATNA
+ B’s BATNA); 6 = 9-2-1]. This is because, as the authors state, A needs B just as much as B needs
A to create the extra 6 - if one person quits, the whole pie is lost.
The Weak Bargaining Power Narrative suggests that developing countries are poor and need to
request external assistance. This seems to imply that capital is more valuable than land or labor.
However, it is not clear from empirical evidence why that would be the case: Only when countries are
agricultural and have a relatively low GDP/capita, labor is cheap and the pie from industrializationled growth is large. I therefore argue that capital and labor have the same value in the relationship.
A second concern about Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s example is that, as traditional bargaining
theory suggests, actors may have different BATNAs that should then in theory influence their
bargaining leverage. If one negotiator lacks alternatives to the current negotiation, then she will be
likely to want to stay with the negotiation. As a result, her bargaining power should be smaller than
the one of her opponent if he has more attractive alternatives to choose from (Fisher and Ury 1981).
Applied to the toy example above, if player B can choose to create a pie with player A or to create
the same pie with player C, but player A only has player B who offers to create a pie together, then
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player B should have more bargaining leverage because of her exit options. Yet, by Nalebuff and
Brandenburger’s definition of the pie [pie = total value with deal – (A’s BATNA + B’s BATNA)], it
becomes clear that while individual BATNAs influence the size of the pie itself, both actors still
maintain equal power over that pie (where the size of the pie itself increases or decreases with different
BATNAs but it should still be divided equally once its size is determined). How big the total value
with a deal is and whether both actors deem that value large enough to in fact work together is then
an inherently empirical question of exit options for both players.
As discussed in the previous section, African governments often face a lack of such exit options
due to scarcity of different investors to choose from. This implies that if an investor expresses their
interest, governments can often either create a pie with that one investor, or create no pie at all (equal
to size 0). Based on this logic, the Weak Bargaining Power Narrative suggests that African
governments therefore must act as deal takers and grant most of the benefits to the investors as that
is still better or equal than having no deal at all.
At the same time, even when a host government’s reservation value is 0, this does not imply that
they should accept their reservation value. Even if governments cannot create any pie without the
investor, what is created under cooperation minus what the investor can create by herself could still
be divided equally. Under the assumption that the host governments’ reservation value is in fact 0,
what fundamentally matters for the creation and the division of the pie is then only the total value
with the deal and the BATNA of the foreign investor [pie = total value with deal – (0 + B’s BATNA)].
If the investor’s BATNA is smaller than their share of the pie they can create with a particular
government, she has an incentive to stay and start to negotiate. If the BATNA is equal to their share
of the pie, she is indifferent. Finally, if the BATNA is larger than their share of the pie, the investor
will choose to look for other markets. For example, Nigeria offers a market of around 200 million
people, which can hardly be matched by any other country on the continent (e.g. the next most
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populous African countries, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt of Ethiopia, all offer
markets half the size). When a Chinese actor expresses high interest in the Nigerian market, Nigeria’s
bargaining power - due to a lack of comparable exit options to the Chinese investor - should therefore
be high, even if Nigeria does not find another actor who is as interested as the Chinese player.
In addition, Figure 4 shows that even African countries with small structural endowments have
received a minimum amount of Chinese capital. These data suggest that Chinese investors may have
placed more value on creating a new investment pie (however small) with an additional African
country rather than investing the same amount in a country with existing investment stocks. The
benefits of entering a new market may therefore outweigh the costs. I offer a more detailed discussion
below on why the BATNA of private Chinese companies in particular, for which large-scale crosscountry data is unfortunately unavailable,28 appears to be often smaller than the share of the pie that
they can create with different African countries.
1.3.4

Determining the BATNA of Private Chinese Investors

Benefits:
I argue that the motivations of private Chinese actors to venture off to the African region are
distinct in nature to Western ones. At the core, Western and Chinese investors face different domestic
economic and political realities in their home countries that influence the type of engagement they
seek in Africa. Concretely, three “China-idiosyncratic” push factors have provided clear financial
incentives for private Chinese companies to move to Africa:
First, while most countries only indirectly support outward foreign investment, the Chinese
government has been actively encouraging Chinese companies to invest overseas through its “Going
Out” strategy, launched in 1999. This has several reasons: China’s economy, while slowing down, is
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still growing at a rate of 6.6%29 per year and the country is in need of raw material to fuel the growth.
In addition, the Chinese government would also like companies to gain international experience so
they can better compete in China’s domestic market with foreign players. Finally, the strategy
complements China's efforts to rebalance its economic growth and make the shift toward higher valueadded economic activity. As a result, the Chinese government is extending low-interest loans to
Chinese entrepreneurs who venture abroad to open businesses.
Second, labor costs in China’s coastal factory belt started to rise in 2005, which has incentivized
industries to migrate like geese to places with cheaper production as part of global networks and value
chains (Akamatsu 1962, 1937, 1935). Studies show that over the past decade, Chinese investments
have indeed significantly increased in Africa’s manufacturing sector (e.g. Sun 2017, Bräutigam 2009).
As the Chinese founder of Goodwill Ceramics stated, “Chinese labor is so expensive now, so you
have to walk out the door [zouchuqu].” (Chen et al. 2018) In addition, some countries in the African
region have other cost advantages: For example, some regions (e.g. Kogi State, Nigeria) have seen a
massive influx of Chinese companies in environmentally sensitive sectors such as ceramics due to
China’s increasing environmental regulations.
Finally, the African region is not only seen as a place for production but increasingly also as a
lucrative market. As China’s economy has recently been slowing down, overcapacity concerns have
generally incentivized companies to create markets in less competitive environments abroad. Large
private Chinese players such as Huawei, Opay or Transsion but also single entrepreneurs have
therefore flooded African markets in search for market-creating opportunities (Bräutigam et al. 2018).
Overall, there are clear economic incentives for private Chinese companies to migrate to the
African region. But what costs are they facing once they are on the ground?
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Costs:
As Bräutigam (2009) shares from one of her interviews:
“Umar Sani Marshal, a Nigerian industrialist, said that his northern city of Kano was being
rejuvenated by growing Chinese investment in plastics manufacturing: ‘Most of the plastic goods that
are going to the market were imported before, but now when you look at it, the Chinese are
discovering that they can have raw material at a cheap rate, they can have a good environment, they
can have cheap labor’ he said. ‘The highest number of private employers in Kano are the Chinese and
they have been expanding day by day.’” (pg. 189)
What is particular interesting about this story is that the city of Kano is located in the North of
Nigeria and has struggled to attract Western investment as it is one of the most dangerous places in
the country due to the presence of Boko Haram. Yet, there is plenty of Chinese activity in the region.
My interview evidence with private Chinese companies in the South of Nigeria on their attitudes
towards kidnappings is similarly telling: I visited a village in Oyo State, where I was told by a Chinese
manager of a foam factory: “Last week, a Chinese man in a different village was kidnapped” and that
“many Chinese now have police men that go with them.”30 But when I asked whether they would
consider leaving the region because of the safety issues, the manager said: “No…. I have heard of the
ones kidnapped, they often pack their bags and go on the next plane back to China [laughs]… but
most Chinese stay.”31 Asked why they would stay, she said: “This just happens, it’s part of life, we just
go back to work.”32 While political risks (e.g. expropriation or violent conflict) often discourage
Western foreign investment, these and other stories suggest that private Chinese investors seem to
have higher market exit thresholds in “high-risk” environments.
In addition, corrupt practices appear to be a more acceptable way to facilitate business
transactions, and not an absolute barrier: While U.S. and European investors must stick to strict acts
that prevent them from engaging in corrupt practices abroad, the Chinese government has little stake
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in prohibiting corrupt behavior of Chinese companies overseas. As one Chinese manager shared with
me in Oyo State: “Yes, we pay officers, they come sometimes to get some money, but we also pay in
China, it isn’t different. It’s common practice for business.”33 But even if Chinese companies have
higher exit thresholds around political risks and corruption, why would private Chinese companies be
operating in almost all African markets, and not still choose the most economically profitable and
politically stable ones?
First, for political reasons, the Chinese government is interested in creating an investment pie
with as many (African) countries as possible. China's value of having an investment presence in more
countries is therefore higher than having an investment presence in only a few countries that offer
them the best terms. Chinese SOEs consequently and importantly do not select countries based on
economic profitability or ease of doing business. Since many private entrepreneurs originally move to
Africa through these SOEs, they arrive in African countries based on the countries’ political and
economic importance to China, and only later venture off to open their own companies that are purely
profit-driven in the same country. Their decision to enter a particular country is therefore first
indirectly politically driven and only later based on economic variables.
Second, and closely related to the first motivation, once Chinese companies have set up their
operations, they are relatively immobile and geared towards a longer-term commitment to the
particular African country. McKinsey (2017) suggests that among surveyed Chinese firms, 44% have
made capital-intense investments in Africa that include factories or purchasing manufacturing
equipment. In addition, 19% invested in capital-light sectors such as shop fittings, and technology in
retail and service businesses, reflecting an interest in the local market. Asked whether they feel
optimistic about the future in Africa, 74% said “yes”, and “many of the firms said they had plans for
expansion, particularly in new products and industries” (McKinsey 2017, pg. 35). Certainly, capital is
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more mobile than labor. Yet, with labor costs rising globally, there are fewer “exit options” to move
industries elsewhere. Chinese manufacturing has consequently been penetrating several African
markets that have been under-industrialized.
My interviews with Chinese companies in Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa, Ethiopia and Tanzania
largely confirm McKinsey’s findings: Asked about how long they envisioned to stay in their particular
African countries, most Chinese managers indicated that they are working with longer time horizons
of at least 10-15 years, even if they were not profitable yet today. Their capital investments often
included building a factory or renting out an office, buying raw material, hiring local insurance
companies, paying bribes and getting police protection. As one interviewee in Ogun State, Nigeria,
who produces bottles shared with me: “We just started, so we are making losses but it is all a longer
investment… Nigeria is the China in the 1970s. I want to be here when money grows, I think this is
the best place to be in the world right now.”34 This sentiment was echoed35 by many other Chinese
managers I interviewed across the five countries.
Third, and relatedly, operating in countries that are less politically stable also allows Chinese
companies to be first comers as relative late-comers on the continent, and to therefore operate in
markets with little competition. Compared to Western companies, Chinese companies are importantly
not only concentrated in urban areas but have penetrated rural Africa as well to set up, for example,
electricity businesses or small manufacturing parks, which suggests a high tolerance for modest living
standards and risk in exchange for profits. This also explains why there is a Chinese investment
presence even in Kano in the North of Nigeria.
Finally, some Chinese firms, particularly small private firms, may also not have the funds or
resources available to obtain sufficient information. Since they may not be as familiar with the business
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environment in some African countries, investment decisions may, therefore, be made with
insufficient attention to the actual associated risks (He and Zhu 2018). To shield themselves against
risks once they are on the ground, most respondents told me that they would hire security guards to
protect their facilities, get police escorts to travel around, and consult local insurance companies. Some
managers said that they would also stay in company clusters while others reported the opposite, that
they try to stay isolated from other Chinese companies, integrate themselves, and keep a low profile.
These responses indicate that companies have come up with clear strategies to cope with risks, rather
than to avoid risks by exiting altogether. My interviewees told me about only five companies in total
that they knew had left African countries after 5-10 years and went back to China because they were
facing major difficulties (e.g. high operating costs, government seizure of assets) in establishing their
businesses.
Chapter 2 provides further empirical evidence to substantiate the claims made above. Overall, the
motivations described suggest that the Chinese governments’ diplomatic relationships open doors to
the African region through SOEs for private Chinese companies, which later choose to simply stay in
the country rather than to find another African country that provides a more investor-friendly
environment. Based on these considerations, I argue that the benefits of private Chinese companies
in Africa are often larger than the benefits of Western companies; and that their costs are often smaller
than those of Western companies. As a result, there are more African countries in which the benefits
outweigh the costs to Chinese investors than Western ones.
This has a direct influence on the salience of intra-continental competition for Chinese capital as
well as the importance of exit options for African governments to Chinese capital. In particular, if all
countries are allocated an investment pie that has a certain size depending on economic and political
importance of the country, local participation becomes only one out of many considerations. As long
as what the Chinese government can create by itself politically and economically on a global scale is

42

smaller than what it can create by adding another diplomatic partner country, private Chinese investors
will enter that country. So, once African countries are allocated that pie, I argue that they possess
bargaining leverage to ask for more local participation from private Chinese players.
1.4

Explaining Variation in Government Strategies Around Investment Deals
As Figure 1 shows, how African governments strategize around foreign investment varies quite

substantially. What explains this variation? Below, I discuss several theories on the enabling
environment - the political economy - that may elucidate why some countries with weak bargaining
power would still negotiate strong deals. I then focus on variables suggested by literature that may
explain why some countries with strong bargaining power would still negotiate weak deals. I finally
offer a new explanation to the second question - why some countries with strong bargaining power
would still negotiate weak deals - that serves as the second central hypothesis of this project.
1.4.1

Explaining Strong Deals from a Weak Bargaining Power Perspective

The currently accepted academic wisdom on the African region suggests that political leaders have
limited bargaining power to impose restrictions on foreign investors. Under that assumption, why
would some countries, especially poorer ones like Ethiopia or smaller ones like Tanzania, still choose
to impose stricter regulations at the cost of becoming even more unattractive to foreign investors?
Some governments might simply not view FDI as an important source of growth, prioritize nationalist
policies, overestimate their bargaining power, or need to be accountable to domestic interest groups.
As bargaining literature suggests, the global spread of capitalism starting in the late 1980s has led to
heightened awareness among governments that foreign investment is essential for achieving positive
development outcomes. Yet, as Rodrik (2006) writes, “the policies spawned by the Washington
Consensus have not produced the desired results” (pg. 973) across developing countries. As a result,
some governments might still be suspicious of the benefits of FDI. Relatedly, countries may prioritize
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nationalist policies over externally imposed advice or overestimate their own bargaining power. For
example, against the advice of the Western organizations and businesses, Robert Mugabe passed an
Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment law in 2007, coming into effect in 2008, which
transferred 51% control of all firms to black Zimbabweans. Only in 2019, Finance Minister Mthuli
Ncube announced that the law would be lifted under mounting pressure from the crashing economy
to attract more foreign investment.
In addition, political accountability may matter. Governments may face a trade-off between
attracting foreign investment and ensuring that locals benefit from the new capital because they want
to be re-elected. Some African governments have certainly used IMF conditions “to push through
their preferred policies, which otherwise would not be approved”, thereby essentially using the IMF
as a “scapegoat” (Vreeland 2006, pg. 1). At the same time, for example South Africa with significant
structural inequality inherited from Apartheid may still face domestic political pressure to keep their
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) policies privileging black individuals in the
labor market although it may hurt the country’s attractiveness to investors. This suggests that rather
than following the advice of the World Bank to liberalize and privatize in order to become more
competitive, some countries may still choose for political reasons to engage in non-cooperative
bargaining relationships with foreign investors over entry (following the models proposed by Grosse
1996, Grosse and Behrman 1992, Kobrin 1987 and Vernon 1977, 1971).
1.4.2

Explaining Weak Deals from a Strong Bargaining Power Perspective

Under the assumption that some African governments do have bargaining power with China, why
would they still choose to negotiate weaker deals? Several reasons stand out in literature. First,
capitalism might simply be “locked in” as the African region’s economic ideology (e.g. Jalata 2016,
Sender and Smith 1986), which has reduced the general policy space of African governments. This
suggests that countries and foreign companies engage in two-tier bargaining, where international
44

organizations or foreign governments dominate tier-1 through bilateral investment treaties or
international agreements on foreign investment that prescribe FDI-friendly policies (Ramamurti
2001).
A second explanation is that some governments may be corrupt or do not feel pressure to be
accountable in order to stay in power, and will therefore accept weak investment deals for an exchange
of personal money (e.g. Abotsi 2015, Hanson 2009). Indeed, it is not immediately clear why the
political or economic elite would be interested in local technology and human capital development.
The issue should be less pronounced in democracies because democratically elected leaders face reelections. Yet, when democratic elites are able to seek rent from the nationalized oil and gas industry,
they are still less dependent on taxes, can pay off voters and may have to be little accountable. This
theory suggests that elites and interest groups may be able to capture benefits from investment deals
with Chinese players while having few incentives to ask for more benefits for their population.
A third and final explanation is that countries with strong bargaining power like South Africa may
be receiving so much foreign investment that the relative amount of Chinese investment in the country
is small compared to Western inflows. In that case, the stakes of reaping additional benefits from
Chinese investors may be sufficiently low not to put in additional effort to be strategic. In such cases,
countries might simply not bother to invest in learning strategies to maximize their interests (Green
and Shapiro 1994).
1.4.3

A New Explanation for Weak Deals Under Strong Bargaining Power: The

Importance of Perceptions on Bargaining Power
The existing explanations outlined above make an important assumption, namely that when
African governments negotiate with foreign investors, governments usually have perfect knowledge
over their bargaining power. Yet, it is in fact not clear how perceptions on bargaining power are
formed, and how African governments assess their power in investment negotiations with China and
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the West. The second central hypothesis advanced here therefore offers a new explanation to the
observed variation in government strategies regarding foreign investment in Africa. I argue that
depending on the enabling environment - the political economy around deal negotiations – some
African governments may significantly underestimate their actual bargaining power with private
Chinese investors. When governments are unaware of their countries’ actual added values, they are
also less likely to ask for the same share of the pie that they would request under perfect information
about this added value.
What determines how countries perceive their bargaining power? Based on my research, I argue
that there are two questions that are central to answering this question: If the negotiation process can
be understood as a game, first, what information and historical frames do political actors start the
game with? And second, what information do political actors share within the game?
The first question (“What information and historical frames do political actors start the game
with?”) can be divided into two sub-themes: What is the extent to which countries have been exposed
to local participation policies before? Countries that have traditionally used local participation policies
have information on how private Chinese investors respond to these policies, while other countries
lack that direct information. Second, to what extent has the Weak Bargaining Power Narrative
penetrated their countries? The more governments have engaged with this narrative, the more
internalized misperceived views on bargaining power will be. The second question (“What information
do political actors share within the game?”) asks about the extent to which information is being shared
“up” to the central government that helps them to accurately count all inflows so they are able to
make better judgements on their actual bargaining power with private China.
Both questions concern the enabling environments - the political economy - that significantly
influence what historical belief systems and policies governments have been exposed to in the past,
and how they share information within the game and consequently process this information at the
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central government level to form opinions and make decisions on how to strategize with foreign
investors. Overall, I show that perhaps counterintuitively, one-party dominant systems or
authoritarian regimes with long-term ruling horizons (e.g. Ethiopia or Tanzania) have higher
perceptions of bargaining power with private Chinese investors than competitive democracies (Nigeria
and Kenya). South Africa is classified as a hybrid case with a centralized government but closer ties to
the West, resulting in accurate perceptions of bargaining power on government-company interactions
but underestimated bargaining power around private Chinese companies that do not interact with the
government.
The logic for each of the three mechanisms is the following: First, several authoritarian regimes
and one-party dominant systems in the African region have emerged from a tradition of
socialist/communist movements after independence with a focus on pan-Africanism and a narrative
on anti-colonialism and liberation. The original aim across African independence movements was to
cut ties to the West and become economically independent through import-substitution
industrialization. These efforts famously failed across Africa due to an inward-focused approach rather
than an export-driven strategy. Some countries later orientated themselves towards the West and
adopted structural adjustment programs that included liberalization of their economies to create an
investor-friendly environment. In contrast, others were more selective in their adoption of
Washington Consensus elements and applied more hybrid models that took into account local
participation.
The assumption is that countries in the latter category simply placed more strategic interest on
an inward-focused strategy and cared less about attracting foreign investment relative to local
production and distribution. Yet, beginning in the 1990s, traditionally socialist regimes did in fact also
concern themselves more with attracting foreign investment and have maintained that concern until
today. How have authoritarian regimes or one-party dominant systems helped governments to learn
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that they can take a different approach with Chinese investors compared to Western ones? One party
dominant system or authoritarian states have had longer ruling horizons that have helped them to
experiment with different types of investors. They were therefore able to test the boundaries of what
attributes to include in negotiations, and what deals were in fact impossible to strike. In contrast,
countries with democratic backgrounds that were supported by the West and took the advice to open
up their economies in the 1990s and then had different parties in power missed the same long-term
learning opportunity. They therefore experimented less with policies that they perceived to be out of
the feasible policy range.
Second, a stronger historical economic and political relationship to the West has naturally led
some African countries to internalize the signaling that they cannot increase local participation
requirements. I argue that governments studied here generally know that in weak institutional settings,
there is both room for case-by-case negotiations with deal conditions that can differ between investor
types. Yet the Western narrative has permeated ideological, educational and intellectual spheres in
Nigeria and Kenya as well as to some extent in South Africa. These developments have perpetuated a
Western-centric focus despite China’s growing presence in their countries. This includes where
political actors received their education, and books they have read; development models they have
encountered and are aspiring to follow; and to what extent they ascribe to Western “policy fitness”
indices, including the “Ease of Doing Business Index” by the World Bank. Since some governments
have so much internalized the Weak Bargaining Power Narrative, they also believe that private Chinese
players would not enter, or exit their markets under stricter policy regulations. As a result, these
governments have come up with relatively few strategies on how to position stricter demands in formal
FDI policies and in informal case-by-case deal negotiations with all types of foreign investors.
Third, countries with a centralized systems, with centralization defined by strong parties
and/or de facto strong centralized institutions - are able to accurately collect information on Chinese
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investment inflows while a de-centralized system – defined by weak parties or weak de facto
centralized institutions - hinders free information flows. Competition among regions may only be
beneficial when the central government is still able to track how much investment is flowing into the
economy, and what national policy restrictions are feasible to implement given the overall amount of
FDI flows. In other cases, if there are a lot of actors competing for investment, and they generally
have incentives not to cooperate and share information, this can lead to a race-to-the-bottom in deal
quality when in fact, the country would have the bargaining power to impose stricter regulations. The
same logic holds true for federal government ministries and agencies. If there are incentives in place
for central government offices to employ a collaborative approach in attracting investment, they are
also more likely to share how much investment comes in through their collaborative effort. In contrast,
if government bodies have incentives to employ a Machiavellian approach, then they are less likely to
share investment-related activities with other government bodies, who are competing in the same
environment.
Overall, this theory provides novel insights into literatures on political regimes, centralization
and party politics. What may be perhaps surprising is that we should not necessarily only ask the
question whether China is actively trying to support and strengthen authoritarian regimes (e.g. Broich
2017, Dreher and Fuchs 2011). Instead, the influence may be more indirect, where African
authoritarian or one-party dominant states are, on average, more aggressive in negotiating investment
deals around local participation than multi-party democracies, which may or may not be re-enforcing
their performance legitimacy and political rule.
In addition, calls for de-centralization and power-sharing have become louder in the
international discourse since the 1990s across the African continent as they are supposed to present a
pathway out of poverty and conflict in Africa (e.g. Fombad and Steytler 2019, Crawford and Hartmann
2008). Yet, systems without a strong central government appear to be struggling with competition
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across ministries and sub-regional units. Political actors will then be less likely to share vital
information on Chinese investment inflows that in turn influence perceived bargaining power of the
central government. Strong parties or strong centralized institutions therefore may be necessary preconditions for negotiating as a unified central government that has complete information about the
amount of Chinese investments flowing into the economy.
Finally, and relatedly, literature on party politics suggests that inter-party competition should
lead to better policy outcomes. A single dominant party could be acting like a monopoly in a market,
which was found to overall lead to less efficient growth policy outcomes for example in some U.S.
states (e.g. Besley et al. 2010). At the same time, party strength also matters for economic outcomes:
Party organization affects incentives and capabilities of politicians, which then influences what policies
are selected, and finally leads to different domestic groups to respond to these policies and influences
economic performance (Bizzaro et al. 2018). In addition, and as Simmons (2016) argues, “wellinstitutionalized” ruling parties matter for technological progress because these parties have sufficient
long-term horizons to accept the deferred returns around promoting innovation and technology
adoption. Taking inter-party competition and party strength together, in countries like South Korea,
where both the left and the right party blocks are strong enough to run the political system, manage
the bureaucracy and speak with one voice, economic growth will follow.
Further, Rosenbluth and Shapiro (2018) show that competition between two strong parties
should allow for politics that aim “for the political middle” (pg. 12). Applied to the African region,
competition between two strong parties would then also lead to stronger deals around local
participation since the majority of voters (perhaps unlike the minority elite) would vote for more local
benefits from investment deals. Yet, I show that in countries such as Nigeria or Kenya, parties are
weak, fractioned and clientelist. This form of party competition has led to rivalrous relationships and
re-staffing of government offices. Both factors have limited political actors’ learning about bargaining
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power through their relationship with the West and China, as well as dis-incentivized these actors to
share information regarding Chinese investment inflows with each other. In this type of environment,
one strong party with a history of local participation policy experimentation and relatively closer ties
to the East may therefore be more effective at negotiating aggressive investment deals than two or
more weak ones.
1.5

Testing the Theories
I aim to show first, that the top-receivers of Chinese FDI in the African region possess substantial

bargaining power with private Chinese companies, and second, that some governments currently
underestimate this bargaining power because they base their estimate on inaccurate or incomplete
information. The first task is therefore to highlight sources of African bargaining power and to track
patterns of Chinese investments that underline this power. The second task is then to dissect the
political economy of deal negotiations and test different causal drivers of weak and strong deals. Below
I present predictions for both the Weak Bargaining Power Narrative and The Power of Weak
Economies Theory for foreign investment flow patterns in Africa. For each theory, I then show
predictions for different causal mechanisms that potentially determine deal outcomes.
1.5.1

Comparing Predictions of the Theories
The Weak Bargaining Power and the Power of Weak Economies Theories offer two different

perspectives on how to think about the prospects of African development. If the Weak Bargaining
Power Narrative holds true, the African region has remained unattractive to all foreign investors.
Chinese investment flow patterns would be sporadic, targeted to the biggest markets, like Western
FDI, and concentrated in a few sectors.
In contrast, my theory posits that private Chinese investors gain large benefits from operating
in many African economies and are therefore willing to carry policy costs. Chinese investment flow
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patterns would consequently diverge from Western ones. In particular, we would observe a
penetration of distinct sectors and more African markets by Chinese investment that is importantly
uncorrelated with the strictness of countries’ foreign investment policies. This chapter has provided a
first glance at diverging U.S. and Chinese investment patterns in the African region. By employing a
variety of statistical techniques as well as drawing from literature and interview evidence, Chapter 2
investigates the validity of both claims in more detail.
Each theory also produces different explanations for the variation observed in the quality of
investment deals across Africa. The Weak Bargaining Power Narrative suggests that in order to attract
foreign investment, the majority of African countries should be negotiating weak deals with foreign
investors. Countries that have weak bargaining power but still negotiate strong deals would then do
so because they are more democratic; the government does not believe in the importance of FDI for
development; they overestimate their bargaining power; or the government has to be accountable to
domestic interest groups that want stricter policies. In countries with stronger deals, we should see
less foreign investment stocks, compared to open economies.
In contrast, the Power of Weak Economies Theory predicts that the average quality of deals
will be more diverse across the continent. Countries with weak bargaining power will negotiate weak
deals. Countries with strong bargaining power will negotiate either weak or strong deals. Assuming
that governments have perfect knowledge of their bargaining power, countries with strong bargaining
power will still negotiate weak deals if the government is corrupt or follows a capitalist ideology. In
contrast, when governments do not have perfect knowledge of their bargaining power, countries with
strong bargaining power will still negotiate weak deals if the government is not aware of that power.
We should observe countries that have closer historical ties to the West, are competitive democracies,
and have a decentralized political system to be less aware of their bargaining power and consequently
negotiate weaker deals.
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1.5.2

Empirical Challenges to Studying African Bargaining Power
Reports and newspaper articles on Chinese investments in Africa often use one term to

describe the landscape of Chinese investments in Africa: “opaque.” Since China is not an OECD
member, the government is not mandated to report official aid, trade and investment figures. As a
result, many investment deals are signed behind closed doors with little information to grasp for the
public. To make matters worse, the growing number of private Chinese players is not nearly fully
captured by the existing databases. How can one then meaningfully study private Chinese investments
and deal quality if they are reported in such an elusive manner? In particular, how can one disentangle
correlations, root causes and causal mechanisms between several independent variables and the
dependent variable, deal quality, with such limited data?
In order to solve this issue, I employed a combination of techniques. I first used regression
analysis of Chinese investment data from the Johns-Hopkins University China Africa Research
Initiative and complemented it with literature and interview evidence to better understand private
Chinese investment behavior on the African continent. I also used three different measures of “deal
quality” (one self-designed) to make larger claims about the correlations between bargaining power
and deal quality. I then designed and implemented two complementary conjoint experiments that
presented hypothetical investment deals to the government and private Chinese companies in Nigeria.
The deals were meant to mimic real investment deal scenarios and included a list of policy attributes
that addressed domestic revenue mobilization and local content development. The experiments help
us to understand for the first time the rationale behind deal signing behavior expressed by both the
government and the investor sides. Finally, I conducted 218 semi-structural interviews with
government officials and Chinese company managers over 15 months of fieldwork across five case
studies – Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, Tanzania and Ethiopia– to be able to distinguish between
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correlations, root causes, and causal mechanisms that explain the relationship between bargaining
power and deal quality in investment negotiations.
The second potential challenge was my own positionality as the principal investigator, a white
Austrian woman, aiming to study Chinese investments in Africa. Most (84%) actors I interviewed
were male, and all of them were either black or Chinese. It proved surprisingly easy to gain access to
government offices and Chinese companies, who were willing to talk to me about their experiences,
perceptions and opinions. Yet, they may still have not fully trusted me enough to share their honest
opinions.
To address this concern, for the two experiments, I hired two survey teams, one Nigerian and
one Chinese, and asked them to conduct a survey that included questions that I had also asked in my
interviews. The responses from the experiments largely overlapped with my interview responses but
with an important exception: The majority of experiment participants indicated with the Nigerian
survey team that Nigeria did have bargaining power with Chinese companies although with me, the
majority of my government respondents indicated that they believed they had no bargaining power.
The actual experiment shows that the government did underestimate how much they could ask for
from Chinese companies. Government respondents therefore seemed to be more open with me than
with the Nigerian interviewers. This could be because admitting this to their co-ethnic peers or citizens
that they believe Nigeria has weak bargaining power might be politically more difficult. This was also
confirmed by a general of a federal government agency who I interviewed, and who said that “officially
to the press”, they would say that Nigeria has bargaining power but to me they can “openly say” that
they “don’t have any power” and that “everyone in the government is aware of that.”36 Being perceived
as a “non-threatening outsider” may have therefore in fact even helped me to obtain more honest
responses from interviewees across the five selected cases.
36
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1.5.3

Preview of The Rest of The Dissertation
The second chapter aims to identify reasons for diverging patterns of Western and Chinese

investments in Africa. The chapter develops a “deal quality index” and shows that Chinese
investments are wide-spread across the continent, and uncorrelated with deal quality. The analysis
suggests that there is indeed space for counties to negotiate more aggressively with Chinese investors,
and with private investors in particular. Explaining why bargaining power and deal quality do not
always correlate then guides the analysis for the rest of the project.
The third chapter uses the case of Nigeria to examine whether African countries in fact have
bargaining leverage with Chinese investors, and highlights the importance of perceptions on
bargaining power in deal negotiations with Chinese investors against competing hypotheses that
attempt to explain weak deal conditions. It draws on two complementary conjoint experiments that I
designed and supervised in the Spring and Summer of 2020. We presented hypothetical investment
deals with randomized deal attributes to 134 technical advisors to the Nigerian federal and Lagos state
governments as well as 142 managers of Chinese companies in Lagos and Ogun state. Through these
complementary experiments, I am able to measure for the first time Chinese companies’ and
governments’ perceptions of their own and each other’s bargaining power, and their willingness to
sign deals with loser or stricter local participation regulations. In addition, I examine different
background characteristics of government respondents in order to make inferences about the
mechanisms by which the Nigerian government agree to sign investment deals. The findings suggest
that indeed, Chinese investors would be willing to sign stronger deals around local participation than
Nigerian technical advisors believe. I therefore provide evidence that the gap between what the
Nigerian government is asking for and what deals Chinese investors would in fact be willing to sign is
based on the government’s perceptions of bargaining power.
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The fourth chapter outlines the rationale of the case selection and perceptions of bargaining
power in five countries, Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, Tanzania and Ethiopia. Together, they account
for 35 percent of total Chinese investment stocks.37 Understanding how and why African leaders from
top-receiving nations decide to negotiate with Chinese investors is therefore especially important to
capture and describe for the first time governments’ logic around a substantial amount of investment
deal negotiations on the African continent.
Chapter 3 and 4 establish that a gap exists between perceptions and actual bargaining power in
some African countries while Chapter 5 and 6 then dive into why the gap exists and persists. Chapter
5 hones in on the historical relationships between the selected countries and the West as well as with
China. It highlights that cases that had authoritarian or one-state dominant systems with a socialist
past have learned over time that Chinese investors are staying under stricter local participation
regulations. In contrast, such regulations were seemingly always out of any feasible policy range for
countries with closer relations to the West and competitive multi-party systems that - with every new
ruling government in power - led to information-erasing, constant new learning and re-defining of a
relationship to the West and East.
Chapter 6 then shows that centralized political systems - that either emerge from strong parties or
strong de facto centralized institutions – encourage political actors to share information on Chinese
investment flows, while de-centralized systems with high levels of political competition and clientelism
tend to disincentivize politicians at various sub-levels to share information on Chinese investment
flows “up” to the central government. Overall, out of the cases studied, it is therefore governments
of authoritarian or one-party dominant systems with a longer ruling party like Ethiopia or Tanzania
who are very confident in their bargaining power with private Chinese investors, while governments
in competitive democracies like Nigeria or Kenya lack the same confidence.
37

Johns-Hopkins University China-Africa Research Initiative 2017 data on Chinese Investment Stocks per country.
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Chapter 7 then summarizes the argument, highlights main contributions to existing literatures,
offers a discussion on future prospects of African economic and political development, addresses the
theory’s applicability to smaller receivers of Chinese FDI, describes future research areas and finally,
it will conclude.
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CHAPTER 2: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BARGAINING
POWER AND DEAL QUALITY
2.1

Introduction
This project focuses on explaining the relationship between countries’ bargaining power and

the quality of deals with private Chinese investors across the African continent. A major challenge to
studying African bargaining power or deal quality is that it is difficult to define and empirically measure
both terms. Bargaining power is often loosely defined as the relative ability of parties in a situation to
exert influence over each other. However, bargaining literature is conflicted on what exactly
determines this relative ability. As a consequence, studies often conflate structural factors, bargaining
techniques and resulting policies meant to attract investment into an overall term that is hard to
disentangle.
As a response to the shortcoming described above, I make an important distinction between
bargaining power, the enabling environment to use this bargaining power, and deal quality. I define bargaining
power as the relative structural attractiveness of a particular economy to the investor. This attractiveness
is purely based on countries’ economic factor endowments (e.g. natural resource endowments, size of
the industrial sector, market size) as well as macroeconomic and political variables (e.g. inflation,
regime type or political stability) that are importantly not controllable by the state in the short-term,
relatively sticky over time and less replaceable by exit options for the investor. In contrast to these
structural variables, policies and deals can be adjusted as a response to countries’ relative structural

attractiveness. As a result, they are captured by the deal quality variable that should in theory be a direct
reflection of countries’ bargaining power.
This project is concerned with private Chinese investment in Africa but unfortunately, there is to
date very limited data available on this relatively new player. For large parts of the statistical analysis
below, I use 2003-2017 Chinese investment data from the Johns-Hopkins University China-Africa
Research Initiative (CARI) as its methodology is the most sophisticated among Chinese investment
data collection efforts38 and widely used by academia and media.39 Unfortunately, this database, like all
other major ones, does not distinguish between private and state-owned enterprises, and certainly
underreports the amount of private Chinese players. Yet, since the share of private Chinese companies
has recently significantly increased in the African region (e.g. Sun 2017), understanding how patterns
of overall Chinese investments have changed over time can give us first important clues on the
preferences of this new private type of Chinese investor. Certainly, the statistical results still only
provide us with a first approximation and I complement the regression analysis with limited data from
McKinsey and Chen et al. (2018) on private Chinese investments in Africa, interviews that I conducted
across five countries, and evidence from literature to more qualitatively describe African bargaining
power with private Chinese investors.
Based on the definitions that I developed in the introduction, this chapter first proposes
different measures for deal quality across the African continent: the Ease of Doing Business Index by
the World Bank, the Global Competitiveness Index by the World Economic Forum, and the Deal
Quality Index that I develop based on data from the International Finance Cooperation and other
sources. The chapter then identifies determinants of investments in Africa for Chinese, U.S. and total
investment and describes the distinct patterns and nature of (private) Chinese investments across the

CARI has combined the ODI figures from both the China Statistical Yearbooks and Statistical Bulletins of China's
Outward Foreign Direct Investment of various years.
39 Please see a list under JHU SAIS CARI Media.
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continent. It finally shows that countries’ bargaining power with private Chinese investors is indeed
largely determined by their structural economic endowments but importantly independent of the
different measures of deal quality that I proposed. Explaining how the political economy - or what I
call the enabling environment around investment negotiations - influences the relationship between these
two variables is then the core of the analysis of the subsequent chapters.
2.2

Measuring the Outcome - Deal Quality
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, structural endowments, bargaining

techniques and policies meant to attract investment are often conflated into an overall concept of
“bargaining power” although structural variables and policies are distinct in nature; while the former
are relatively fixed, government can adjust the latter ones as a response to their structural endowments.
In fact, this is precisely what the Weak Bargaining Power Narrative leans on – because African
countries have historically failed to attract large amounts of foreign investment, they cannot afford
imposing any restrictions on foreign investors that are already hesitant to enter without any
restrictions.
The ambiguousness about the difference between structural factors and policies is also directly
visible in existing efforts that aim to assess country’s relative attractiveness to foreign investment. The
Ease of Doing Business (EDB) Index by the World Bank Group was launched in 2003 and measures
countries’ business regulations across 11 sub-indices for local companies across 190 countries. The
index is based on an expert survey and covers a wide span of topics such as “starting a business”,
“registering property” or “trading across borders”. One of its shortcomings for this project’s analysis
is that the index measures both government strategies in the form policies as well as structural capacity
that is less about strategy. For example, the sub-index “Starting a Business” assesses both the number
of procedures required to start a business (deliberate government policy) and the time required to start
a business (structural capacity). In addition, the EDB index also only assesses the regulatory
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framework for domestic firms. As a result, it fails to capture strategic differences that governments
may decide to take around imposing regulations specifically on foreign investors.
Like the EDB Index, the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) by the World Economic
Forum conflates both intentional policies and capacity in its expert survey that aims to assess
countries’ overall attractiveness over 12 pillars: institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomic
environment, health and primary education, higher education and training, goods market efficiency,
labor market efficiency, financial market development, technological readiness, market size, business
sophistication and innovation. Pillar 6, on goods market efficiency, includes Section 2: Foreign
Competition that offers an index for: prevalence of non-tariff barriers, trade tariffs, prevalence of
foreign ownership, business impact of rules of FDI, burden of customs procedures, and imports of
goods and services (% of GDP). Unfortunately, the outcome variables are only measured as
respondents’ opinions40 and may not reflect the actual state.
In light of the existing indicators’ shortcomings for this project, I propose a third measure of
deal quality, called “Deal Quality Index”, that solely measures government policies around foreign
investment as opposed to structural factors. The measure is based on data from the International
Finance Corporation (IFC)’s “FDI Regulations” initiative executed in 2012 complemented with
variables that I found relevant to add based on my interview findings with foreign investors and
government officials across the five case studies.
2.2.1

Component Variables
The IFC’s “FDI Regulations” database codes restrictions across four thematic areas with sub-

indicators: “Converting and Transferring Currency”, “Starting a Foreign Investment across Sectors”,
“Employing Skilled Expatriates” and “Arbitrating and Mediating Disputes”. Based on the importance

For example, “In your country, how restrictive are regulations related to the hiring of foreign labour?” [1 = highly
restrictive; 7 = not restrictive at all].
40
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of tariffs, taxes and property ownership that both government and company respondents reported to
be important for investment decisions in the interviews I conducted across five African countries, I
add all three variables as a combined fifth category. Figure 1 summarizes thematic areas, sub-indicators
and questions.
2.2.2

Constructing the Index
Several individual questions are related and can be combined into broader categories of

restrictions. In particular, the authors of the database aggregate scores from sub-questions and offer
summary scores on inflow restrictions, outflow restrictions, payment documentations, foreign
exchange restrictions, foreign ownership, and arbitrating and mediating disputes. Based on the same
approach, I also calculated summary scores for the categories “Additional Procedures Required
Exclusively of Foreign Companies”, “Work Permit and Quota Regulations”, and “Taxes”, “Tariffs”
and “Foreign Freeholder Ownership”. I followed a standard “-5” point system that is also employed
by the EDB initiative.41
The following questions were dropped because they were either redundant, did not measure the
difference between the government’s treatment of foreign and domestic investors, or had the same
score for all countries: Under “Additional Procedures Required” – “Total days required to establish
for foreign- owned companies”; under “Work Permits and Quotas” – "Average number of calendar
weeks to get work permit", “Is there a spousal work permit available? (No for all)”; and "Does the
current skilled migration regime represent a minor, moderate or major obstacle?" Further, I add scores
for taxes and foreign freehold property ownership that I collected from the Financial Freedom Index
(Lucas Vincent Holding Limited 2016), which provides financial rankings of 198 Countries by tax
rates, cost of living, currency convertibility, investor protection, freehold property ownership, legal

41

The scores I used are listed in the Methodology section in the Appendix.
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Figure 1: Components and Sub-Components of the Deal Quality Index
DEAL QUALITY INDEX:
COMPONENTS

SUB-COMPONENTS

I. CONVERTING AND

1. Receiving investment inflows

TRANSFERRING

2. Repatriating investments and income

CURRENCY

3. Making payments abroad
4. Holding foreign exchange

II. STARTING A

1. % Foreign equity ownership allowed

FOREIGN

2. Additional procedures required exclusively of foreign

INVESTMENT

companies

ACROSS SECTORS
III. EMPLOYING

1. Work permit and quota regulations

SKILLED
EXPATRIATES
IV. ARBITRATING

1. Strength of ADR laws and institutions

AND MEDIATING

2. Ease of initiating and conducting arbitration proceedings

DISPUTES

3. Ease of recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards

V. TARIFFS, TAXES

1. Tariffs

AND PROPERTY

2. Taxes

OWNERSHIP

3. Property ownership
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rights and inflation. Finally, I collected tariff rates (applied, weighted mean, all products (%)) from the
World Bank Open Data catalogue for the year 2012.
We might expect scores to correlate and load onto one dimension using Principal Component
Analysis. Yet, that is in fact not the case. Within the five components, only the sub-components of
the first and fifth one, Converting and Transferring Currency and Arbitrating and Mediating Disputes,
reveal a single dominant factor (65.79 and 55.31, respectively). A solution to this problem could be to
focus on variables that are deemed most important about deal quality. Yet, my interviews across the
five African cases show that a wide array of policies matter in deal negotiations. Dropping one of the
areas would leave out a substantial FDI area around which governments strategize. The aim of the
deal quality index is to provide a first “big picture” measure on how holistically aggressive individual
governments are vis-à-vis foreign investors. As a result, I include all themes in the overall index and
also work with thematic sub-indices in the analysis. Following the EDB and GCI methodology, I used
a simple additive method to calculate the index. I then subtracted each value from 100 to reverse the
order, and rescaled values to a 0-100 scale. I use the cut-offs 0-40, 40-70 and 70-100 for the
classification presented in Table 1 (please view Table 1 and 2 in the Appendix to see the scoring
method and all sub-indices).
2.2.3

Index Limitations
The index developed here has three central limitations. First, measuring formal policies rather

than informal case-by-case deal agreements is certainly only an approximation and incomplete
assessment of “deal quality”. Attributes in individual investment deals could look significantly different
to formal laws. For example, a country could have strict formal laws but individual government
officials could be willing to grant investors exemptions in specific cases
in return for personal payments. Or, on the other extreme, countries could formally impose very few
restrictions but individual sub-regional political or traditional leaders could be imposing their own
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Table 1: Deal Quality Index

Countries:
Deal Quality Score:
Very Investor-Friendly Deals:
Egypt, Arab Rep.
15.86
Mauritius
19.11
Uganda
19.75
Zambia
19.92
Kenya
27.27
Liberia
35.04
Congo, Dem. Rep.
36.40
Rwanda
36.40
Madagascar
36.95
Medium-Investor Friendly Deals:
Ghana
41.90
Tanzania
46.40
Sierra Leone
48.08
Nigeria
53.77
Tunisia
57.88
Côte d'Ivoire
58.40
Morocco
59.40
Senegal
60.19
Burundi
61.11
South Africa
62.75
Mali
63.38
Burkina Faso
64.23
Aggressive Deals:
Cameroon
72.69
Chad
77.96
Mozambique
83.04
Algeria
90.28
Angola
99.73
Ethiopia
100.00
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rules. In a world with complete data access, I would measure deal quality by assessing strictness of
attributes of all deals signed by African governments and Chinese investors. Yet, data on Chinese
investments in Africa is already extremely scarce, let alone data on specific investment deals with
private Chinese investors. I respond to these concerns in three ways: First, in Chapter 3, I hone in on
case-by-case negotiations and present findings from two complementary conjoint experiments that I
conducted in Nigeria. In the experiments, we presented hypothetical investment deals with
randomized attributes to both Nigerian technical advisors and Chinese companies in Nigeria. The
findings suggest that Nigerian technical advisors rated the likelihood of both parties signing a deal
lower the more it deviated from the status quo. An important exception I found through my qualitative
interviews was on a sub-national level in Nigeria, where village chiefs sometimes ask for stronger deals
with Chinese investors than national formal laws require. Chapter 6 discusses these findings in detail.
Second, I present evidence in Chapter 5 from qualitative interviews with government officials
across five case studies on how they think about the relationship between official laws and case-bycase negotiations. The main finding is that government officials in countries like Ethiopia or Tanzania
that have stricter formal FDI regulations also reported that they tend to enforce stricter case-by-case
conditions on investors, compared to countries with laxer formal FDI regulations. In particular,
federal governments with stricter regulations sometimes even asked for more in case-by-case
negotiations that national law would require. As a third approach, Chapter 5 therefore hones in on the
reasons as to why both formal policies and case-by case deals in Ethiopia and Tanzania appear to be
more aggressive around local participation, compared to Nigeria or Kenya.
The second apparent limitation to using the IFC’s “FDI Regulations” database is that it only
captures policies for the year 2012 since it was a one-time data collection effort by over 5,000 regional
contributors. The database is to my knowledge the only source that also covers regional data on
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policies targeted towards foreign capital in their economies across 25 African countries.42 While more
recent data would of course be desirable, the concern that it is outdated is strongly mediated by two
factors: First, the most reliable data sources on Western and Chinese investments, namely UNCTAD
and the Investment database by CARI at Johns Hopkins University, also only cover investments until
2012 and 2017 respectively. So, the main focus of analysis in this chapter is the period of 2001-2017.
In addition, policies are also relatively sticky and data from 2012 have not dramatically changed
per country over the past eight years. Out of the cases studied here, regulations have only more
significantly changed to become stricter in Tanzania. Importantly, Tanzania should today be ranked
above Nigeria as it has been implementing stricter local employment regulations since 2015. For
example, according to the Non-Citizens (Employment Regulation) Act, 2015, S. 19 (1), “businesses
are granted up to five individuals during the start-up process but foreigners need to submit a
justification letter indicating that all efforts have been made to hire a Tanzanian but that they hold
qualifications, knowledge and skills required for the performance of the job that are unavailable in
Tanzania and that businesses prepare a succession plan to transfer the applicant’s knowledge to local
employees.” Tanzania is part of the case studies that I focus on in Chapter 4, 5 and 6. In order to
resolve the last concern, Chapter 4 therefore describes current (2020) FDI regulations for each country
in detail. The IFC database is the most fine-grained data collection effort to date. As a result, I deem
measuring “deal quality” with the IFC data as a third approach to the EDB and the GCI still a useful
exercise.
2.3

Measuring Bargaining Power
What are push factors that drive investors to explore other markets; and the relatively

immobile pull factors that countries are endowed with to lure foreign capital? Unsurprisingly, a meta-

The second publicly available data source on FDI regulations - the OECD’s FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index excludes the African region in its country coverage.
42
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analysis of studies on the determinants of FDI in the African region reveals that investors are market,
resource- and efficiency seeking,43 and sensitive to a number of unfavorable political conditions. Table
2 provides a summary of structural push and pull factors of foreign investment.
Academics, international organizations and thinktanks often base their advice to African governments
on an analysis of these overall FDI flows into the African region without distinguishing FDI by origin.
This is because Western investments still account for by far the largest share of foreign investments
in Africa (UNCTAD 2020). And even though FDI flows to the African region have risen, these flows
are still small by global standards (3% of total global FDI inflows in 2019; UNCTAD 2020). Advisors
have consequently often urged governments for very investor-friendly policies if they want to attract
more investments.44 The argument is that because there is so little investment flowing into the region,
any barriers to entry should be removed. Since Chinese investments account for a fast growing but
still very small share of these overall investments, then naturally, African governments should have
even less bargaining leverage with Chinese investors and treat them the same as Western investors.
But what if Chinese investment patterns are different not in volume (yet) but in allocation?
Depending on their home economy, investors from the West and China may be interested in
fundamentally different markets that complement their expectations from home (Calvo et al. 1993).
As motivations determine benefits and costs in bargaining negotiations, they are essential for assessing
respective levels of bargaining power. A summary of the distinct nature of total and private Chinese
FDI in Africa is therefore provided in the next section. I first offer a regression analysis (OLS and

43 Dunning (1993) provides a simple typology that divides foreign investment into three categories. Depending on whether
investors are interested in resource extraction (natural resource-seeking), markets to sell their products (market-seeking),
or in sources of competitiveness, economies of scope and specialization (efficiency-seeking), they will be attracted to
different types of countries. Dunning’s framework has been widely used in investment literature and is also employed for
the analysis here. A fourth type of FDI listed in Dunning (1993) is strategic-asset seeking FDI, which includes cross-border
mergers and acquisitions for a variety of strategic reasons, e.g., to access research and development, innovation, and
advanced technology. It is barely present in Africa (e.g. see Chen et al. 2018), so it is also excluded from the analysis here.
44 See for example the Ease of Doing Business Index Initiative by the World Bank Group, which rates
countries’ attractiveness to investors, or the Ernst and Young Africa Attractiveness Report (2019).
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Table 2: Push and Pull Factors of Foreign Investment in the African Region
Investors’ Motivations in the

Variables Determining Host Country’s Bargaining Power (Immobile

African

Pull Factors):45

Region

(Push

Factors):
Resource-Seeking: motivated by

Imports, electricity, logistics, water, primary school enrolment rate, share of

cheap raw material, pool of

agricultural land, manufacturing (value added, % GDP), natural resources

labor, infrastructure

(Asiedu 2005, Anyanwu and Yaméogo 2015, Bokpin, Mensah and Asamoah
2015, Mijiyawa 2015), educated labor force (Asiedu 2005), low cost of labor
(Bende- Nabende 2002), infrastructure (Anyanwu and Yaméogo 2015,
Bokpin, Mensah, and Asamoah 2015, Bende- Nabende 2002, Dupasquier
and Osakwe 2006), labor-capital ratio (Fedderke and Romm 2006), labor
force growth rate (Yasin 2005)

Market-Seeking:

aim

at

GDP per capita (Bende-Nabende 2002, Dupasquier and Osakwe 2006),

penetrating the local markets of

GDP growth (e.g. Bende-Nabende 2002), population size, land size, exports,

host countries

markets (Asiedu 2005, Bende- Nabende 2002, Dupasquier and Osakwe 2006,
Fedderke and Romm 2006, Mijiyawa 2015), trade openness (Asiedu 2005,
Anyanwu and Yaméogo 2015, Bende- Nabende 2002, Fedderke and Romm
2006, Mijiyawa 2015, Yasin 2005), urbanization levels (Anyanwu and
Yaméogo 2015), regional blocks (Bokpin Mensah, and Asamoah 2015)

Efficiency-Seeking: in search of

Inflation (Anyanwu and Yaméogo 2015), macroeconomic stability (Asiedu

new sources of competitiveness,

2006), (Dupasquier and Osakwe 2006), agglomeration (Anyanwu and

economies

Yaméogo 2015), technology and manpower (Bende-Nabende 2002), nominal

of

scale

and

specialization
Governance:
mediating

exchange rate (Yasin 2005), real exchange rates (Bende-Nabende 2002)
in

political

search

of

Regime type, efficient legal system (Asiedu 2005), rule of law (Dupasquier

risk

to

and Osakwe 2006), protection of property rights (Dupasquier and Osakwe

guarantee economic profits

2006), political institutional structure (Fedderke and Romm 2006),
corruption (Asiedu 2005), political stability (Asiedu 2005, Anyanwu and
Yaméogo 2015, Dupasquier and Osakwe 2006, Fedderke and Romm 2006,
Mijiyawa 2015), foreign aid (Anyanwu and Yaméogo 2015), political risk
(Bende-Nabende 2002), positive image of the region (Bende-Nabende 2002),
good governance ((Dupasquier and Osakwe 2006)

45

The matching of push and pull factors was adopted from Chen et al. (2015).
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LASSO) to better understand the relationship between total Chinese investment stock data and several
economic and political variables. I then hone in on literature and interviews around total and private
Chinese investments in Africa to show that (private) Chinese investment on the African country is
extremely diverse and less sensitive to variables that have been proposed in the past to limit African
bargaining power with foreign investors.
2.3.1

Regression Analysis

What are push factors of Chinese investors in Africa, and how have they changed over time? I use
2003-2017 Chinese investment data from the Johns-Hopkins University China-Africa Research
Initiative (CARI) for the analysis as a first approximation. As mentioned in the introduction,
unfortunately this database, like the major other ones, does not distinguish between private and stateowned enterprises, and certainly underreports the amount of private Chinese players. Yet, since the
share of private Chinese companies has recently significantly increased in the African region (e.g. Sun
2017), understanding how patterns of overall Chinese investments have changed over time can give
us first important clues on the preferences of this new type of Chinese investors.
I consider resource-seeking, market-seeking and efficiency-seeking variables as well as
variables concerning governance that have been suggested by literature (please see Table 2) to
influence companies’ decisions to invest into the African region. For resource-seeking motives, I
consider:
•

Imports: Imports of goods and services (BoP, current US$), World Bank Open Data

•

Natural resource rents: Total natural resources rents (% of GDP), World Bank Open
Data

•

Agricultural land: Agricultural land (% of land area), World Bank Open Data

•

Manufacturing: Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP), World Bank Open Data
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•

Electricity: Access to electricity (% of population), World Bank Open Data

It is important to note here that investors could be looking for different “types” of resources,
either natural resources (e.g. natural resource rents or agricultural land) or labor for manufacturing or
services (e.g. manufacturing (value added), electricity, or imports).

For market-seeking motives, I used:
•

Population: Population, total, World Bank Open Data

•

GDP: GDP (Current US$), World Bank Open Data

•

Exports: Exports of goods and services (BoP, current US$), World Bank Open Data

For efficiency seeking variables, I used:
•

Inflation: Inflation, consumer prices (% annual), World Bank Open Data

For governance, I considered the following variables:
•

Regime type: polity2 variable, a 21-point index, where the highest value corresponds to
a fully institutionalized democracy, Polity IV Project

•

Corruption: 0-100, with 100 being very clean, Corruption Perception Index,
Transparency International

•

Rule of law: index, measures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence
in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of
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crime and violence. Estimates range from -2.5 to 2.5, World Bank Governance
Indicators
•

Political stability and absence of violence and terrorism: index, measures perceptions of the
likelihood of political instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including
terrorism. Estimates range from -2.5 to 2.5, World Bank Governance Indicators

Finally, I use the following outcome variables:
•

Chinese foreign direct investment stocks 2003-2017: Johns-Hopkins University China-Africa
Initiative

•

U.S. foreign direct investment stocks 2001-2012 (unfortunately, no later years are available),
UNCTAD Investment Statistics

•

Total FDI inward stock 2003-2017: World Bank Open Data

I had initially also included logistics, primary school enrolment, and secondary school
enrolment but had to drop these variables due to severe cross-country missing data concerns (more
than 25% of the data was missing for each variable). The data was still unbalanced, so I also employed
hot-deck imputation to fill in for missing values (please see Table 7-10) in the Appendix for the
results).
A panel data regression using country- and year-fixed effects with standardized variables shows
that most importantly, Chinese investments have increasingly shifted from natural resources to
manufacturing resource-seeking (Table 3 in the Appendix): While the coefficient of natural resource
rents was positive (0.08) and statistically significant for Chinese investments between 2003-2007, the
coefficients become negative (-0.35 and -0.17, respectively) and statistically significant for the periods
2008-2017 and 2003-2017.
72

At the same time, manufacturing and, relatedly, access to electricity have become more
important pull factors for Chinese investments in Africa: After controlling for natural resource rents,
the coefficient of manufacturing, value added (% of GDP) is negative (-0.29 and -0.57, respectively)
and statistically significant between 2008-2017 and 2003-2017 and remains large, negative (-0.41) and
statistically significant between 2003-2017 after controlling for other resource-seeking motivations.
The coefficient on access to electricity is positive (0.79 and 0.97 respectively) and significant with
controls between 2008-2017 and 2003-2017. These results support the Flying Geese Theory, that
Chinese investors have increasingly become attracted to African countries that are not industrialized
yet (therefore the negative coefficient on manufacturing) but with robust access to electricity to start
manufacturing. Finally, agricultural land seems to matter less as a pull-factor for Chinese investment:
The coefficient decreases over time and has no statistical significance throughout the regressions in
Table 3 in the Appendix.
After accounting for resource-seeking factors, what are market-seeking motives of Chinese
and other investors? (Table 4 in the Appendix) In addition to countries with less natural resources and
manufacturing, Chinese FDI is mostly attracted to economies with large imports and populations,
confirming its market-seeking motivations. After introducing inflation as an efficiency-seeking variable
(Table 5 in the Appendix), the coefficient on GDP becomes statistically significant and negative while
the coefficient on inflation is not statistically significant. This points towards efficiency-seeking factors
playing less of a role.
Interestingly, similar results hold for U.S. and total foreign investment, which have
decreasingly been attracted to countries with high natural resource rents (Table 5 in the Appendix).
U.S. investments seem to be more attracted to places with less electricity, higher imports and GDP.
Total FDI, meanwhile, is more pulled to places with higher imports and larger populations (and less
exports and higher inflation although both coefficients are small).
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Finally, how do governance indicators attract or deter Chinese and other foreign investments
(Table 6 in the Appendix)? After controlling for resource- and market-seeking motives, only the rule
of law and corruption coefficients remain statistically significant (with the corruption coefficient
turning negative) for Chinese FDI stocks. In contrast, regime type, rule of law, corruption and political
stability and absence of terrorism and violence all appear to be important for U.S. FDI stocks, with
more democratic and less corrupt countries being able to attract more U.S. investors. Total FDI is
larger in countries with less political stability and absence of terrorism and violence.
Since the OLS regression analysis may be prone to multicollinearity, I also employed the
LASSO (Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator) method with cluster dependent errors on
the same regression that I used to produce Tables 3-6 in the Appendix for Chinese investment stocks.
The LASSO performs both variable selection and regularization in order to enhance the prediction
accuracy and interpretability of the statistical model it produces. The analysis reveals three variables,
lagged imports (coefficient: 0.031), population (coefficient: 1.53) and lagged GDP (coefficient: 0.57),
to be predictive of Chinese FDI stocks per country.
2.3.2

Literature and Interviews on Total and Private Chinese Investments
The regression analysis points to important and distinct trends about Chinese investment in

Africa over time that have also been confirmed in my interviews to hold with private Chinese
companies across the five case studies: Of all the private Chinese companies (87 in total) I interviewed
across Nigeria, Ethiopia, South Africa, Kenya and Tanzania, most settled in their respective African
economies for manufacturing or services. The vast majority (74%) indicated that they came to Africa
to produce for or serve the African economies, not to export beyond the African continent. On
political variables, respondents were mostly concerned with policy uncertainty (68%), meaning that
policies around operating in their countries’ economy may be changing overnight and not be stable
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over years. In contrast, Chinese companies cared significantly less about political stability (25%), rule
of law (16%), terrorism (7%), or regime type (3%) in their respective countries.
What other distinct distributional patterns of Chinese investments in Africa are there to
discern from looking at various investment data bases? As Chapter 1 already mentioned, while
Western investment still accounts for the largest share in the African region (Figure 1, Appendix) these
investment flows have been highly concentrated (UNCTAD 2012 data). France and Great Britain
have been investing mostly in their larger former African colonies, and little elsewhere. The United
States have a more diverse investment profile (27 African countries in total; Figure 2 in the Appendix)
but the top-five economies account for 77% of all U.S. investments in the region (UNCTAD 2012
data). In addition, U.S. investment flows in the region have been highly irregular: While they were
increasing up to the financial crisis in 2008, they dropped under the Obama administration and have
not significantly picked up again (Figure 3 in the Appendix).
In contrast, investment data from the China-Africa Research Initiative at Johns-Hopkins
University reveal that Chinese investments in Africa have risen by far the fastest (Figure 1 in the
Appendix) and have been steady since 2003 with an upward sloping trend line (Figure 3 in the
Appendix) and are significantly more wide- and evenly spread across the continent. In 2019, China
was the largest investor in Africa and has invested more than double the amount of France or the U.S.
(Ernst and Young 2019). Except to e-Swatini, Burkina Faso and Somalia, China has invested in all
countries on the African continent (51 countries in total; Figure 4 in the Appendix). Importantly,
China has especially heavily invested in countries from which the West has so far shied away. In 2012,46
six (Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zambia, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia and the Republic of

46

The last year for which UNCTAD U.S. data is available.
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Congo) of the top-15 Chinese investment destinations rank at the bottom of U.S. investments in
Africa.47
What sectors do Chinese companies invest in? In 2017, construction (29.8%), mining (22.5%)
manufacturing (14.0%) and financial intermediation (13.2%) were the largest sectors of Chinese
investments in the African region.48 Since 2013,49 investments have increased by 3.7% and 0.6% in the
construction and in the manufacturing sector, respectively; and decreased by 3.9% and by 0.8% in the
mining sector and in financial intermediation, respectively.
What are differences among Chinese investors? As pointed out in the introduction, there are four
ideal types of overlapping Chinese investors in Sub-Saharan Africa: central government SOEs,
provincial government SOEs private sector incorporated in China, and private sector incorporated in
SSA (e.g. Kaplinsky and Morris 2009). My interviews with each type of Chinese company confirm He
and Zhu (2018)’s findings that their motivations significantly differ: Central government SOEs (e.g.
China Bridge and Port Corporation) are operating under strong control of the Chinese government,
are driven by economic incentives but also the diplomatic relationship between the respective African
country and China. Provincial government SOEs and big private companies (e.g. Huawei) are mostly
driven by economic incentives, aim to compete with Western big private companies in Africa but still
need to report back to the Chinese government. Finally, small private companies are exclusively driven
by economic incentives and are mostly individual entrepreneurs.
Central government SOEs have focused their investments on geological exploration and
development, especially in the petroleum and nonferrous metals sectors, provincial government SOEs
are invested either in natural resources, services or manufacturing, big private companies often occupy
the service sector and small private companies are both dominant in manufacturing and services. The

Comparison between 2012 UNCTAD data on U.S. FDI Stocks and 2012 CARI data on Chinese FDI Stocks.
CARI data on Chinese FDI Stocks per Sector.
49 The first year for which data are available.
47
48
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American Enterprise Institute Tracker finds that Chinese investment and construction fell in 2019 but
that this fall is due to large headline cases and that smaller Chinese firms remain highly active (Scissors
2020). McKinsey (2017) confirms that private Chinese companies have in fact been rapidly growing
on the continent: 90 percent of the Chinese companies identified across eight countries are private,
with almost 1/3 involved in manufacturing, 1/4 in services, and around 1/5 each in trade, and in
construction and real estate. McKinsey also estimates that Chinese companies are already responsible
for 12 percent of Africa’s industrial production, valued at around $500 billion a year in total.
How are these private players distributed across the African continent? Chen et al. (2018) utilize
the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) database on small and medium private firms
investing in Africa and find that these firms are mostly attracted to natural resource-rich countries,
larger markets and political stability but not the rule of law. These results are different to my regression
findings but probably due to the fact that I used a database that captures all Chinese companies, not
just private ones. The diverging results suggest that private companies may be less sensitive to the rule
of law, compared to SOEs.
Nigeria (oil rich country), South Africa (non-oil resource intensive country) and Ethiopia (nonresource rich country) are the top-three hosts for these small and medium companies. While the size
of the “investment pie” that each of the 49 countries are receiving from small and medium private
firms is different, the sectoral distribution is similar, especially for the top-20 receivers (Figure 5 in the
Appendix). Based on the MOFCOM dataset, small and medium private Chinese companies have
predominantly invested in the service (72%) and manufacturing sectors (15%) in Africa. Finally, the
authors show that small and medium private Chinese firms have invested more heavily in skillintensive sectors in skill-abundant countries but in capital-intensive sectors in capital-scarce countries.
Since these patterns are the strongest in politically unstable countries, the authors conclude that small
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and medium private Chinese firms have stronger incentives to seek profits in more difficult
environments.
The analysis shows that compared to Western investments, private Chinese investments in Africa
are exceptionally diverse. These distinct investment patterns also confirm the four idiosyncrasies of
Chinese private investors that were discussed in Chapter 1: First, many entrepreneurs first arrive as
employees of SOEs to Africa and only after venture off to start their own companies and then bring
in other Chinese contacts in from China. Most managers (76%) that I interviewed came directly to the
African destination country through referral by a Chinese friend who had already been operating in
the same country and recommended it. Yet, they could almost all tell me stories of Chinese managers
that had entered the country through an SOE and then simply decided to stay.
Second, once Chinese entrepreneurs, often through SOEs, have set foot in a particular African
country, they tend to stay for a longer period of time in the same country. Of all the Chinese managers
that I interviewed, only 7 percent had been operating in another African country before. One
interviewee in Lagos shared with me that Chinese businesses in Lagos knew that corruption levels in
Ethiopia were much lower. But in his words, “Nigeria is the best place to be in Africa… you see, the
government has come after me for taxes, since Buhari came to power, they targeted my company
because they know we are making a lot of money…. But how we say here, ‘we manage.’ It’s overall
still worth it.”50 Across the five case studies, only 16% of Chinese managers reported that they had
considered moving to another African country, and only 6% said that they had thought about it “more
intensively.”
Third, markets of politically more stable countries have often already been penetrated by
Western investors, leaving smaller space for newcomers to compete and grow. Some Chinese
companies consequently strategically select less politically stable countries where they can act as
50

L18.
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“market creators” to capture large shares of a market. There are firms like Tecno, a mobile phone
manufacturer based in Hong Kong, which exclusively focuses on selling phones in Africa. Tecno is
now one of the top-three mobile phone sellers in the region. The company started the production of
“Made in Ethiopia” phones already in 2011 although Western investors have been shying away from
Ethiopia until today due to high political risks. Similarly, as mentioned earlier, the vast majority of
interviewees (74%) indicated that entered the African region to produce for or serve the African
economies, not to export beyond the African continent. New markets therefore appear to be especially
attractive, even if they are less safe compared to areas that have already been frequented by other
Western companies.
Finally, smaller private Chinese firms may also often lack the resources to obtain information
on political risks, or simply care less about them. Asked whether they thought that the country they
were operating in was dangerous, Chinese managers almost unanimously said yes. They also shared
stories of Chinese employees who had just been kidnapped a week before the interview, and how they
had increased police escorts for whenever they go outside. Asked if that was a reason for them to
leave the country, however, two managers said that they heard of the actually kidnapped individuals
leaving the country, but no single manager said that they would personally leave. I also asked about
insurance, and interestingly, most companies I asked either had no insurance or were insured with
local insurance providers.
2.4

Overall Assessment of African Bargaining Power with Private Chinese Companies

Around FDI Policies
Several studies point out that foreign investment in Africa is sensitive to trade openness,
investment climate, proactive and reform-oriented policies and FDI-related policy liberalization
(Asiedu 2005, Bende-Nabende 2002), to an increase in corporate tax rates in host countries (Fedderke
and Romm 2006), or to limitations of ownership, restriction of repatriation of capital, inefficient
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financial systems and economic and political instabilities (Yasin 2005), and that the importance of
these factors has even increased over the past years (e.g. Chen et al. 2018). This seems to be consistent
with the Weak Bargaining Power Narrative – that only providing an enabling policy environment will
attract more foreign investment to environments that are otherwise too difficult and costly to investors
to enter.
But is that really also the case for private Chinese investors? Assessing countries’ bargaining
power with this type of player in Africa is a difficult exercise due to severe data availability constraints.
Below, I therefore offer three methods to measure the relationship between bargaining power and
deal quality for Chinese investors (first and second method) and the relationship between private
Chinese investment stocks and deal quality (third method). Together, all three approaches suggest that
the correlation between investment patterns and deal quality is very low.
2.4.1

Method 1: LASSO Predictions
First, I split the Deal Quality Index into three baskets (based on the shaded areas in Table 1)

and used the LASSO method with cluster-dependent errors to determine structural drivers of Chinese
investments for countries that offer very investor-friendly deals. The LASSO method reveals one
single variable, “GDP lagged” (coefficient: 0.61).
I then use this coefficient to predict Chinese FDI investment stocks in 2012 for countries
offering medium-friendly and aggressive policies in 2012 (Figure 2 and 3) for if they suddenly had
offered investor-friendly deals. If FDI regulations mattered for attracting Chinese investors, the
predicted Chinese investment stocks under friendly policies would be higher than the actual
investment stocks that we observe for medium-friendly and aggressive countries. Yet, as Figure 2 and
3 show, this does not appear to be the case everywhere – actual Chinese FDI stocks are in fact in
several cases larger than the predicted stocks, especially for the top-receivers of Chinese investments
such as South Africa, Nigeria or Tanzania. In other words, if GDP is actually the dominant deciding
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factor for Chinese investors to enter markets and if countries with medium-friendly or aggressive FDI
policies suddenly decided to implement more investor-friendly policies, the results suggest that they
would not necessarily be able to attract more Chinese investment.
Similar to the analysis above, I also used the LASSO method to determine structural
determinants of Chinese investments for countries that offered medium investor-friendly or
aggressive policies in 2012. The LASSO method reveals two variables, lagged imports (coefficient:
0.01) and lagged GDP (coefficient: 1.35).
I then again use the coefficients on these variables to predict Chinese FDI investment stocks
in 2012 for countries offering very investor-friendly deals if they had offered stricter regulations
(Figure 4). If FDI regulations mattered for attracting Chinese investors, the predicted Chinese
investment stocks under stricter regulations would be lower than the actual investment stocks that we
observe for very investor- friendly countries.
Figure 2: Actual and Predicted Chinese FDI Stocks for Countries with Aggressive Deals
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Figure 3: Actual and Predicted Chinese FDI Stocks for Countries with Medium InvestorFriendly Deals
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Figure 4: Actual and Predicted Chinese FDI Stocks for Countries with Very Investor-Friendly
Deals
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While observed stocks are indeed on average higher than predicted ones, most of them are within one
standard-deviation change per standard deviation increase in the predictor variable.
There are three limitations to this approach. First, the main limitation is the possibility for
unobserved country-level variables that affect bargaining power but are unmeasured (and also thereby
affect deal quality). Second, the LASSO reveals two different dominating deciding factors for different
baskets of deal quality. Although the LASSO analysis for all 54 African countries also reveals GDP as
the one dominant predictive variable, Chinese investors who care about GDP could in theory care
more about lax FDI regulations than investors drawn to manufacturing hubs. Method 2 will therefore
try to respond to these concerns. Finally, this analysis covers all Chinese investment, not just private
Chinese one. I therefore use Method 3 to mediate this concern.
2.4.2

Method 2: FDI Flows and Policy Shocks
In order to respond to the first and second concern above, I also conducted an analysis of

U.S. and Chinese FDI flows around policy shocks in several African countries with different
background characteristics. The country comparisons in Figure 5 show that U.S. firms may be
significantly less willing to providing local skill and technology transfers compared to Chinese firms.
For example, in 2008, Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe signed the Indigenization and
Economic Empowerment Act into law. The Act required 51 percent control by locals in the major
sectors of the economy and was first adopted in 2006 for the hydrocarbons sector and later expanded
to all sectors. Similarly, against a massive outcry from Western and especially French investors, the
Algerian government adopted 51% local ownership in all companies in its 2007 investment law
reforms. These laws were blamed for Zimbabwe’s and Algeria’s inability to attract foreign investment.
Indeed, Figure 5 shows that U.S. investments significantly decreased in both countries after they had
strengthened local participation requirements on foreign investments. Yet, interestingly, Chinese
investment stocks in Zimbabwe and Algeria have in fact dramatically increased since 2010, so after
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Figure 1: Comparison of U.S. and Chinese Investment Stocks Over Time51
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was only available until 2012, while CARI data on Chinese investments was available until 2017.
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the regulations were set in place. As one South African interviewee with businesses in Zimbabwe
revealed to me, “I know that most South African companies are still there, most Chinese companies
are still there... because the question was always about how do we comply with this [meaning the local
ownership requirements], not about how do we get out - it was always about how to make the 51%
work.”52
These developments are also visible in other countries around different types of policy shocks.
For instance, the Ethiopian government developed its famous comprehensive industrial policy in
2002/03 and introduced local content requirements in manufacturing industries and limits on the
employment of expatriates, where companies applying for investment permits must provide a time
schedule for the replacement of foreign employees by Ethiopian employees in addition to training
programs. As Figure 5 shows, U.S. investment stocks in Ethiopia dropped while Chinese investment
stocks heavily increased after 2002. It is possible that Chinese stocks would have grown even more if
there had been an alternative cause for the US investment withdrawal.
In Angola, U.S. FDI stocks grew until 2011, when the government was about to enact a new
foreign exchange law in 2012, requiring the petroleum industry to channel all payments through the
local banking system, and later in 2015 a new investment law that would raise taxes on early
repatriation of profits and dividends for foreign companies and create disadvantages foreign investors
relative to domestic investors by imposing local partnership requirements for foreign investment in
several key sectors (U.S. Department of State Investment Climate Statements 2017). Chinese
Investment stocks meanwhile steadily increased.
In Madagascar, U.S. investment stocks only picked up when the government introduced the
Investment Law 2007-036, where foreign investors are free to hold up to 100 percent of shares of
stock in the company in which they carry out their activities except for the telecommunication sector,
52
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where shares of the foreign companies cannot exceed 66 percent. Meanwhile, Chinese investments
have been growing at a fast rate in Madagascar since 2003.
Finally, in Tanzania, U.S. investment stocks never picked up and have been stagnating since
2016, when the government began to encourage the hiring of Tanzanian citizens over foreigners, and
to protect local industries. In particular, Tanzania enforces limits on expats, where companies are
required to present a transition plan of training locals. In addition, the country has also increased tariffs
and import and export bans. Despite these regulations, Chinese investments appear to keep flowing
rapidly to Tanzania. The last development is not visible in the graphs due to lack of data for but mostly
based on my interview evidence and on newspaper articles.53
2.4.3

Method 3: Country’s Private Chinese FDI Stock Rankings and Policy Restrictions
In order to respond to the concern that the LASSO regression and the Chinese FDI flow

analysis above do not capture only private Chinese investment, I also calculated correlations for
different measures of deal quality (EDB, GCI and Deal Quality Index54) and private Chinese
investment stocks. It is important to note that I am not using the amount of Chinese FDI stocks per
country as a direct measure of bargaining power as these stocks could be endogenous to FDI policy
regimes. The analysis is only meant to provide an understanding of correlations between where private
Chinese companies have settled, and the aggressiveness of FDI regimes through which they are being
met.
I employ Chen et al.’s (2018) and McKinsey’s rankings of where private Chinese companies
have invested across the continent. Chen et al.’s MOFCOM data is likely underreporting the amount

E.g. Strafor 2019.
Please note that I am using the raw score (before I reverted the order by subtracting each score from 100 and then
rescaled) for the analysis in order not to skew correlations.
53
54
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of private Chinese companies across the African region. Yet, the ranking seems to still moderately
overlap with McKinsey results from eight countries studied (please see Table 11 in the Appendix).
The differences observed between the MOFCOM and McKinsey rankings most likely arise
due to different measuring methods: the MOFCOM database captures small and medium private
Chinese companies while the McKinsey data addresses all private companies in Africa. In addition,
the MOFCOM dataset contains a heavy proportion of service companies while companies in the
McKinsey data are more evenly distributed between services and manufacturing.
Table 11 in the Appendix presents five rankings: Ranking 1 lists the McKinsey country case
studies by the number of private Chinese firms per country. I calculated the amount of private firms
per country by taking the total number of Chinese firms and multiplying it by the percentage of private
Chinese firms that McKinsey lists for each country.
Ranking 2, 3, 4 and 5 are based on the MOFCOM database employed by Chen et al. 2018.
Ranking 2 measures the total amount of Chinese projects in the respective country. Ranking 3, 4 and
5 list the number of projects by sector (services, manufacturing, raw material). I obtained the values
listed by measuring how different sectors are proportionally distributed in Figure 5 in the Appendix.
Rounding may result in numbers not adding up to 100%.
Tables 12 and 13 in the Appendix use the Ease of Doing Business Index, Tables 14 and 15
use the GCI Index: Pillar 6 – Foreign Competition, and Table 16-22 use the Deal Quality Index. I use
the raw scores (before I subtracted each value from 100 and re-scaled) of the Deal Quality Index in
order not to skew correlations. The higher the index rating is for all indices, the more favorable
conditions are for foreign investors. Overall, the results show that the relationship between amount
of private Chinese investments and deal quality is weak, and that it is stronger but interestingly also
not significant for other types of investment.
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The EDB, the GCI (after introducing controls) and the Deal Quality Indices all do not serve
as strong predictors of Chinese, U.S. or total investment stocks (Table 12, 14 and 16). The same holds
for all five Deal Quality sub-indices and foreign investment stocks (Tables 17-21), except for SubIndex 3 and Sub-Index 5: The coefficient on the Sub-Index 3: Employing Skilled Expatriates is
negative and statistically significant for Chinese FDI stocks, implying that Chinese investors do not
shy away from countries with stricter employment regulations. In addition, higher scores on SubIndex 5: Taxes, Tariffs and Property Ownership (Table 21) are predictive (with no controls) of more
U.S. FDI stocks and total FDI stocks.
Table 13, 15 and 22 show correlations of different measures of Chinese activity per country
and deal quality measures. All correlations are low, with the by far “highest” correlation between
“MOFCOM number of manufacturing projects” and the Ease of Doing Business (0.37, which is still
relatively low).
Why are the correlations so low for both private and total Chinese investments? Despite
concerns about intra-continental competition regarding local participation requirements, Chinese
investors do not seem to only focus on countries with the most open economies. Let us revisit Figure
5 in the Appendix, which shows investments in Africa for small and medium Chinese enterprises, who
are especially driven by market incentives. As pointed out before, although the size of the “pies” that
countries create with Chinese investors certainly varies, the distribution of different types of
investment (in raw material, manufacturing, and services) is still about around the same across
countries, especially in the top half. This suggests that several African markets (and not only e.g. the
five biggest, natural resources rich ones) provide diverse and lucrative business opportunities to
Chinese companies. Importantly, as mentioned earlier, Nigeria, South Africa and Ethiopia rank on
top for small and medium Chinese despite their diverging FDI regulations. Finally, it is also important
to note that “debt traps” do not appear to limit African countries’ ability to impose aggressive FDI
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regimes on foreign investors. Angola and Ethiopia are the highest debtors with China (Figure 6 in the
Appendix) but also have strict foreign investment policies that private Chinese investors do not appear
to shy away from. Factors such as access to natural resources, cheap land and labor as well as large
markets appear to weigh more in investment decisions than FDI-friendly policies.
2.5

Conclusion
Overall, the patterns highlighted around Chinese investments in Africa cast significant doubt

on the Weak Bargaining Power Narrative that countries should impose very few requirements on
investors if they do not want to deter capital from private Chinese investors. How do African countries
strategize around this new type of investor, whose behavior is so at odds with the one of traditional
investors? In order to answer this question, I conduced two complementary conjoint experiments with
the Nigerian government and private Chinese companies to directly test their preferences and exit
thresholds around various policy changes. A summary is provided in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3: BARGAINING POWER AND DEAL
QUALITY - EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM
NIGERIA
3.1

Introduction
Nigeria is often used as an example case for weak trade and investment deals between Africa

and the rest of the world. There are three common explanations that academic literature, newspaper
reports and policy advisors usually point to in order to explain why this is the case. The Weak
Bargaining Power Narrative posits that if governments like the Nigerian one strengthened FDI
restrictions, foreign investors would either choose not to enter their markets or - if they are already
operating in the markets - they would exit. The bargaining space for these governments to influence
deal conditions is therefore effectively very limited, and they are best advised to exclusively cater with
their policies towards the needs and preferences of foreign investors if they want to kick-start growth
and development.
A second perspective points towards corruption and the lack of accountability to be the
sources of weak economic outcomes in Africa, and particularly in Nigeria. With the small bargaining
power they have, governments could simply choose to use it for personal gains rather than to put in
place conditions that would benefit their populations. Solving the issue of corruption is therefore the
first and most important step towards achieving a higher quality of investment deals.
A third and final account looks at regime type and ideology. Democracies are guided by
capitalist ideologies where requirements for domestic revenue mobilization and local content may
simply lie outside the feasible ideological policy range. Even if governments had bargaining power to

ask for stronger FDI restrictions, they would not do so because they believe that open markets would
in the long-term be more beneficial to their countries’ growth trajectories.
All three explanations described above assume that governments have perfect knowledge on
how much bargaining power they possess with foreign investors. But is that truly always the case?
While bargaining literature is rich and has expanded to address particularities within the contexts of
developing countries, it has paid comparably scant focus on the role of information and the difference
between perceived versus actual bargaining power as predictive of negotiation outcomes. A few
studies shine light on the importance of information, notably Wolfe and McGinn (2005), who analyze
the effect of (perceptions of) relative power on both the distribution of resources and the
integrativeness of bargaining outcomes. They use experimental games and find that negotiating pairs
who perceived a smaller difference in relative power reached agreements of greater integrativeness
than pairs who perceived a greater power difference, which we would also expect in the context
studied here.
Regarding the African region, the role of information has been studied for high-level
negotiations between state actors. For example, Weinhardt and Moerland (2017) offer a
reconceptualization of Putnam’s (1988) two-level game by conducting a case study on the Economic
Partnership Agreement negotiations between the EU and the West African and the Caribbean regions.
They argue that “[l]imited institutional capacities for collecting and transmitting information about the
domestic win-set may prevent domestic constituents from exerting influence on the negotiator. This
perspective sheds new light on the outcomes of negotiations in two-level games, as they do not
necessarily reflect actual win-sets, but more likely the negotiator's (mis)perceptions or
(mis)representations thereof.” (pg. 1) Finally, and perhaps most related to the study conducted here,
Berge and Stiansen (2016) analyze the influence of states’ experiences around bilateral investment
treaty (BITs) negotiations. They use novel text-as-data analysis and leverage states' public regulatory
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preferences as expressed through Model BITs to argue that bargaining power stems from expertise in
states' bargaining institutes that can be found in effective and meritocratic bureaucracies, rather than
can be predicted by economic resources alone.
Since expertise can also be treated as a form of “information”, these findings shine some light
on the influence of cues as a key variable for bargaining outcomes. Yet, evidence from the semistructured interviews that I conducted with African government officials and managers of private
Chinese and Western companies across five countries show that high level state-to-state agreements
and BITs have played no significant role in private Chinese companies’ decisions to enter African
markets. Instead, they listed governments’ national FDI policies and conditions offered in case-bycase negotiations with government officials as essential pull-factors for foreign investment inflows. 55
How governments think about FDI policies and how companies decide to enter markets based on
these policies often takes place in an isolated context, where parties do not directly face each other. I
argue that this process can still be understood as a form of negotiation since two parties are weighting
and basing their demands and decisions on each other’s’ perceived alternatives to the negotiated
agreement.
To my knowledge, no study to date has analyzed the importance of the perceptions on
bargaining power versus competing existing explanations for the outcome of investment negotiations
with private companies in developing countries with weak formal institutions. Scholars consequently
do not know what role information on bargaining power plays for investment outcomes in this
particular setting. In order to fill this gap, I therefore designed and implemented two complementary
conjoint experiments in Nigeria in the Spring and Summer of 2020. The first experiment (Experiment
1) was conducted in cooperation with a Nigerian NGO. We hired and trained a Nigerian survey team
that then interviewed technical advisors and key investment negotiators of the Nigerian federal
55
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government and of the Lagos State government. The second experiment (Experiment 2) was
conducted in cooperation with a Nigerian company that provides services for Chinese businesses.
Similar to Experiment 1, we also hired and trained a Chinese survey team to interview senior managers
of private Chinese companies in the service and manufacturing sectors located in Lagos and Ogun
State. Both parties (government and company respondents) were asked to rate hypothetical
investment deals with randomly assigned policy attributes that capture “deal quality” including
ownership, employment, taxes and licenses, facilitation payments,56 property rights, environmental
regulations, government assistance, and longevity of the policy horizon. In addition, several attributes
capturing investment location, sector, the presence of a competitor, type of company (U.S. or Chinese)
and entry/exit negotiations were included as part of the deals to vary the background scenario of the
deals.
The experiments allow us to measure for the first time how technical advisors and key
negotiators of the Nigerian federal government and Lagos State government assess their bargaining
power with Chinese and Western investors, how Chinese companies in Nigeria assess their bargaining
power with the Nigerian government, and finally how the government and the companies
consequently act or do not act on their bargaining power. By asking Nigerian and Chinese respondents
separately about their deal preferences, the study purposefully excludes the influence of negotiation
and persuasion techniques that would be salient in face-to-face negotiations. I am therefore able to
isolate the effects of actual and perceived bargaining power without psychological disturbances
through the presence of the other party.
The findings show that while the Nigerian government accurately assesses how sensitive
Chinese companies are around revenue generating attributes (e.g. taxes and licenses), there is a
statistically significant gap between how much the Nigerian government is asking for, and how much
56
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Chinese companies would be willing to give regarding local participation requirements (local
ownership and employment). While government respondents rated the likelihood of both parties
signing a deal with an average score of 1.06 (scale: 0-3), company respondents rated the attractiveness
of deals with an average score of 1.34 (scale: 0-3). The 0.28-point gap between the two ratings largely
exists because government respondents overestimated the importance that Chinese companies ascribe
to local participation requirements. Through the complementarity of the two experiments, I am able
to show that this gap can be primarily attributed to the Nigerian government’s distorted perceptions
about their own bargaining leverage. Overall, these findings suggest that the theory proposed in
Chapter 1 holds for Nigeria – Chinese companies would be willing to comply with stricter local
participation requirements if the Nigerian government asked for them.
In order to explain why some governments may underestimate their bargaining power with
China around local participation, I complemented the experiment with a survey to better understand
the number of actors involved in the negotiations, how they cooperate or compete with each other
on each side, and what creates well-coordinated vs. poorly-coordinated teams that induce (or fail to
induce) free flow of information about sources of bargaining power (e.g. the role of national and state
governments; or the formation of national ministries), the role of regime type and electoral politics
(e.g. how electoral cycles change politicians’ incentives and demands to gain access to information
about bargaining power); and the importance of third-party advisors and information shocks (e.g.
Western advisors, international organizations, and NGOs). Chapter 5 and 6 describe in detail how the
findings travel from Nigeria to the other four case studies, and tease out the causal mechanisms that
distinguish governments that hold perceptions of high bargaining power (e.g. Ethiopia, Tanzania)
from governments that hold perceptions of medium bargaining power (e.g. South Africa) to those
that hold beliefs of low bargaining power (e.g. Nigeria, Kenya).
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3.2

Case Selection
I selected Nigeria for the experiment because the Nigerian federal government imposes very

few requirements on foreign investors while it is ranked among the top-receivers of Chinese
investments across Africa. “You can’t negotiate with the Chinese!”57 was among the most common
phrases I gathered in my interviews with government officials in Abuja, Nigeria in the summer of
2019. At the same time, my interviews with Chinese companies in Nigeria reveal that in fact a high
readiness exists to comply with stricter regulations since “the Nigerian market is so good” that they
“would stay under any kind of policy restrictions.”58 Consequently, there may exist an important gap
between what the Nigerian side believes to be able to ask for, and what the Chinese side is in fact
willing to give. Nigerian politics is also ridden with corruption and its economic ideology may have
significantly been influenced by the international capitalist regime, notably since the 1990s. Nigeria is
therefore an appropriate case to test my theory and alternative hypotheses on why Nigeria maintains
an open FDI regime despite its high attractiveness to Chinese investors relative to other countries on
the continent.
It is also an appropriate case to test whether my interview results overlap with the experimental
results. Since a growing body of literature points to the influence of identity, gender, and foreigner
effects in international research (e.g. Baldwin et al. forthcoming; Adida et al. 2016; Blaydes and Gillum
2013; Campbell 1981), respondents may be more open to discuss issues related to the government
with their co-ethnics rather than with a white foreign woman. For this purpose, I hired a fully Nigerian
staff (four members, two male, two female) to conduct the interviews with the technical advisors to
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the Nigerian government, and a fully Chinese staff (two members, both male59) to conduct the
interviews with Chinese companies in Lagos and Ogun State.
3.3

Variables That May Influence the Quality of Deals
Below, I describe different theories on why governments may negotiate weak deals with

foreign investors, and predictions on how each mechanism should play out in the conjoint
experiments.
3.3.1

Weak Bargaining Power Narrative
Following classic work on the poverty trap (e.g. Sachs et al. 2004), the first mechanism

describes governments’ behavior under the assumption that they have perfect knowledge over their
bargaining power with Chinese investors and that this bargaining power is simply weak. If Chinese
companies exited, or did not enter an African market if stricter policy requirements were set in place,
the government has simply no options but to agree to whatever conditions the Chinese side is asking
for. We would consequently expect government respondents, who believe that Nigeria is negotiating
from a position of weakness, to sign weaker deals in Experiment 1. In addition, we would also expect
Chinese companies in Experiment 2 to only sign deals that grant them significant freedom and
benefits, and to leave small bargaining space to the African side across all policy attributes.
3.3.2

Lack of Accountability and Corruption
The second mechanism concerns how governments think about their direct relationship to

voters, and whether they believe constituents can punish them for signing deals whose outcomes are
unfavorable for the population. If governments believe that their constituents will not change their
vote based on official FDI regulations or specific conditions present and absent in deals signed with

I would have preferred to hire one male and one female but finding Chinese interlocuters was extremely difficult, also
due to the Covid-19 pandemic.
59
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foreign investors, governments may be more likely to sign deals that are in their own self-interest
rather than those that consider their voters’ preferences. Deals in Nigeria could consequently grant
foreign investors relatively much freedom because governments are aware of their bargaining power
but choose this bargaining power to ask for personal payments. Such self-interested decision-making
could be especially likely in an environment like Nigeria, where ethno-regional identity (Olayode 2015)
and vote-buying (Francis et al. 2014) largely determine the outcome of elections; and where the
government generally does not provide public information on investment deals. While governments
may not try to cater to all voters, they could still take into account the preferences of special-interest
groups that contribute to election campaigns (e.g. Grossman and Helpman 1996). As a result, I test
for both governments’ accountability sentiments towards voters and special-interest groups.
In particular, I included four questions on corruption/lack of accountability on the
government survey:
1.

Have voters in the past asked your office about the conditions specified in the deals? If yes, what were
they interested in? (please circle one and take notes if answered with yes)

2.

Judging from your past experience, what are important drivers of voters’ decision-making during
elections?

3.

(if not mentioned in the list above) Are investment deals an important driver of voters’ decision-making
during elections? (If respondent says no) - Why not? (please circle one and take notes if answered with
no)

4.

Judging from your past experience, have Nigerian business men asked your office about investment
deals set up by your government office with foreign investors? If yes, what were they interested in? (please
circle one and take notes if answered with yes)
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If either question 2 did not include foreign investment deals in the response, and/or question
3 was answered with no, and question 1 and 4 were both answered with no, I coded the
“corruption/lack of accountability” variable as 1, otherwise as 0.
3.3.3

Liberal Economic Ideology
The third mechanism concerns how governments think about their embeddedness within the

larger international democratic-capitalist regime. Governments could be aware that their FDI policies
could in theory be more aggressive but they choose not to implement stricter policies because they
overall believe in the long-term benefits of economic deregulation or feel bound to the international
regime on foreign investment that includes norms of deregulation, or bilateral investment treaties (e.g.
Ramamurti 2001). Even when governments are not technically “locked in” and dependent on
international financial institutions, governments could still strategically subscribe to liberal economic
policies, to push for their preferred policies against domestic opponents of economic reform
(Vreeland 1999). As a result, we should observe that technical advisors who generally subscribe to a
neoliberal agenda are less likely to sign more restrictive investment deals, regardless of what they
believe their government could in fact ask for from foreign investors.
The government survey includes three questions on liberal economic ideology:
5.

Do you agree that the government should generally follow economic deregulation?

6.

Do you agree that the government should generally follow privatization policies?

7.

Do you agree that Nigeria should participate as much as possible in open trade?

If respondents’ answer at least two out of the three questions with “fully agree” or “somewhat
agree”, I code the “liberal ideology” variable as 1.

99

3.3.4

Perceptions on Bargaining Power
Finally, the fourth and most underexplored mechanism describes government behavior under

the assumption that their bargaining power with Chinese investors is strong, but that the government
underestimates this power. If the government believes that it has small bargaining leverage to influence
deal conditions, it would be willing to sign deals that are highly favorable to the investors to lure them
into their markets, even if effectively the Chinese companies would also be entering and/or staying
under stricter regulations.
There is an important difference between the first and the fourth causal mechanism: In the
first case, government responses of what they think they are able to demand, and what Chinese
companies are in fact willing to give, should overlap. In contrast, under the fourth causal mechanism,
we should observe a gap between the two. The complementarity of the two conjoint experiments
therefore helps us to understand respective levels of bargaining power between the companies and
the government, how the Chinese side thinks about the Nigerian investment climate, and whether
Chinese companies would be willing to agree to stricter FDI regulations.
I asked the following background questions on low (coded as 0) versus high (coded as 1)
perceptions of bargaining power with China” on the government survey:
1. In your opinion, does Nigeria receive little, same or a lot of Chinese money compared to the rest of the
African continent?
2. Does Nigeria have no, few or a lot of competitors for foreign investment on the continent? Who are they?
3. Which of the following statements do you think are true? (please show them the list, printed on a separate
document, and let them circle what is appropriate to them. Please attach the form to this survey at the end
of the interview.)
a.

It is easier to negotiate with Western investors than with Chinese ones.

b.

It is easier to negotiate with Chinese investors than with Western investors.
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c.

Nigeria and the West are equal partners.

d.

Nigeria and China are equal partners.

e.

Nigeria offer land, labor or raw material but foreign investors bring the money. So foreign
investors should have most of the say in investment negotiations.

f.

Nigeria is a dwarf and China is a giant.

g.

Nigeria has little say in investment deals with the West.

h.

Nigeria has little say in investment deals with China.

i.

The Chinese are everywhere in Africa, and very aggressive, they will not come to your country
if they don’t get their way, so you can’t negotiate with them.

If Question 1 is answered with “receive little” or “receive the same”, it is coded as 0. If
Question 2 is answered with “a lot of competitors”, it is coded as 0. If statements 3e, 3f, 3h or 3i are
answered with “yes”, they are each coded as 0. If out of Question 1, 2, 5, and 3e, 3f, 3h and 3i, at least
four are coded as 0, I code the person as 0, “low perceptions of bargaining power with China.” Table
1 summarizes predictions of each mechanism outlined above for the experiment with the technical
advisors in Nigeria.
3.4

Survey Experiment Design: Conjoint Analysis
The empirical innovation of this research threefold. First, I use for the first time an

experimental design to complement the few existing observational studies on negotiation behavior
around trade and investment in China-Africa relations (e.g. Soulé 2019). Blair and Roessler (2018) use
survey experiments and experimental games to examine the effects of Chinese aid on the legitimacy
of African states but to the best of my knowledge no experiment has been conducted to better
understand motivations, policy sensitivity and exit thresholds of different types of Chinese companies
in Africa.
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Table 1: Summary of Predictions of Each Mechanism
Attributes predicted Corruption and Economic
to condition effects of Lack
of Ideology
including
local Accountability
participation in mock
deal with Chinese
investors

Believe
population
and/or special-interest
groups cannot punish
them based on choice to
sign the deal
Believe
government
should generally follow
economic deregulation
(e.g. also not experiment
with import substitution
policies)
Believe they negotiate
from a position of
weakness
Expect Chinese partner
to be willing to pay
bribes
Expect Chinese partner
to be willing to agree to
stricter deal conditions
Chinese respondents
agree to the same
level of deal strictness
that
government
respondents predict
Chinese respondents
agree to stricter deals
than
government
respondents believe

Weak Bargaining
Power Narrative:
Correct
Perceptions on
Bargaining
Power under the
Assumption that
bargaining power
is small

Ö

Distorted
Perceptions
Bargaining
Power

?

Ö

?

Ö

Ö

Ö

Ö

Ö

Ö

Ö

Ö

Ö
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Second, the study’s design for the first time shines light on how the Nigerian government and
Chinese private companies perceive each other. This feature allows us to understand the validity of
the Weak Bargaining Power Narrative versus the new Power of Weak Economies Theory advanced
in this project. The central power of the experiment therefore arises from comparing the results of
the two experiments and from drawing inferences for players’ levels of (perceived) bargaining power.
The third innovation of this research in the context of China-Africa relations is that it is an
original choice-based conjoint survey experiment. Conjoint designs allow for studying individuals’
preferences on multidimensional policies. They have been applied to a range of topics that are of
interest to political science, including voting behavior (e.g. Franchino and Zucchini 2014), mass
attitudes towards immigration (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014) or tax policy preferences (BallardRosa et al. 2017), among others. Yet, this is to my knowledge the first time that a conjoint analysis is
used to study investment deal preferences in order to A conjoint analysis is useful in this case for two
reasons: First, investment deals typically include a multitude of attributes that are a reflection of
countries’ FDI policies and case-by-case deal requests. A conjoint design allows us to estimate the
causal effects of multiple treatment components and to assess several causal hypotheses
simultaneously. It helps us to answer questions such as: How much value do companies place on the
amount of taxes versus local ownership requirements when deciding on where to invest? In addition,
a conjoint design is useful in this context here since one of the competing alternative hypothesis
concerns corruption, a variable that is difficult to measure. The conjoint design will therefore reveal
corrupt practices (if they do play a role) without direct questions on the matter.
As mentioned above, I conducted two conjoint experiments that are complementary. In
Experiment 1, government respondents were first asked to answer a series of background questions
on regional origin (North Central, North East, North West, South East, South South or South West),
education (domestic or abroad), age (< or = 50, > 50) and gender (F/M). In Experiment 2, Chinese
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respondents were asked to answer questions on industry (manufacturing or services), business
environment (competitive/not competitive), number of employees (0-5, 6-10, 10+), years of
operations (less than a year, 1-5 years, 5+ years), and located in industrial park (Yes/No) to better
understand the influence of these background variables on measured outcomes.
Each respondent in Experiment 1 and 2 was then given two hypothetical investment deal pairs
with several features that are independently randomized. Respondents were asked to rate each deal on
a scale of 0-3, and also asked which deal they would prefer to sign. Figure 1 provides a template for
the deals that were presented to all respondents.
Each combination of components corresponds to a realistic policy attribute in line with the
conditions that I found in my qualitative interviews to be important to foreign investors and
governments. In addition, several background variables are also randomized to test the influence on
deal outcomes. A short description of each attribute is offered below.
3.4.1
•

Policy Attributes

Foreign Ownership: One of three conditions appears on each deal – “The company can be 100%
foreign owned (status quo). / The company must set up a contractual joint venture with a local
partner. / The company must be 51% locally owned.” The first option describes the status quo in
Nigeria, the second option was informed by policies across several sectors in China, and the third
option reflects policies (still) practiced in e.g. Algeria and Zimbabwe. In general, we would expect
companies to be more sensitive to an increase in local ownership restrictions but the cases of
Algeria and Zimbabwe show that Chinese companies continued to increase investments over time
even after the 51% local ownership policies were set in place. As a result, this attribute is included
here to test how the Nigerian government thinks about how sensitive Chinese companies in
Nigeria would be to such restrictions, and what these companies indicate themselves.
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Figure 1: Investment Deal [Template]
Imagine that a [U.S. company60 / Chinese company] [is interested in running / has been for a year running] [a
microloan business / a foam factory / a keke ride hailing service] in [Lagos State / Oyo State / Kano State].
[blank / Another company is also interested in entering the market with the same idea.]
Imagine now that the conditions for the [U.S. company61 / Chinese company ] to [operate / keep operating
suddenly] were the following:

60
61

•

[The company can be 100% foreign owned. (status quo) / The company must set up a contractual
joint venture with a local partner. / The company must be 51% locally owned.]

•

[No local employment requirements apply. (status quo) / The company can hire non-Nigerians only
if all efforts have been explored to obtain a local expert and must propose a succession plan to train
and hire a citizen for the same position. / The company must hire at least 30% locals for executive
and senior management positions.]

•

[A five year tax holiday applies. / A corporate income tax of 30% applies. (status quo)/ A corporate
income tax of 35% applies.]

•

[No license fees apply. / A license fee of N2 million annually applies.]

•

[No facilitation payments apply / One-time facilitation payments of 180,000 Naira apply.]

•

[The company may acquire and own immovable property. Property rights will be enforced by the
Nigerian government. (status quo) / The company may lease all immovable property from the
government.]

•

[There are no water or air pollution restrictions imposed on the company. (status quo)/
The company will need to stick to strict water and air pollution regulations, including emission
restrictions set forth by the Nigerian government.]

•

The company will need to obtain standard business licenses, work permits, land acquisitions and visas
if applicable. (status quo) / The government, through the Nigerian Investment Promotion
Commission (NIPC), will expedite delivery times of business licenses, work permits, land acquisitions
and visas for the company. In addition, the government will assist the company in labor strike
settlements, facilitation of resettlements and compensation negotiations.

•

[The company is guaranteed the same conditions to hold over the next two years after which the
conditions may change or stay the same. / The company is guaranteed the same conditions to hold
over the next five years after which the conditions may change or stay the same.]

_____________________________

_________________________________

Government Signature

Company Signature

This option was left out in Experiment 2.
This option was left out in Experiment 2.
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•

Foreign Employment: Similar to the first attribute, respondents are presented with one of three
conditions: “No local employment requirements apply (status quo). / The company can hire nonNigerians only if all efforts have been explored to obtain a local expert and must propose a
succession plan to train and hire a citizen for the same position. / The company must hire at least
30% locals for executive and senior management positions.” The first option again describes the
status quo in Nigeria, the second option is practiced in other countries such as Tanzania, and the
third option describes a more extreme case
to test a possible threshold at which Chinese companies decide not to enter or exit a market. We
would again expect companies to be more sensitive to stricter employment regulations but they
may be less sensitive than government respondents believe.

•

Corporate Income Tax: The options were the following: “A five year tax holiday applies. / A
corporate income tax of 30% applies (status quo). / A corporate income tax of 35% applies.” I
included the first option to study how much companies value tax holidays compared to how much
they want to avoid the costs of other requirements. Tax holidays are already formally practiced in
several special economic zones across Africa as well as informally in villages with clusters of
Chinese companies across Nigeria. The second option describes status quo tax levels in Nigeria
and the third option is a stricter variation as practiced for example in Zambia.

•

License Fees: The options were as follows: “No license fees apply. / A license fee of N2 million
annually applies.” License fees can be placed on companies on a case-by-case base. For example,
in the summer of 2019, two keke ride hailing service providers entered the Lagos market. One
company was Nigerian (Gokada) while the other one was Chinese-owned (OPay). The Lagos
government asked both to pay a license fee of N25 million (about $70,000) annually per 1,000
kekes. I kept the license fee amount far more conservative at N2 million (around 5,500 U.S.
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dollars) to account for the fact that background characteristics include three different industries. I
also only included an annual fee that is not dependent on output levels.
•

Facilitation Payments: One of the two following conditions appeared on the deals: “No facilitation
payments apply. / One-time facilitation payments of 180,000 Naira apply.” While Western
companies need to adhere to strict anti-corruption acts in their home countries, Chinese
companies are not bound by the Chinese government to restrict corrupt behavior. We would
expect government respondents to have experience with this and ask for facilitation payments
only from Chinese companies; and Chinese companies to be willing to pay facilitation payments
although sensitivity around the amount may exist.

•

Property Rights: The two possible conditions were: “The company may acquire and own immovable
property. Property rights will be enforced by the Nigerian government (status quo). / The
company may lease all immovable property from the government.” We would expect that
companies would be more willing to sign deals where property rights are ensured, and that the
government is also aware of that. Yet, although Nigeria officially enforces property rights, some
cases of government expropriation exist. So, it may be the case that companies have experience
with expropriation cases in Nigeria and may be indifferent to what the formal law states.

•

Environmental regulations: The options were the following: “There are no water or air pollution
restrictions imposed on the company (status quo). / The company will need to stick to strict water
and air pollution regulations, including emission restrictions set forth by the Nigerian
government.” My interviews with Nigerian brokers and Chinese companies reveal that some
Nigerian regions such as Kogi State have seen a massive influx of Chinese firms in environmentally
sensitive sectors such as ceramics due to China’s increasingly strict environmental regulations and
Nigeria’s loose policies. Since these policies were apparently a pull-factor to attract companies, we
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would expect that Chinese companies are sensitive around environmental regulations and that
technical advisors may be aware of that as well.
•

Government assistance with investment procedure and settlements: One of the following conditions appeared
on each deal: “The company will need to obtain standard business licenses, work permits, land
acquisitions and visas if applicable (status quo). / The government, through the Nigerian
Investment Promotion Commission (NIPC), will expedite delivery times of business licenses,
work permits, land acquisitions and visas for the company. In addition, the government will assist
the company in labor strike settlements, facilitation of resettlements and compensation
negotiations.” Although the NIPC has recently tried to play a more active role in attracting
investment and facilitating investment procedures (e.g. by setting up a one-stop shop service),
Nigeria overall still keeps an off-hand approach to foreign investors relative to other countries
such as Ethiopia or Tanzania where their one-stop services play a much more active role in politics.
Including government assistance as an attribute will therefore help discern whether Chinese
companies prefer assistance, and how the Nigerian government thinks about the usefulness of
assisting foreign investors in setting up and running a business in their country.

•

Policy Uncertainty: The options were the following: “The company is guaranteed the same conditions
to hold over the next two years after which the conditions may change or stay the same. / The
company is guaranteed the same conditions to hold over the next five years after which the
conditions may change or stay the same.” I included policy uncertainty as an attribute following
my interviews with Chinese companies across the continent. “Policy uncertainty” was one of the
top-3 complaints reported, so we would expect longer promised policy horizons to also influence
Chinese company behavior in the experiment.
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3.4.2
•

Background Characteristics

Type of Investor: Governments were presented with deals with either a U.S. company or a Chinese
company. Chinese companies were only presented with deals about Chinese companies. The Weak
Bargaining Power Narrative suggests that Western companies are sensitive around a variety of
investment deal conditions. As a result, I include two types of investors to better understand
whether and to what extent government respondents are aware of how policy preferences differ
between Western and Chinese companies.

•

Sector: Deals described scenarios in one of three sectors: a foam factory, a keke ride hailing service,
or a microloan business. These sectors were chosen to describe scenarios that were the closest
possible to companies’ real-life situations. Most Chinese businesses in Lagos and Ogun state are
small and private, and either produce goods in a factory or provide services.

•

Entry/Exit Negotiations: The hypothetical investment deals either described an entry or an exit
scenario: In the entry scenario, a company is interested in opening a business in Nigeria, and then
the deal describes the conditions under which that would be possible. In contrast, in the exit
scenario, a company has been operating in Nigeria for a year, and suddenly the policy conditions
change to what the deal describes. This attribute is meant to test companies’ sensitivities to sudden
policy changes as experienced in Zimbabwe in 2008 and in Algeria in 2007. Since companies that
are already operating in Nigeria have already set up factories or offices in Nigeria, they may incur
more costs from exiting the market compared to those who are simply thinking of entering
Nigeria. As a result, we would expect companies already in operation to be less sensitive to stricter
policies than those who have not yet entered Nigeria.

•

Competitor: In each investment deal, there was either a competitor present or absent. We would
expect companies to be more willing to agree to deals with stricter conditions if a competitor is
present because it indicates that the sector is lucrative. At the same time, my interviews reveal that
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Chinese companies’ sensitivities were similar regardless of whether their sector was competitive
or not. Therefore, this also helps us to test whether African governments have weak bargaining
power with Chinese investors because there are no exit options for governments, or if Chinese
investors always behave the same way regardless of how competitive the environment is.
Finally, I test for potential interaction effects between the following variables:
Type of Investor & Facilitation Payments: Since U.S. companies need to adhere to strict anticorruption laws in their home economy, I expect Nigerian government respondents to know that U.S.
companies will be less willing to sign deals that include facilitation payments. In contrast, since Chinese
companies are not constraint by such laws, they may be more willing to provide these payments, and
from experience, government respondents may also be aware of that.
Sector & State: On Feburary 1, 2020, Lagos State implemented a ban on kekes and okadas. As
a result, I expect government respondents and Chinese respondents to rate the likelihood of both
sides signing deals describing a hypothetical scenario of a Chinese keke company in Lagos to be low.
After the experiment, respondents in both Experiment 1 and 2 were asked a list of follow-up
questions. Given the overlap of the experiment with the Covid-19 outbreak in the Spring of 2020, I
included questions on the impact of Covid-19 on perceived bargaining powers in the follow-up
questions for surveys conducted after March 30, 2020 (the beginning of the lockdown in Nigeria). The
full surveys can be found in the appendix.
There are certainly benefits and drawbacks in including a variety of attributes in the
hypothetical investment deals. Most importantly on the drawbacks, respondents may not understand
the wording of the deals, mix up attributes or lose interest before they have finished reading the
scenarios. In order to mitigate these concerns, survey teams received detailed instructions on how to
present the deals, to ensure that respondents in fact read the deals, and to ask after the deals were read
whether anything was unclear. We also sent out both teams to conduct pilots with government
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respondents and Chinese companies prior to conducting the experiments, where we alternated the
number of attributes from three to 15. We did not observe any differences in willingness to participate,
respond or complete the rating of two investment deal pairs, which is why we chose to include all
attributes that were commonly mentioned as important in my interviews with government officials
and companies prior to conducting the experiment. Including more attributes does not pose a threat
to power in conjoint experiments, only including more levels does. I therefore kept the amount of
levels to a maximum of three, and usually only had two per attribute.
To respond to the concern that participants might not carefully read the deals, I included a
keke ride hailing service as one of the sectoral scenarios. As mentioned above, the Lagos State
Government banned all kekes and okadas on February 1, 2020. The ban was widely publicized via the
news, social media, and posters on the street and led to protests on Lagos mainland. We would
therefore expect respondents to be generally aware of the ban, and
– if presented with a keke ride hailing service scenario in Lagos – to bring up the new regulations.
Finally, a few studies show that the order in which attributes are presented influences decision making
processes when respondents’ familiarity with the attributes is low (e.g. Kumar and Gaeth 1991). Since
all attributes listed in the deals are informed by interviews that I had conducted with stakeholders, I
assume that respondents were generally familiar with these attributes. In addition, randomizing order
of attributes per deal would also come at some costs. Most importantly, since we are asking
respondents to compare deals, keeping an order within the list of attributes may help them to compare
differences per condition more easily. I consequently decided to keep the order of attributes fixed.
3.4.3

Outcome Variables
Deal Rating (0-3): I code a variable Deal Rating that takes a value of 0, 1, 2 or 3, depending on

how likely the respondent believes the government/the company/both together would sign the deal.
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Sign deal (Yes/No): I code a binary outcome variable Sign Deal that takes a value of 0 or 1,
depending on whether the respondent would sign the deal.
3.4.4

Hypotheses
I conduct three types of analyses. First, I compare government and company responses on the

following four questions:
Government Respondents (Experiment 1):
1. In scenario X, how likely do you think would the government and the company be to both
sign the deal? (0 = definitely not sign, 3 = definitely sign)?
2. Do you think the government in scenario X would sign the deal?
3. Do you think the company in scenario X would sign the deal?
Company Respondents (Experiment 2):
4. How likely on a scale from 0-3 are you to sign deal X (0 = definitely not sign, 3 = definitely
sign)?
The central hypothesis tested through the two complementary conjoint experiments with the
Nigerian government and Chinese companies is the following:
Hypothesis 1: Technical advisors and key investment negotiators to the Nigerian government will underestimate
the government’s bargaining power with Chinese companies. This means that they will estimate Chinese
companies’ sensitivity around all policy attributes to be higher and the companies’ willingness to sign deals as lower
(Question 1 and 3) compared to their own willingness (Question 2) and to what Chinese companies report themselves
(Question 4) (Testing the Weak Bargaining Power Narrative and the Perceptions of Bargaining Power
theories).
Second, I analyze potential conditional AMCEs for both government and company responses.
As summarized in Table 1, I expect the following:
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Hypothesis 2: For government respondents that indicate to have low perceptions of bargaining power, the gap
between what deals they believe to maximize the likelihood of both the government and the company signing (Question
1) and what the Chinese company would in fact be willing to sign (Question 4) will be larger than for respondents that
have high perceptions of bargaining power (Testing the Perceptions of Bargaining Power theory).
Hypothesis 3: Government respondents who are of type “corruption/lack of accountability” will prefer deals
that include facilitation payments, and will also believe that Chinese companies are willing to sign these deals (but not
U.S. companies due to the Anti-Corruption Act), compared to respondents who are not of that type. (Testing the
Lack of Accountability and Corruption theory).
Hypothesis 4: Government respondents who are of type “liberal economic ideology” prefer to sign deals that
are less strict across all policy attributes, compared to government respondents who are not of that type (Testing the
Liberal Economic Ideology theory).
Third, since the experiment was conducted during the global Covid-19 outbreak, I also
included questions on the implications of the virus for bargaining power at the end of the survey for
respondents who took the survey after March 30, 2020 (when the Federal Government announced a
total lockdown of Lagos and Abuja due to Covid-19) to test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5: Government respondents who took the survey after March 30, 2020 will report lower/higher
levels of bargaining power across attributes, compared to pre-March 30 government respondents. Company respondents
who took the survey after March 30 will report lower/higher levels of bargaining power across attributes, compared to
pre-March 30 respondents.
3.5

Sampling and Implementation
For the government experiment, I worked together with a Nigerian NGO based in Abuja. For

the company experiment, I collaborated with a Nigerian company providing services for Chinese
companies in Lagos. We recruited the respective research teams and trained them on how to conduct
conjoint experiments. For both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, the research teams then employed
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snowball sampling to identify suitable research subjects. For the government survey, the Nigerian
research team reached out to all technical advisors within the federal government of Nigeria as well as
for the Lagos State governments, who then gave us contacts to more research subjects involved in
investment and trade negotiations. We contacted each person at most twice. In total, we were able to
recruit 134 government respondents. 122 respondents rated both deal pairs, 12 respondents chose to
only rate one deal pair. In total, we therefore have 512 ratings (Table 2).
For the Chinese company survey, the Chinese research team used contacts from the Nigerian
company that was leading the project with me, who then gave us contacts to more research subjects
who were managing Chinese companies in Lagos and Ogun State. In addition, our research team also
drove around the city of Lagos and small villages in Ogun State to look for Chinese company signs
and then approached them directly. We specifically targeted clusters of Chinese companies (but not
Ogun Guangdong and Lekki FTZ Zone) outside of Lagos, and focused on single Chinese companies
in the Lagos area. We were able to recruit 142 company respondents, with 121 respondents rating
both deals and 21 choosing to only rate one deal pair. In total, we collected 526 ratings (Table 2).

Table 2: Set of Respondents and Total Number of Ratings
Pre-Covid-19

Pre-Covid-19

Total Number Total Number

Number of

Number of

of

Respondents

Respondents

Respondents

85

49

134

512

71

71

142

526

or Ratings

Government
Respondents
Company
Respondents
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Both survey experiments were supposed to be implemented between February and May 2020.
Yet, the first official Covid-19 cases emerged in Nigeria at the beginning of March and the Nigerian
government implemented a lockdown in Lagos and Abuja on March 30, 2020. We had conducted 85
surveys with the government and 71 surveys with companies until then. We then had to pause the
experiments while waiting for further instructions from the Nigerian government and the Yale Faculty
of Arts and Sciences Dean’s Office on in-person research. To protect the safety of the research teams,
we eventually decided to switch completely to phone interviews. The Chinese research team resumed
work on April 15, while the Nigerian research team resumed work on June 10. Both survey
experiments were completed by July 10, 2020.
The exogenous Covid-19 shock could have significantly influenced causal processes that this
project aims to study. We therefore included Covid-19 related questions in the interviews conducted
after March 30 to be able to deal with the shock as a potential “treatment”. Please find the Covid-19
related questions in the questionnaires in the Appendix.
3.6

Results
Since the deal attributes are conditionally independent randomizations, the Average Marginal

Component Effect (AMCE) and the Average Component Interaction Effect (ACIE) are nonparametrically identified and are estimated using a regression of the outcome variables on indicator
variables corresponding to the values taken by each attribute (Hainmueller et al. 2013; Hainmueller
and Hopkins 2014). Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level to account for the nonindependence of multiple choices made by each respondent. I employ Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
throughout the analysis. Research subjects in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 are hereafter called
“government respondents” and “company respondents”, respectively.
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3.6.1

Analysis 1: Perception versus Reality - Comparison Between Government

Perceptions and Actual Behavior of Chinese Companies
The first and core analysis concerns responses to the following four questions, with a key
comparison between questions 1 and 4:
Government Respondents (Experiment 1):
1. In scenario X, how likely do you think would the government and the company be to
both sign the deal? (0 = definitely not sign, 3 = definitely sign)?
2. Do you think the government in scenario X would sign the deal?
3. Do you think the company in scenario X would sign the deal?
Company Respondents (Experiment 2):
4. How likely on a scale from 0-3 are you to sign deal X (0 = definitely not sign, 3 =
definitely sign)?

The

comparison

between

these

four

questions

shines

light

on

government

respondents’ perceptions of Chinese companies’ behavior (Question 1 and 2), their own behavior
(Question 1 and 3), and whether Chinese companies would in fact agree to deals with the government
(Question 4).
Figure 1 in the Appendix summarizes the main results for how government respondents rated
the likelihood of both the government and the company signing the deal (Question 1) and 95%
confidence intervals for each attribute. The first finding is that government respondents rated the
likelihood as significantly lower if everything else equal, the deal included ownership [“Joint Venture”
(-0.22) and “51% locally owned” (-0.26)], and employment restrictions [“Succession Plan” (-0.11) and
“At least 30% local for executive and senior management” (-0.15)], if the deal included facilitation
payments (-0.10), license fees (-0.058), if the deal was made in Kano State (-0.15) or if the corporate
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income tax was raised to 35% (-0.12). In contrast, government respondents rated the likelihood of
both parties signing the deal as higher if the government provided extra assistance (0.10) or if there
was a competitor present (0.13).
Perhaps surprisingly, the responses placed relatively less value on whether the negotiations
were over entry or exit, whether environmental regulations were present or not, whether companies
were granted land rights or the land was only able to be leased, for how long the regulations would be
in place, what sector the deal was concerning and whether the deal took place in Lagos State.
Importantly, respondents also made no distinction on their likelihood ratings between whether the
company was a Chinese or U.S. one, indicating that they assessed both types of companies to be
equally likely to sign or not sign deals with the government. None of the Average Component
Interaction Effects (ACIEs) were statistically significant, which could be an issue of small sample size.
The average rating of the likelihood of singing a deal was a mere 1.06. If the cut-off between
singing a deal or not were 1.5 (since the scale was 0-3), this implies that government respondents
believed most deals would be rejected by at least one of the parties. The assumption is that respondents
have evaluated both the government and the company’s likelihood to sign the deal, and then based
their assessment of overall likelihood of singing the deal on whatever likelihood of the two parties
they believed to be lower. So, whose perceived preferences are driving this low rating? In other words,
are government responses based on what they believe to be Chinese or Nigerian government
preferences?
In order to answer this question, the survey had government respondents answer separately
whether they thought that first, the state government and second, the company would sign the deal.
Figure 2 in the Appendix provides a summary of government respondents’ opinions about the state
government decisions and 95% confidence intervals for each attribute. Since most attributes are
beneficial to the government, the percentage of deals that state governments are perceived to be willing
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to sign is unsurprisingly high (79%). The government is perceived to be significantly more willing to
sign a deal if, everything else equal, it included a 35% corporate tax rate (0.12), local ownership
requirements (0.11 and 0.18, respectively for each level), license fees (0.19) and facilitation payments
(0.11), and at least 30% local employment requirements for executive and senior management (0.14).
In contrast, the government is less likely to sign deals that include a competitor (-0.14), if it was
concerning a keke ride hailing service (-0.07), was signed in Lagos (-0.12), or included a tax holiday (0.08). Interestingly, the ACIE for keke ride hailing service and Lagos is now negative, large and
significant (-0.31), indicating that the government may well be aware of the keke and okada ban in
Lagos.
Figure 3 in the Appendix summarizes government respondents’ perceptions of whether a
company (either Chinese or U.S. one) would sign a deal or not. Of the deal presented, respondents
estimated that companies would sign a mere 18.55 percent.62 Similar to their response on Question 1
(the overall likelihood of both parties signing the deal), government subjects indicated that they
believed companies are less likely to sign deals if they included ownership (-0.175 and -0.206,
respectively for each level) and employment restrictions (-0.161 and 0.215 respectively for each level),
if there were facilitation payments (-0.069), if the deal was made in Kano State (-0.216) or if corporate
taxes were raised to 35% (-0.129).
In contrast, they believed companies were more likely to sign deals if the deal included
government assistance (0.121), if a competitor was present (0.227), or if it included tax holidays (0.174).
Importantly, the coefficient on type of company is small (0.03) and not significant, indicating that the
government believes U.S. and Chinese companies are about equally likely to sign deals. The results
largely overlap with the responses to Question 1, except the coefficient on license fees remains
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Assumed cut-off rating between signing/not signing: 1.5.
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statistically insignificant here and the coefficient on tax holidays is now large and significant (since
Question 3 is explicitly about company preferences only).
These findings provide important information on how government respondents assess
company’s preferences, and how these perceived preferences translate into the overall likelihood of
the government being able to strike a deal with investors. Beliefs about companies’ preferences
(Question 3) significantly overlap with respondents’ overall assessment of how likely both parties
would be to sign a deal (Question 1), indicating that it is mostly perceptions about
companies’ preferences that are overall driving the results presented in Figure 1. According to
government respondents, the government would be likely to sign most deals while companies strongly
favor deals with less restrictions and, importantly, are also unlikely to give in to government demands.
Overall, the low average rating suggests that there was a general pessimism on companies signing,
which translates into a very low average rating for the likelihood of a deal signed by both parties.
The central question of this analysis is: How do these government perceptions of Chinese
company behavior compare to companies’ actual behavior gathered from the company survey that
was conducted with managers of Chinese businesses in Lagos and Ogun State? The results in Figure
4 in the Appendix show that there is a quite striking gap between what deals government respondents
believe Chinese companies would sign and what deals Chinese companies would in fact sign. Most
centrally, companies rated deals with an average of 1.34 (on a 0-3 scale), which is 0.28 points higher
than what government had respondents indicated on Question 1 (1.06).
In particular, Chinese companies indicated that they would be less likely to sign deals that,
everything else equal, required 51% local ownership (-0.14), or “At least 30% local for executive and
senior management” (-0.11). However, and very importantly, the coefficients on “Joint Venture” and
“Succession Plan” are small (-0.09 and -0.07) and not statistically significant. In addition, companies
rated deals lower that included environmental regulations (-0.09), license fees (-0.09), and if corporate
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income taxes were raised to 35% (-0.12). In contrast, companies were more likely to sign deals where
the government provided assistance (0.14), the deal concerned a foam factory (0.19) or companies
were granted a tax holiday (0.42). All interaction terms, including the interaction term of state and
sector remains insignificant, indicating that Chinese companies may have also been unaware of the
okada and keke ban in Lagos.
A key comparison in Figure 2 between Question 1 and Question 4 shows that government
respondents severely overestimated the importance of ownership (by 0.12 points for “51% locally
owned” and the coefficient for “Joint Venture” is only large and statistically significant in the
government survey results) and employment restrictions (by 0.03 points for “At least 30% local for
executive and senior management” while the coefficient for “Succession Plan” is only large and
significant for the government survey results). The government slightly underestimated the
importance of a deal being signed in Kano (by 0.04 points) and of license fees (by 0.02 points).

Figure 2: Comparison Between Question 1 (Government Responses) and Question 4
(Company Responses): Likelihood to Sign the Deal
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On the positive attributes to investors, government respondents underestimated the
importance of providing government assistance (by 0.04 points), and believed that the presence of a
competitor and facilitation payments would influence the likelihood a deal being signed ratings, which
is not reflected in the company results. Government and company responses largely overlapped,
however, for (estimated) sensitivity to 35% tax. Finally, the government believed that facilitation
payments, the presence of a competitor and whether the deal was signed in Lagos State mattered to
Chinese companies (which they did not). In addition, the government did not indicate that
environmental restrictions, tax holiday, or sector (keke ride hailing service) would matter for Chinese
companies (which they did).
A comparison between Question 3 (government perceptions on whether the company would
sign a deal) and Question 4 (company responses on whether they would sign the deal) shows very
similar results.63 Government respondents again significantly overestimated the importance of
ownership (by 0.01 points for “51% local owned”, and the coefficient for “Joint Venture” is only large
and statistically significant in the government survey results) and employment restrictions (by 0.05
points for “At least 30% local for executive and senior management” while the coefficient for
“Succession Plan” is only large and significant for the government survey results). Again, government
respondents underestimated companies’ sensitivity to environmental regulations and thought they did
not matter (which they did).
On positive attributes, they underestimated the importance of government assistance (by 0.02
points) and the foam factory sector but overestimated the importance of a competitor and facilitation
payments (the coefficient was not significant for company respondents). They acknowledged but
underestimated the importance of tax holidays by 0.24 points.

Question 3 asks for a Y/N answer while Question 4 asks for a rating. For a comparison, we need to view the 0-3 scale
as a Y/N, with 1.5 as the decision point.
63
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As a second check on the company survey I included the question: “What would have to
happen so that you take the decision to leave Nigeria; and where else would you go?” at the very end
of the survey. Interestingly, my research team reported back to me that many respondents were
confused about this question in particular and said that they did not intend to leave, even if the overall
business environment got difficult. “I don’t understand, I don’t want to leave.”, “I’m not leaving, my
business is here, we always face difficulty with the government or the currency or electricity but [it is
the] same in China, I prefer to be here, I can make better money here”, and “There is no place like
here I can go to.”
25% of company respondents said that they would leave if taxes increased significantly, they
started to make losses or if the security situation got significantly worse, and that in that case, they
would go back to China. Interestingly, none of the respondents mentioned that they would leave if
they suddenly had to employ locals, and only five said that they would leave if they had to set up a
Joint Venture with a local company.
Is the difference statistically significant in how the government and companies perceive local
participation requirements? In order to answer this question, I combined government and company
responses and interacted each of the variables “ownership” and “employment” with type of
respondent. Figure 3 and 4 present the results. The Average Component Interaction Effects (ACIEs)
for both ownership levels are negative and statistically significant (-0.22 and -0.25, respectively) for
government respondents, but only negative and significant for “51% local ownership” (-0.15) for
company respondents. Similarly, the ACIEs for both employment levels are negative and statistically
significant (-0.09 and -0.12, respectively) for government respondents, but neither level is significant
for company respondents.
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Figure 3: Interaction Effects (ACIEs) Between Ownership and Type of Respondent

Government Respondents

Company Respondents

Ownership

Figure 4: Interaction Effects (ACIEs) Between Employment and Type of Respondent

Government Respondents

Company Respondents

Employment
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After re-introducing all other attributes and interacting each ownership and employment
variables with type of respondents, the interaction of “Joint Venture” and “government respondent”
remains significant and positive (please see Figure 5 in the Appendix), which is again supporting
Hypothesis 1. Introducing interactions of different attributes generally hurts power in conjoint
experiments. In combination with the very small sample size here, we may therefore not be able to
detect significant interaction effects of the other interacted levels around “51% ownership” and the
employment attribute levels.

Discussion:
Overall, government and company responses largely overlapped regarding revenue generating
attributes (e.g. taxes, licenses, facilitation payments) but there appears to be an important gap between
what the government thinks they can ask in terms of local participation (ownership and employment)
and what Chinese companies are in fact willing to give, especially on the first levels (“Joint Venture”
and “Succession Plan”). This confirms Hypothesis 1 for the local participation dimension - technical
advisors and key investment negotiators to the Nigerian government will underestimate the
government’s bargaining power with private Chinese companies. This means that they estimated
Chinese companies’ sensitivity around ownership and employment restrictions to be higher and
companies’ willingness to sign deals as lower (Question 1 and 2) compared to their own willingness
(Question 3) and to what Chinese companies report themselves (Question 4). That companies are
sensitive around revenue generating attributes, and that the government is also aware of that, seems
logical. After all, companies invested in Nigeria to generate profits - and taxes, licenses, and facilitation
payments directly reduce these profits. In contrast, local participation requirements may have more
indirect effects – by employing someone local, companies’ profits may not automatically suffer if they
train the person well and efficiently. Governments may be more aware of companies’ sensitivities to
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revenue generating attributes since these are also highly important and debated within the international
capitalist regime while the Weak Bargaining Power Narrative suggests that local participation
requirements are “lying outside” any possible policy range.
One argument against my theory is that even if formal deal conditions were aggressive, companies
know that the government has limited capacity to effectively enforce these conditions. The results that
companies are sensitive around taxes is therefore particularly interesting – the Nigerian government
may be enforcing tax collection at least well enough so that Chinese companies are in fact sensitive to
an increase.
Another interesting observation is that government respondents believed Chinese and Western
companies were sensitive to facilitation payment (corruption) when at least the Chinese ones are in
fact not. My interviews with Chinese managers in Nigeria also confirm that Chinese companies tend
to view personal payments as a way to facilitate transactions and that they were used to these payments
from the Chinese market. The fact that the Nigerian government is less aware about this again suggests
that they may equate Chinese company behavior with Western one, where there are clear and
prominent Anti-Corruption Acts in the West that prevent Western companies from engaging in
corrupt behavior with government officials.
3.6.2

Analysis 2: Subgroups
As indicated earlier, the first part of the conjoint experiment included a survey on background

covariates to test whether different “subgroups” of government respondents reacted differently to the
presented investment deals. Since the subgroups are not randomly assigned, the differences in effects
across the subgroups are only descriptive rather than causal, and may be sensitive to sampling
variability. Below I present responses to Question 1: “In scenario X, how likely do you think would
the government and the company be to both sign the deal?”, categorized by “perceived bargaining
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power”, “corrupt” and “liberal ideology” for government respondents. Please find all other subgroup
results in the Appendix.

Perceptions on Bargaining Power:
Figure 6 in the Appendix shows that among government respondents, low perceivers of
bargaining power are more pessimistic than high perceivers around the likelihood of a deal signed by
both parties if it included “51% local ownership”, an “employment succession plan”, “at least 30%
local for executive and senior management”, “35% income tax”, “license fees”, and if the deal was
made in Kano State. In contrast, high perceivers were more pessimistic around “Joint Venture”
requirements. High perceivers were optimistic that “government assistance” would increase the
likelihood of both parties signing a deal and pessimistic around “facilitation payments”, while the
coefficients on both variables for low perceivers were not statistically significant. Low perceivers were
optimistic that a deal situation around an “exit” versus an “entry” decision would increase the
likelihood of both parties signing a deal, while the coefficient was not statistically significant for high
perceivers. In addition, low perceivers were also more optimistic of a deal being signed than high
perceivers if there was a “competitor” present.
Overall, these results support the argument advanced here that low perceivers of bargaining
power believe that companies will be more sensitive to a variety of policy restrictions, compared to
high perceivers. At the same time, even the high perceivers underestimated how much Chinese
companies were willing to comply around local participation. Interestingly and in stark contrast with
my government interviews, the majority indicated in their responses that Nigeria has bargaining power
(104 out of 134). Government respondents therefore seemed to be more open with me than with the
Nigerian interviewers, and there may have been more interviewees of the type “low perceivers” than
they self-identified to the interview team. This could be because admitting to their co-ethnic peers or
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citizens that they believe Nigeria has weak bargaining power might be politically more difficult than
to have an open conversation with a foreigner. This was also confirmed by a head of a federal
government agency who I interviewed, and who said that “officially to the press”, they would say that
Nigeria has bargaining power but to me they can “openly say” that they “don’t have any power” and
that “everyone in the government is aware of that.”64

Corruption/Lack of Accountability:
Regarding “corruption, lack of accountability”, 80 out of 134 respondents were coded as
“corrupt.” Most respondents said that deal outcomes did not matter for elections, and that neither
voters nor companies had inquired with them about the conditions specified in any past investment
deal. Interestingly, Figure 7 in the Appendix shows that respondents coded as “corrupt” were more
pessimistic across a variety of attributes compared to the “non-corrupt” ones, also regarding
companies’ sensitivity to facilitation payments. I would have expected the opposite – if respondents
believed that deal conditions were not accessible to the public, and that deal outcomes would matter
very little for elections, then governments could have preferred to sign deals that included personal
benefits, e.g. facilitation payments, and cared little about the rest of conditions. Yet, in fact,
respondents of type “corrupt” perceived the overall likelihood of a deal being signed by both parties
as lower if facilitation payments were part of the deal, compared to the type “not corrupt”. These
results point against the corruption hypothesis, that the government would be willing to sign “weak
deals” in exchange for personal benefits.

64

L17.
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Liberal Economic Ideology:
Very few individuals (14 out of 134) indicated that they always supported a liberal ideology, so
confidence intervals are very wide here for this group. Figure 8 in the Appendix shows that those of
type “liberal ideology” appear to be more pessimistic of both parties signing a deal across attributes.
The fact that very few respondents reported to always support a liberal ideology indicates that most
are in theory flexible around deal conditions, and that they are not bound to a particularly liberal
ideology that would lead them to support “weak deals”, regardless if they perceive their bargaining
power to be high or low.
3.6.3

Analysis 3: Covid-19 as an External Shock
As mentioned earlier, both experiments were conducted in the Spring and Summer of 2020.

The global Covid-19 outbreak and the beginning of the lockdown in Abuja and Lagos on March 30
forced the team to put the experiments on a hold when we had collected 85 and 71 of completed
government and company survey forms, respectively. We switched to phone interviews thereafter.
Figure 9 and 10 in the Appendix show that the conjoint experiment results reveal no striking
differences between pre-and post-Covid-19 induced lockdown for the likelihood of signing deals. In
order to better understand the potential impact of the shock, I also included the following questions
on the survey for respondents who took it after the lockdown decision was announced.

Government Survey:
1. "How do you think have falling oil prices and the devaluation of the naira affected Nigeria’s relations with
China? With the rest of the world?"
2. "How, if at all, has the Covid-19 outbreak changed your image of China?"
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Company Survey:
1. How, if at all, has the Covid-19 outbreak affected your business in Nigeria?
2. Do you consider changing anything about your business operations in response to the Covid-19 outbreak?

The majority of government respondents indicated that the falling oil prices and the devaluation
of the naira would affect Nigeria’s relation with China and the rest of the world “negatively” and that
their image of China has not changed due to the outbreak. Overall, this indicates that perceived
bargaining power did not shift, or because the Nigerian economy took a severe hit in the second
quarter of 2020, shifted in favor of China.
The majority of company respondents, and especially those in the manufacturing industry, said
that the Covid-19 outbreak did affect their business in Nigeria, mainly because of supply shortages in
raw material imported from China, because of a decline in consumer demand in Nigeria, or because
of distribution difficulties due to the inter-state travel and transportation ban imposed by the
government during parts of the lockdown. Responses to the second question varied and were perhaps
surprising: Factory managers said that they would like to diversify away from importing only from
China, and try to source raw material locally. In addition, several managers in service-based industries
said that they would need to have an even stronger focus on the Nigerian market to better understand
what drives demand in a depressed economy. Only five respondents said that they were considering
to exit the market due to the Covid-19 outbreak. Overall, it therefore seems like the outbreak has (so
far) not significantly negatively affected the attractiveness and bargaining power of the Nigerian
government; in fact, company responses indicated that they are considering an even more Nigeriafocused strategy that may also cover procurement of raw material in the future.

129

3.7

Long-Term Learning
One central limitation to the experiments conducted here is that while they provide us with a

“snapshot” of how governments and companies perceive bargaining power at one point in time, they
tell us very little about how these perceptions change over time with information updates that could
lead to longer-term learning and shifts in perceptions around respective bargaining power. To respond
to this concern to a very limited extent, I included the following “information treatment” after the
survey team had presented both deal pairs to the government respondents:

(Interviewer: Please read the following text to the respondent and show them the graph
attached to this survey package. Please then take notes on the interviewee’s response)
“Studies show that Nigeria is the #1 investment destination on the continent for small and medium private Chinese
firms. Chinese firms like the cheap land, labor and the large market size in Nigeria that is unparalleled on the continent.
Naturally, the most common response in a survey conducted by us among Chinese manufacturers in Nigeria was along
the lines of “Labor is so cheap here, I would stay under any policy regulations”. (+show graph below from Chen, Dollar
and Teng (2015) This shows that Chinese companies really want to invest and operate in the Nigerian market.”
Knowing this, would you want to impose stricter local participation requirements on them, or not? Why/Why not?
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Of the 134 government respondents, 98 (73%) indicated that they would indeed impose
stricter local participation requirements. The most common reasons listed were: “I didn’t know that
we had that many small private firms here”, “I didn’t know Nigeria was ranked #1.” 21 respondents
even asked whether they could read the full report on the survey that was conducted. 36 respondents
indicated that they would still not impose stricter regulations. Asked why, the most common responses
were that “Maybe we are #1 because we don’t have these restrictions” and “It isn’t good to have too
many regulations, investors don’t like it.”
While the results point towards my hypothesis, certainly, this “information treatment” has
severe limitations. For example, respondents could have felt pressured to say yes, but kept supporting
their original stance on local participation policies. In addition, we also do not know for how long this
“information treatment” lasted, and how many treatments would be needed to update
respondents’ perceptions more permanently. This is therefore only a first attempt at measuring
learning about bargaining power that future research should undertake more systematically and
rigorously.
3.8

External Validity
External validity questions concern the similarity between the experiment setting and real-world

experiences of deal negotiations between investors and governments. The first concern is that
negotiation partners were not sitting in the same room, and that if respondents had faced their
negotiation partner, they would have rated deals differently. This concern is mitigated by the fact that
in situations where both parties are present, intimidation practices may influence individuals more
than without the negotiation partner actively present. As a result, both parties could be acting bolder
separately as if they were in a room together and one party was intimidating the other one.
Governments granted Chinese investors much leeway even without them present in the room. These
findings indicate that the government is likely to grant them the same or even more if the investor was
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actually present. On the Chinese side, the reasoning is similar - even without a government official
present, Chinese companies indicated that they would be willing to sign more deals than what
government respondents believed.
A second concern is that government respondents may have been highly aware of what Nigeria’s
current official national FDI policies are, and felt reluctant to sign any deal that deviated from the
official law, even if they felt that companies would agree to stricter regulations. This concern is
mediated through two forces. First, the year prior to conducting the experiments, I conducted semistructured interviews with 45 Nigerian government officials at the federal and state level. The majority
of interviewees (87%) agreed with the statement that “it was possible to adjust national policies in in
case-by-case situation where local realities required such changes.” I also heard of multiple examples
of state governments effectively setting their own conditions in deal negotiations around land rights,
facilitation payments or license fees. Second, I included the survey question: “How many of the
following changes would you make to maximize the chances of the company in scenario 4 signing the
deal?”, with a list of individual attributes below. Responses vastly overlapped with the regression
results found for Question 1.
A final concern is about how the results travel cross-nationally. I had interviewed Chinese
companies in the manufacturing and service sectors across all countries that I visited in the year prior
to conducting the experiment; responses largely overlapped across countries, with companies
confirming a high likelihood of agreeing to stricter deals. These interview findings were in fact the
motivating force behind also identifying the gap in government perceptions versus reality within an
experimental setting.
3.9

Conclusion
This chapter makes an important contribution to China-Africa literature by for the first time

highlighting a gap between perceived and actual negotiation power of the Nigerian government with
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Chinese companies regarding local participation. The existence of this gap stands in stark contrast to
the Weak Bargaining Power Narrative, which claims that perceptions and reality of respective levels
of bargaining power perfectly overlap, and that there is simply very small room for governments to
impose stricter regulations if they want to attract any types of investors.
The experiment serves as a fitting test to show that the gap exists. However, it leaves important
questions unanswered on why exactly the gap exists. At the core, the Nigerian government does not
receive accurate or complete information on its bargaining power. Yet, what are the causal
mechanisms through which governments continue to receive this inaccurate or incomplete
information that then translates into wrong perceptions on bargaining power? In order to answer this
question, I conducted 218 semi-structured interviews across five African countries to shine light on
the political economy around information flows that influence governments’ perceptions of their own
bargaining power. Chapter 5 and 6 summarize these findings and responds to external validity
concerns that are posed by any experimental setting.
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CHAPTER 4: PERCEPTIONS ON BARGAINING
POWER
4.1

Introduction
This study aims to assess the degree of African bargaining power and why it does or does not

translate into how aggressive African governments negotiate with private Chinese investors around
local participation. One of the major challenges when making claims about the scope of “African
bargaining power” is the following: Ideally, one should define a large enough universe of comparable
countries for analysis (e.g. see Chen et al. 2018). At the same time, it is also important to pay enough
attention and time to studying each country well enough to understand idiosyncrasies in
countries’ negotiation behavior that may otherwise be overlooked (e.g. see Lauria 2020, Chen 2020).
Faced with an inherent tradeoff between depth and breadth, this project takes three
approaches to studying African bargaining power: First, the cross-country panel regression analysis
conducted in Chapter 2 provided a first bird’s eye-view on the overall bargaining landscape in Africa.
Yet, while a cross-country analysis is useful as a first step, it does not allow us to understand causal
mechanisms behind the detected correlations in the panel data.
Chapter 3 then presented as a second approach to studying African bargaining power a
conjoint experiment conducted in Nigeria to highlight the rationale behind investment negotiations in
one single case to understand how causal drivers of weak deals with Chinese companies play out on
the national level. Nigeria is arguably one of the more difficult cases to test the theories presented here
due to high levels of corruption as well as its close economic ties to the West. It is therefore a fitting
case to assess the new theory on bargaining power and why some countries underestimate it against
existing alternative explanations.

Chapter 5 and 6 will offer a third approach to studying African bargaining power by drawing
on qualitative interviews and honing in on why some of them negotiate more aggressively than others
around local participation. This chapter therefore provides the justification for the case selection of
five countries (Nigeria, Ethiopia, South Africa, Kenya and Tanzania) that I deem appropriate to study
for making larger claims about “African bargaining power” in the region. I purposefully focus on the
top-receivers as their decisions around Chinese capital have more impact on a regional scale.
4.2

The Logic For The Case Selection – A New Typology
What countries lend themselves as suitable case studies to better understand African

bargaining power? While China has invested in 51 out of 54 countries, the top-15 receivers of Chinese
investments still account for 77.565 percent of total investments. Despite the magnitude of investment
deals negotiated in these countries, literature has little grasp on Chinese investments in Africa,66 let
alone on the negotiation processes around investment deals that are often signed behind closed doors.
Understanding how African leaders from top-receiving nations think about negotiating with Chinese
investors is therefore especially important to capture and describe for the first time governments’ logic
around a substantial amount of investment deal negotiations on the African continent.
The primary motivation behind the case selection here was to ensure that there is variation in
the dependent variable, deal quality. Table 1 shows that among the top-15 receivers67 of Chinese
investments, there are significant differences in how aggressive FDI regulations are, based on the Deal
Quality Index that I developed in Chapter 2.

2017 estimates, Johns-Hopkins University China-Africa Research Initiative data.
For example, see Bräutigam et al. 2015, who called literature on Chinese investments at best “thin.” (pg.2).
67 Based on 2017 estimates, Johns-Hopkins University China-Africa Research Initiative data. Please note that Zimbabwe
(ranked 8th), Sudan (ranked 12th) and the Republic of Congo (ranked 13th) are also among the top-15 receivers of Chinese
investments (2017) but are not listed here because the IFC’s “FDI Regulations” data base does not provide data on these
countries.
65
66
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Table 1: Top-Receivers of Chinese Investment Stocks (2017)68

Top-Receivers of
Chinese
Deal Quality
Investment Stocks
Score:
in Africa (2017):
Very InvestorFriendly Deals:
Zambia
Mauritius
Kenya
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Group Means:
Medium InvestorFriendly Deals:
Ghana
Tanzania
Nigeria
South Africa
Group Means:
Aggressive Deals:
Mozambique
Algeria
Angola
Ethiopia
Group Means:

Chinese FDI Stocks
Chinese FDI
(US$ bn) 2018:
Stocks/GDP 2018:

19.92
19.11
27.27
36.40
25.67

3.52
1.00
1.76
4.44
2.68

0.14%
7.52%
2.23%
11.69%
5.39%

41.90
46.40
53.77
62.75
51.21

1.80
1.30
2.45
6.53
3.02

3.05%
2.44%
0.65%
1.87%
2.00%

83.04
90.28
99.73
100.00
93.26

1.41
2.06
2.30
2.57
2.09

10.67%
1.23%
1.88%
3.14%
4.23%

Zambia, Mauritius, Kenya and the Democratic Republic of Congo provide a relatively open
environment (deal score: 0-40) for foreign investors while Ghana, Tanzania, Nigeria and South Africa
are more restrictive (deal score: 40-70), and finally Mozambique, Algeria, Angola and Ethiopia are the

I consistently use 2017 CARI data throughout the project but please note that I used Chinese FDI stocks and GDP
for the year 2018, which became available in 2020, in order to provide the most recent estimate.
68
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most aggressive (deal score: 70-100) in their foreign investment policies. Selecting countries from each
of the three “baskets” of deal quality was therefore important.
I classify countries among the 15 top-receivers of Chinese investments to have either “strong”
or “very strong bargaining power.” Countries like South Africa or Nigeria, who receive more absolute
Chinese investments and whose share of Chinese investments of total GDP is lower (1.87% and
0.65%, Table 1) should have even higher bargaining power than countries like Ethiopia, Tanzania and
Kenya that receive relatively less Chinese investments and where the share of Chinese investments of
total GDP is higher (3.14% and 2.44% and 2.23%, Table 1). This is because it is not only important
how much investments matter to both the African and the Chinese side, but also the difference who it
is more important to (Hirschman 1958). If the amount of Chinese investment relative to total GDP
is small, it matters less for economic development, and African countries should have more bargaining
power with China.
What explains this variation in deal quality among these top receivers who have strong or very
strong bargaining power? The central argument advanced here is that several African governments
possess bargaining power with private Chinese investors but that African bargaining power is not
always reflected in the quality of deals negotiated between the two players. Rather than variables such
as corruption or ideology, where the underlying assumption is that actors always have perfect
knowledge of their bargaining power, I argue in Chapter 1 that some top-receiving African countries
underestimate this power.
In order to test this claim, I selected Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa, Ethiopia and Tanzania as
case studies because they provide variation in both independent and dependent variables and therefore
lend themselves as suitable cases to make claims about the larger universe of receivers of Chinese
investments in Africa.
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This project relies on 15 months of field work in Nigeria, South Africa, Ethiopia, Kenya and
Tanzania that I completed over two semesters and three summers between the years 2018 to 2020. In
addition to the two conjoint experiments described in Chapter 3, I conducted 218 semi-structured
interviews with political representatives of the Nigerian, Kenyan, Ethiopian, South African and
Tanzanian federal governments, the Lagos, Ogun and Oyo State governments, village chiefs in
Nigeria, members of parliament, senior opposition leaders, and private sector executives and Chinese
investors, company owners and senior managers across the five countries (please see Table 2 and 3
for numbers by country; and numbers by position). In order to protect my interviewee’s anonymity, I
do not list positions or offices wherever I did not get explicit permission to do so. However, Table 3
shows that most of my interviewees were senior staff, including seven ministers or deputy ministers
and generals or deputy generals of federal government agencies or parastatals. I spent around one to
two months of field work in each country, and seven months of field work in Nigeria.

Table 2: Number of Interviews Per Country
Nigeria Kenya South Africa Ethiopia Tanzania TOTAL
#Government Interviews

45

23

23

21

19

131

#Company Interviews
TOTAL

38
83

15
38

5
28

13
34

16
35

87
218
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Table 3: Position of Government Interviews Per Country
Nigeria Kenya South Africa Ethiopia Tanzania TOTAL
Minister or General of
Federal Government
Agency/Parastatal

3

1

1

0

0

5

Deputy Minister or Deputy
General of Federal
Government
Agency/Parastatal

1

0

0

1

0

2

28

13

19

18

16

94

1

0

0

0

0

1

5
1
2
1

4
3

0

0

0

0

0

1
1
0

9
5
3
1

3
45

2
23

3
23

2
21

1
19

11
131

Senior Staff (e.g. senior
economist, investment
promotion commissioner,
senior foreign affairs officer)
Sub-Regional Leader (e.g.
governor/county leader)
Mid-Level Staff (e.g. deputy
economist, trade bureau
officer etc.)
Members of Parliament
Opposition Leaders
Village Chiefs
Others (senior business
individuals, villagers etc.)
TOTAL

In all five countries, I reached out to all government offices tasked with investment promotion
via email, phone contacts or personal connections and also visited them in person to gain access to
schedules and to set up appointments. For company interviews, I relied on online research, personal
contacts and snowball sampling once I was on the ground. I tried to ensure variation among
companies for each country that I visited, and to interview around half of companies in the
manufacturing sector, and the other half in the service sector. Overall, 51% of companies I interviewed
were operating in the manufacturing sector, 44% in the service industry, and 5% in natural resources.
All of them were in-cooperated in Africa only, and had a maximum of 25 employees.
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Since I was spending most of my time in capitals, I naturally conducted more in-person
interviews with Chinese companies in urban areas. Yet, I also conducted phone interviews with
Chinese companies in rural areas, including Kano and Kogi State in Nigeria. I was also able to visit 17
Chinese companies operating in a village in Ogun State. Chapter 6 discusses this visit in detail. I
conducted interviews in English or French, depending on what the interviewer was more comfortable
with. Three Chinese interviewees used a translator that they provided. Individuals were usually
surprisingly open to be interviewed – only one person declined an interview. Interviews took around
45 minutes, on average.
Table 4 summarizes my interview results on how governments assess their bargaining power
with Chinese private investors across the five cases. My interviews reveal that despite having strong
or very strong bargaining power with private Chinese investors, governments in Nigeria and Kenya
perceive this bargaining power to be low, that South Africa is a hybrid, and that the Ethiopian and
Tanzanian governments perceive their bargaining power to be high.

Table 4: Actual and Perceived Bargaining Power – Case Selection

Strong

or

Weak Perceived

Medium Perceived

Strong Perceived

Bargaining Power

Bargaining Power

Bargaining Power

Kenya, Nigeria

South Africa

Ethiopia, Tanzania

Very

Strong Bargaining
Power
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4.3

Perceptions on Bargaining Power Across the Selected Cases
The following section describes each “type” (weak perceived bargaining power, medium

perceived bargaining power and strong perceived bargaining power) in more detail by summarizing
sectoral composition of Chinese investments in each country, the nature of countries’ foreign
investment regimes, and how respective government offices tasked with attracting foreign investments
assess their bargaining leverage with Chinese investors in general, and with private ones in particular.
4.3.1

Weak Perceived Bargaining Power – Nigeria and Kenya
Both Nigeria and Kenya attract large amounts of Chinese FDI across several sectors. Chinese

FDI stocks in Nigeria have increased 89 times between 2003 and 2017, and Nigeria is ranked #4 on
the continent,69 with 95 percent70 of companies being private. Similarly, FDI stocks in Kenya have
seen a 60-fold increase between 2003 and 201771 and Kenya ranks 10th for Chinese FDI stocks in
Africa. 80 percent72 of Chinese firms in Kenya are private. Most Chinese companies operate in leasing
and commercial services (34 percent), followed by construction (26 percent), manufacturing (19
percent), import and export trade (12 percent) and real estate industry (9 percent).73 McKinsey (2017)
reports that 44 percent operate in capital-intensive sectors (e.g., manufacturing), 18 percent in capitallight investments (e.g. services) and 16 percent in labor-intensive contracting (e.g., construction). In
Nigeria, most Chinese companies operate in capital-intensive sectors (53 percent, e.g., manufacturing),
followed by capital-light investments (16 percent, e.g. services).7475
Despite their high attractiveness to Chinese investors on the continent, Nigeria and Kenya
maintain FDI regimes that are very friendly towards foreign capital. Following the advice of Western

Based on Johns-Hopkins University China-Africa Research Initiative investment data.
McKinsey (2017) estimates.
71 Based on Johns-Hopkins University China-Africa Research Initiative investment data.
72 McKinsey (2017) estimates.
73 He and Zhu (2017) estimates based on Peking University data (which is based on MOFCOM data).
74 McKinsey (2017) estimates.
75 Only McKinsey data is available for Nigeria.
69
70
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experts, Nigeria set up the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission (NIPC) in 1995 and
liberalized its foreign investment regime. That included allowing 100 percent foreign ownership
(previously 40-60 percent) in all sectors except to the petroleum sector (limited to joint ventures or
production sharing contracts.) through the NIPC Act 1995. In Kenya, companies can also be 100
percent foreign owned except to telecommunications (20 percent Kenyan shareholding within three
years of receiving a license), mining (60 percent Kenyan ownership of mineral dealerships and artisanal
mining companies), private security (25 percent) and construction. The National Construction act
requires foreign contractors to enter into subcontracts or joint ventures assuring that at least 30
percent of the contract work is done by local firms. Firms listed on the Nairobi Securities Exchange
have been allowed to be 100 percent foreign-owned since 2015. Foreigners can only lease land in 99year increments.
How do the Nigerian and the Kenyan governments perceive their countries’ attractiveness? In
the interviews, government officials from both countries severely underestimated the amount of
Chinese investment entering their economies, judged their factor endowments as weaknesses with
Chinese investors, and indicated that China was benefitting more from the China-Africa relationship
as well as that there was insufficient space for African governments to change that. 39 out of the 45
senior government officials that I interviewed in Nigeria believed that Nigeria did not receive a
substantial amount of private Chinese investment, compared to other African countries (listed
countries included Kenya and South Africa). Asked in what sectors Chinese investors operate in
Nigeria, 44 respondents listed the oil sector and mining, 24 included construction and three mentioned
manufacturing. Finally, 44 out of 45 respondents said they agreed with the statement that “China is a
giant, and Nigeria is a dwarf”.
A general of a key government office tasked with attracting investments summarized their
views to me as follows:
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“My official stance in press interviews is of course that Nigeria has bargaining power,
that is my diplomatic response… but if you ask me personally, we negotiate from a position
of weakness. The Chinese will bring funding to make it [investment projects] happen, so we
just can’t fully negotiate… and they are not really investing in Nigeria anyways, they are more
in other African countries, they are everywhere there… so the Chinese have all the control”.76
Asked why the Chinese are everywhere on the continent but in Nigeria, they replied: “Because
we only have raw material… other countries like Kenya can also manufacture… we don’t have
Chinese manufacturing in Nigeria, they just import everything here.”77 Others mentioned that Nigeria
has no negotiation leverage with Chinese investors because there is not sufficient infrastructure. As a
consequence, local participation requirements seem to lie outside the feasible policy range. Common
answers also included: “Chinese people are profit-oriented, I think they would weigh what is more
favorable, they prefer to use their own labor”78 and “enacting a restrictive law to foreign investors is
always a barrier… it is better to attract foreign investors if you keep it [the economy] open.”79
In Kenya, government officials’ perceptions on bargaining power largely resembled the
responses that I received in Nigeria. I told the receptionist at one of the government offices that I
visited that I am working on Chinese investments in Africa - he laughed and his immediate response
was: “The Chinese are very aggressive, they are everywhere and they come with muscles.”
Interestingly, his words turned out to be a fitting summary of the general sentiment among 23
government officials that I interviewed. 19 respondents agreed with the statement that “Kenya has
very little bargaining power with China.” The other four respondents said that they were not sure and
that they would need to do a “cost-benefit analysis”80 but one said that “China is a giant and Kenya is

L17.
Ibid.
78 A23.
79 A34.
80 N3, N6.
76
77
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small.”81 Respondents also reported that Kenya is in a difficult position because it has no natural
resources and African countries are not complementing each other on the continent.82
When asked where respondents think that Kenya ranks in terms of attractiveness to private
Chinese investors relative to other African countries, 66 percent said the top-5, the rest thought Kenya
is ranked within the top-10. One respondent mentioned again that: “Kenya doesn’t have any natural
resources. And the Chinese are mainly in Africa for natural resources.”83 22 out of 23 reported that
Chinese companies in Kenya mostly work in construction but less so in the service sector and
manufacturing. Asked whether China or Kenya was benefitting more from China’s presence in Kenya,
most respondents thought that China was benefitting more due to the trade imbalance and because
Chinese companies have increasingly won construction contracts and been pushing local developers
out of the market. As one interviewee at a government office tasked with economic development
summarized it: “We don’t have the capacity to impose stricter regulations, it is not our place.”84
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, when I asked government respondents in both Nigeria
and Kenya why Chinese investors have more bargaining power when they come to their countries for
their labor and land, I kept hearing that capital was still the key factor that they were dependent on,
and so they had to negotiate from a position of weakness. In the words of one Nigerian senior officer,
"the Chinese bring the money, so they should [emphasis added] have all the power."85
4.3.2

Medium Perceived Bargaining Power – South Africa
Chinese investments in South Africa have seen a 146-fold increase between 2003-2017 and

the country ranked #1 for Chinese investment stocks in Africa in 2017. Most Chinese companies
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84 N13.
85 L22.
81
82

144

operate in manufacturing (34 percent), leasing and commercial service (17 percent), import and export
trade (16 percent), wholesale and retail trade (11 percent), and geological exploration and development
(10 percent).86 McKinsey (2017) estimates that 38 percent operate in capital-intensive sectors (e.g.,
manufacturing), 30 percent in trade, 20 percent in capital-light investments (e.g. services) and 9 percent
in labor-light contracting (e.g. telecoms). 90 percent of the companies surveyed by McKinsey (2017)
in South Africa were private. In 2018, the South African government signed multi-billion-dollar
investment agreements with China in manufacturing (special economic zones and industrial parks),
climate change, water resources, transported related infrastructure and refurbishments to a number of
technical and vocational training colleges, following the commitments made at the FOCAC 2015
meeting. In addition, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa was invited by the CCP to co-host the
FOCAC 2018 meeting in Beijing, indicating that China has been building up South Africa as a brother
and first point of contact from where to expand operations on the continent.87
How is South Africa meeting foreign and Chinese investments? In 2003, the African National
Congress (ANC) launched the Black Economic Empowerment (B-EE) program to redress the
structural inequalities of Apartheid and to redistribute assets and opportunities to black South
Africans. The B-EE regulations were later criticized for only benefitting a narrow branch of previously
disadvantaged groups, so the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) Codes of
Good Practice emerged in 2007. The first phase of the codes encouraged all entities, public and
private, to implement proper B-EE initiatives through the issuing of licenses, concessions, sale of
assets and preferential procurement. The second phase of the codes that started in 2015 has then been
addressing the seven components of the B-BBEE scorecard: ownership; management control;

86
87

He and Zhu (2017) estimates based on Peking University data (which is based on MOFCOM data).
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employment equity; skills development; preferential procurement; enterprise development; and
socioeconomic development (including industry-specific and corporate social investment initiatives).
An often-heard argument about South Africa is that it has the highest amount of human capital
on the continent, and that investors would therefore be willing to hire locally in South Africa more so
than in any other African country. Yet, McKinsey finds that Chinese firms in South Africa only hire
23 percent local managers, compared to an average of 44 percent across all eight countries studied
(South Africa, Ethiopia, Zambia, Nigeria, Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, Angola and Tanzania).
Why is that the case? While the B-EE regulations appear strict, they turn out to de facto only
apply to a relatively narrow part of companies operating in South Africa. Private companies only have
to adhere to the codes if they want to do business with any government enterprise or organ of state
to tender for business, apply for licenses and concessions, enter into public-private partnerships, or
buy state-owned assets. While companies are encouraged to apply the code in their interactions among
each other, no law requires them to do so.
My interviews with 23 senior officers from various government offices in Pretoria show that
the government is confident in probed methods with the more “official” China, such as BB-EEE
regulations with companies that interact with the government, but lacks confidence that private
Chinese companies in B2B interactions would also stick to the regulations.
A senior-level employee at a South African parastatal told me that his agency was currently in
discussions with a large Chinese bank (they did not tell me the name but it is a mix of SOEs and
private companies) to set up a 2 billion Joint fund in South Africa. The project was set up this way
because Ramaphosa had decided to avoid the typical “government-government” model where
“usually the Chinese give billion dollars directly to the African government.”88 Instead, he asked my
interviewee’s agency (a state-owned but self-funded entity) to negotiate the deal. According to the
88
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employee, South Africa is “pushing the agenda:”89 So far, the parastatal asked for 50 percent of the
fund to be dedicated to projects in South Africa and 50 percent for projects in the rest to whole
continent where a certain percentage of raw materials and equipment for these products would be
sourced from South Africa. As the employee told me, “We are dealing with a China that wants to
make money investing in South Africa, big amounts of money… so they didn’t argue about 50 percent
of the fund being dedicated to projects in South Africa…”90
At the same time, respondents severely underestimated the importance of South Africa’s
economy for private Chinese companies. Asked what they thought were the biggest sectors for private
Chinese companies in South Africa, most respondents listed service sectors, such as financial services,
with one saying: “I don’t think we have as many private Chinese companies here as in other African
countries, most of them here are SOEs.”91 In general, respondents thought that South Africa was less
attractive to private Chinese companies because “they are only interested in raw material... and
manufacturing. And we don’t have raw material and production is too expensive for manufacturing.”92
Most respondents were surprised when I told them that South Africa ranked second for private
companies (based on Chen et al. 2018), with two respondents explicitly wondering why there was
more Chinese manufacturing in South Africa than in Ethiopia.93 Overall, I therefore classify South
Africa’s perceptions of bargaining power as “medium”.
4.3.3

Strong Perceived Bargaining Power – Tanzania and Ethiopia
Tanzania and Ethiopia are both also top-receivers of Chinese investment stocks (#11 and #6,

respectively). Between 2003-2017, Chinese FDI in Tanzania increased 171 times, and in Ethiopia 413
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times. 90 percent of companies in Ethiopia are private, while the value is slightly higher (92 percent)
in Tanzania. In Tanzania, most Chinese companies operate in capital-intensive sectors (40 percent,
e.g., manufacturing) and capital-light investments (25 percent, e.g. services).9495 In Ethiopia, most
Chinese companies operate in manufacturing (49 percent), leasing and commercial services (21
percent), followed by construction (13 percent), geological exploration and development (11.8
percent), agriculture (3.2 percent), import and export trade (2 percent).96 McKinsey reports that 67
percent operate in capital-intensive sectors (e.g., manufacturing), 14 percent in capital-light
investments (e.g. services) and 9 percent in labor-intensive contracting (e.g. construction).
Both countries also maintain a more aggressive relationship with foreign and Chinese
investors. While Tanzania started to borrow from the IMF in the mid-1980s and the first marketoriented investment code was introduced in June 1990, its foreign investment policy framework has
remained relatively strict and become increasingly aggressive on raising revenue and on hiring of
Tanzanians and protecting and growing local industries since the election of President John Magufuli
in 2015. Minimum domestic shareholding through Joint Venture agreements is mandatory across
several sectors such as shipping, insurance, several categories of mining, fishing and for free-to-air
broadcasting. Since the implementation of the Mining Act 2010, primary mining licenses are
exclusively given to Tanzanian citizens, partnerships and companies. Following the Contractors
Registration Act of 1997, foreign contractors are allowed temporary registration only.
In addition, Tanzania imposes quotas on the number of foreign employees. According to the
Non-Citizens (Employment Regulation) Act, 2015, S. 19 (1), businesses are granted up to five
individuals during the start-up process but foreigners need to submit a justification letter indicating
that all efforts have been made to hire a Tanzanian but that they hold qualifications, knowledge and

McKinsey (2017) estimates.
Only McKinsey data is available for Tanzania.
96 He and Zhu (2017) estimates based on Peking University data (which is based on MOFCOM data).
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skills required for the performance of the job that are unavailable in Tanzania and that businesses
prepare a succession plan to transfer the applicant’s knowledge to local employees. The Petroleum
sector has specific Local Content Regulations (2016), where Tanzanian citizen are given priority in
employment and training on petroleum operations. Law requires that plans are designed and
implemented for Tanzanians to gain knowledge in petroleum operations, which may include the
establishment of local facilities for technology transfers. Suppliers of local goods and services get
preferential treatment over foreign ones through easier access to fees, permits, and procurement
marks.
Ethiopia’s relationship with foreign investors is the most aggressive out of all countries listed
in the Deal Quality Index. Between 1991-1999, the country went through three phases of IMF/World
Bank structural and economic reform programs and subsequent liberalization of trade and market-led
economic strategy. But in 2002/2003, it formulated an Industrial Policy Strategy (IPS), and as part of
its 2002 Investment Proclamation, Ethiopia asked for local content requirements in the manufacturing
industries and imposed limits in the employment of foreign staffers (excluding managerial positions),
where foreign companies must provide a succession plan of foreign employees by Ethiopian nationals
in addition to a training program.
Several sectors are completely closed to foreign investors, including telecommunications,
power transmission and distribution, and postal services, banking, insurance, and financial services.
Foreign companies may only provide technical support and training in these sectors.
As Deborah Bräutigam (2011) writes:
“Ethiopia is clearly in charge in this [China-Ethiopia] engagement. Chinese traders and
shopkeepers, who are fixtures across many African cities, are absent on Ethiopia's streets. These
positions are reserved for locals, and Ethiopians enforce their rules. And China listens. A decade
ago, Chinese companies building the ring road complained they couldn't find enough local skilled
workers. The Ethiopian government asked China to establish a college that would focus on
construction and industrial skills. The fully-equipped Ethio-China Polytechnic College opened in
late 2009, funded by Chinese aid. Chinese professors offer a two-year degree with Chinese
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language classes alongside engineering skills. Chinese companies are waiting to hire its first crop
of graduates.”
How do the Tanzanian and Ethiopian governments assess their respective levels of bargaining
power with private Chinese investors? Out of 19 government officials interviewed in Tanzania, 18
correctly indicated that their country was ranked among the top-15 destinations of Chinese FDI
stocks. In addition, 17 said they agreed with the statement that China and Tanzania were equal
partners. While all 19 respondents indicated that other countries like Nigeria or South Africa had more
bargaining leverage with China, they also said that this does not limit their own negotiation leverage
because Chinese investors are “so abundant”97, “in search of “all kinds of activities”98 and “efficient
in researching and knowing what opportunities are out there in Tanzania.”99 In particular, they
indicated as their own country’s strength that “Tanzania is a gateway to many other countries…look
what we have, abundance of natural resources, animals… we have things that attract investors.”100 In
the words of a senior employee at a Tanzanian ministry:
“In an economy, you would think that there are two parties… and every party should put in
place orders to balance interests… so we have restrictions, they are moderate and they don’t limit
investors, it is simply a balance the interest… where everyone is happy, this is the right destination.
Why would they invest? It means they think what we have is value, that we have something to give …
and giving doesn’t mean free of charge. We know that the Chinese government has a mission on
continent, and we are essential in that mission.”101
As a senior opposition leader shared with me:
“I don’t get the logic, if you ask more for local benefits, how would FDI stop coming… there
are conditions for a country to attract FDI, issues like political stability, tax regime, market, things like
that are more prominent… but from my point of view, local participation in FDI creates security for
FDI. If a foreign company comes here, a local partner will act as a buffer.”102
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Asked whether he thought that the Tanzanian government was also sure of their bargaining
power with Chinese investors, he replied: “Oh certainly… We all know.”103
In Ethiopia, responses largely resembled those in Tanzania. “Chinese interest in Ethiopia is
extreme. We know that we can offer the cheapest manufacturing… Why would they not come?” was
only one of the many confident responses I received from Ethiopian government officials. All
respondents (21 in total) correctly indicated that Ethiopia was among the top-15 receivers of Chinese
investments on the African continent, and all but one respondent agreed that Ethiopia and China were
equal partners.
4.4

Causal Drivers and Mechanisms of Weak Deals
In order to assess the validity of my argument, this project paid careful attention to providing

variation in background variables to study a variety of factors that have been suggested to be driving
forces of deal quality. In particular, based on my hypothesis and alternative explanations, I selected
countries with variation in countries’ historical relationship to the West, corruption levels,
communist/socialist history and de-centralization within the federal government and across subadministrative units within the country (Table 5).
A first glance at the relationship between deal quality and different variables across the three
“baskets” of deal quality reveals what I had already discussed in Chapter 2 - that the amount of Chinese
investment stocks per country is uncorrelated with countries’ strategy on how to attract and benefit
from foreign investments. The average ranking for Chinese investment stocks in the first basket is
7.25 while the average ranking for the second and the third basket are 6.25 and 8.25, respectively.
In contrast, the amount of U.S. investment stocks does appear to be related with deal quality:
The average rankings for U.S. investment stocks in the first, second and third basket are 21.25, 6.5

103
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and 11.75, respectively. This suggests that countries in the top basket are ranked relatively lower in
their attractiveness to U.S. investors and may therefore keep more open foreign investment regimes;
while economies in the second and third basket may be relatively attractive to U.S. foreign investments
regardless of their FDI regulations. As a result, one hypothesis is that countries may base their FDI
strategies on Western investment flows. Including both relative top- (e.g. South Africa and Nigeria)
and bottom- (e.g. Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia) receivers of U.S. investments was therefore important.
How do accountability and corruption levels correlate with deal quality across the topreceivers of Chinese investments? Average corruption perception levels calculated by Transparency
International do not significantly differ across the first and the second baskets (33.25 and 36.75) but
are lower in the third one (27.75). Multiple potential causal mechanisms exist for the observed
correlation between corruption perception levels and deal quality. These governments may be aware
that they possess bargaining power and could be asking for more deals but they keep their regulations
for foreign investors small in exchange for personal money. Or, corrupt governments could have
learned over time that foreign investors are willing to pay bribes but they are unaware of their actual
bargaining power regarding other deal conditions because their economies have always been open.
Consequently, this study includes countries that have relatively low (e.g. South Africa, Ethiopia) and
relatively high (e.g. Nigeria, Kenya) perceived corruption levels to further test this hypothesis.
What role does regime type play for deal quality? There are two theoretical forces at play that are
pulling into opposite directions: Politicians of democratic regimes may be more likely to act
accountable to their population because they want to be re-elected. As a result, they may only sign
deals that also benefit their constituents. At the same time, democracies may also be ideologically more
similar to Western democracies that have sent more aid and development advice to these countries.
Table 5 shows that authoritarian regimes tend to negotiate more aggressive deals with foreign
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investors, which supports the second explanation. In order to investigate this further, I therefore
included variation in regime types in my case studies.
Where do countries with a strong socialist/communist history rank in terms of deal quality?
Countries that underwent socialist or communist rule after independence and were aligned with China
or the Non-Aligned Movement tend to have stricter FDI policies than those countries who sided with
the U.S. during the Cold War. One explanation is that these governments place less emphasis on
attracting foreign investment relative to inciting production and redistribution among its own
population. In that case, we would observe these governments to therefore keep strict FDI regulations.
Or, socialist African governments knew that they had more bargaining power with China than with
the West and chose to intensify their relations with China that would allow them to keep FDI
restrictions high. A third explanation is a combination of the two: In the beginning, socialist
governments placed priority on redistributing gains from foreign investment to their own population
without emphasizing the need to attract more FDI in the first place; however, over time these
governments learned that despite FDI regulations, Chinese investors so they felt no need to get rid of
these regulations. In order to investigate this further, I include countries that were socialist/communist
(Tanzania, Ethiopia) and capitalist (Kenya, Nigeria) during the Cold War to better understand the
mechanism behind the correlation here.
Finally, how do the top-receivers of Chinese investments rank in terms of de-centralization
within the federal government and across sub-administrative units within the country? Ethiopia,
Nigeria and South Africa are often listed as three classic examples of “African federalism” although
their “type” of federalism significantly differs. In addition, Kenya signed a new constitution in 2010,
devolving substantial power to 47 sub-units (counties). Understanding how different government
units cooperate in centralized political system may shine light on what countries are able to negotiate
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more aggressively with foreign investors, which is why I also include a variation of political systems in
the cases.
4.5

Conclusion
This chapter provided a justification for the case selection in this project. Overall, I argue that

Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Kenya and Ethiopia lend themselves as suitable case studies because
they collectively account for around 35 percent of Chinese investment inflows to Africa, they offer
variation in the dependent variable (deal quality) and in relevant independent variables. The following
two chapters hone in on the causal mechanisms at play that explain the variation in perceptions of
bargaining power and resulting deal quality across the five selected cases.
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CHAPTER 5: INFORMATION AND HISTORICAL
FRAMES AROUND BARGAINING POWER
5.1

Introduction
The theory outlined in Chapter 1 and the empirical evidence described in Chapter 3 establish that

some African governments misperceive their actual bargaining power with private Chinese players in
their countries. Following classical work on Bayesian inference (e.g. Knill and Richards 1996, Iversen
1984), I assume that perceptions are fundamentally formed by information pieces that individuals use
to update their views on the world. As a result, the task of this project is to identify pieces that inform
African players on their bargaining power, and to describe through what channels they either do or
do not reach the recipient.
The study of information flows as important cues is prominent in political science literature, most
importantly around the role of the internet, media and elections (e.g. Cagé 2020, Gibson and
McAllister 2015 and Dalton et al. 1998). Further, the role of information has been studied on
unanticipated political revolutions (e.g. Kuran 1989), electoral outcomes and coups (e.g. Wig and Rod
2014) or on voters’ opinions (e.g. Brader and Tucker 2009). Literature on the role of information
related to bargaining power is also growing. Rose and Dickson (1987), for example, study the effect
of information that is gathered from observing opponents’ repeated patterns behavior over time on
impression formation, attribution and bargaining behavior. In addition, the role of asymmetric
information for bargaining power has also received more attention, for example in the sphere of buyerseller relationships (e.g. Arnold and Lipplan 1998), international mergers (e.g. Das and Sengupta 2004)
or SME lending (e.g. Grunert and Norden 2012). Yet, while the source for asymmetric information is
generally straightforwardly detected and assumed in these cases, understanding players’ formation of

perceptions of bargaining power embedded in an ever-changing geo-political context requires a deeper
qualitative

exploration of root causes and causal mechanisms that have

influenced

countries’ perceptions on bargaining power described in Chapter 4.
This and the next chapter therefore contribute to the development and bargaining literature
by for the first time explaining why asymmetric information exists and persists in investment
negotiations between African governments and Chinese private players. At the same time, the study
of information flows is of course inherently complex, and certainly also depends on over-time learning
as well as the willingness of the recipient to make use of the information. This project aims to respond
to a very limited extent to both concerns by presenting in Chapter 3 evidence from the experiments
conducted in Nigeria on how respondents change deal ratings if more information on their bargaining
power is presented. Yet, more longer-term research is certainly needed to assess the importance of
learning over time. The focus of this project solely lies on describing the types of environments in
which information on bargaining power may generally flow more effectively than in others.
Based on my interviews with government representatives across five African countries and the
survey results from Nigeria, I argue that there are two central questions whose answers influence how
countries perceive their bargaining power: If the negotiation process can be understood as a game,
first, what information and historical frames do political actors start the game with? And second, what
information do political actors share within the game?
The first question, what information and historical frames do political actors start the game with,
can be divided into two sub-themes. The first sub-theme is: To what extent have countries been
exposed to local participation policies before? Countries that have traditionally used local participation
policies have information on how Chinese investors respond to these policies, while other countries
lack that direct information. The second sub-theme is: To what extent has the Weak Bargaining Power
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Narrative penetrated their countries? The more governments have engaged with this narrative, the
more internalized misperceived views on bargaining power with Chinese players will be.
The second question around information that political actors share within the game primarily
concerns: To what extent are central governments informed about the amount of Chinese investments
flowing into their economies? Countries that have political systems in place that help them to centrally
count all investment inflows will be able to make a better judgement on their actual bargaining power
with China than those that lack such a system.
For each of these information pieces, this and the next chapter discuss the enabling
environments - the political economy - that significantly influence whether governments receive access
to these three information pieces, and how governments consequently process this information to
form opinions and make decisions on how to strategize with foreign investors. It thereby provides
explanations to three empirical observations pointed out in Chapter 4: I argue that first, countries with
dictatorship or a socialist/communist history originated these policies because they did not place
priority on attracting foreign investment; with time, however, they did develop an awareness that
attracting foreign investment is important but realized that they could lure Chinese investors while
keeping their relatively stricter requirements. Second, stronger historic economic and political
relationships to the West have naturally led some African countries to internalize the Weak Bargaining
Power Narrative’s signaling that they cannot afford to increase local participation requirements. Third,
political actors in centralized systems – defined through either strong parties or de facto strong
centralized institutions - have incentives to share information across government bodies while a
competitive relationship in de-centralized systems has hindered the same transmission of information.
Taken all together, this explains why Ethiopia, a country that has resisted colonial rule more
completely than any other African country and with a communist past, strong party and de facto
centralized institutions, has imposed the strictest regulations while still attracting massive amounts of
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Chinese investment – Ethiopia had the most ideal enabling environment for the Ethiopian
government to learn that they can in fact act aggressively with Chinese investors. Tanzania had a
similar enabling environment, even if less pronounced: The region of today’s Tanzania had been
colonized by various Western powers but the Republic of Tanzania entered an economic and
diplomatic relationship with China the year they became independent, and President Julius Nyerere’s
rule was both a playground for socialist policies and for a de facto centralized state due to his nationbuilding efforts of unity.
South Africa is a hybrid – the African National Congress only learned about the Chinese
strategy starting in the 1990s, and its federalism is also more pronounced than Ethiopia’s. South Africa
has a strong party and de facto centralized institutions but a historically close relationship with the
West. Negotiators are therefore confident in their local participation policies for actors engaging with
the government but lack the same confidence and experience with private players that are operating
in the economy without government engagement.
Finally, Nigeria and Kenya had the least enabling environments, where both still have strong
relationships to their former British colonial power and the West; they have experimented with
“leftist” policies such as import-substitution but never experienced success with them and ultimately
kept a capitalist economy; and have weak parties and de facto de-centralized systems with a rivalrous
government culture across ministries and sub-regional levels. The following sections describe the
causal mechanisms at play around the historical frames and information that political actors start the
game with. Chapter 6 will then focus on mechanisms that incentivize information-sharing among
political actors within the game.
5.2

Enabling Environment 1: Long-Term Learning
In 2015, the Tanzanian government together with Oman’s State General Reserve Fund and

China Merchants Holdings, the largest port operator in China, started the construction of what was
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to become the largest deep-water port in Africa in Bagamoyo, a small town about 45 miles north of
the capital Dar es Salaam. As part of the project, China Merchants was also going to construct railways
and a special economic zone to propel Tanzania to become a regional trade and transport center. The
2013 framework agreement was signed by then Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete. But only a few
months after assuming the presidency in October 2015 President Magufuli suspended the project in
January 2016. After some back and forth in the negotiations, on October 21 2019, the Tanzanian
government finally issued China Merchants its ultimatum: accept the government’s terms and
conditions or leave the project. Asked about why the Tanzanian government would risk losing a 10billion-dollar project, a key negotiator around the deal simply told me: “It’s a gamble we are willing to
take… the Chinese have been Tanzania’s partner for a long time, and they are facing international
pressure because of Mombasa port, because of Djibouti port… I am confident that they will accept
our conditions… and if not, I am sure eventually another Chinese company will come around to build
it.”104
The ultimatum came at an unusual time – Magufuli with the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM)
party, which has been in power since 1977105 had just won the national elections in 2015 with a vote
share of 58%. The elections planned for 2020 were cancelled. The CCM is the second longest ruling
party in Africa after the National Party of South Africa. Since the creation of a multi-party system in
1995, the CCM has still won every election since then, rendering Tanzania a classic example of a oneparty dominant system. Authoritarianism together with one-party dominant states have long been
criticized in the African region since their leaders arguably have less incentives to be accountable to
their population compared to those in competitive democratic environments. As a result, they should
also be less likely to ask for local participation and prioritize their own self-interested demands. In
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addition, Tanzania has also received comparatively little investments from the U.S. or Europe, which
has effectively limited the pool of investors it could draw from, and should render Tanzania a deal
taker to whoever in fact offers to invest or provide technical support.
Why would we then observe the CCM, under the leadership of President Magufuli, to
challenge Chinese demands, and a clear expression of confidence from one of the key negotiators that
the Tanzanian government can in fact do so without fearing any longer-term disadvantages with its
partner China? Several authoritarian regimes and one-party dominant systems in the African region
have emerged from a tradition of socialist/communist movements after independence with a focus
on pan-Africanism and a narrative of anti-colonialism and liberation. The original aim across African
independence movements was to cut ties to the West and become economically independent through
import-substitution industrialization (ISI). The efforts famously failed across Africa due to an inwardfocused approach rather than an export-driven strategy. Some countries later orientated themselves
towards the West and adopted structural adjustment programs that included liberalization of their
economies to create an investor-friendly environment. In contrast, others were more selective in their
adoption of Washington Consensus elements and applied more hybrid models that took into account
local participation.
The assumption is that countries in the latter category simply placed more strategic interest on
an inward-focused strategy and cared less about attracting foreign investment relative to local
production and distribution. Yet, the analysis below shows that beginning in the 1990s, traditionally
socialist regimes did in fact also concern themselves more with attracting foreign investment and have
maintained that concern until today. How have authoritarian regimes or one-party dominant systems
helped governments to learn that they can take a different approach with Chinese investors compared
to Western ones? One party dominant system or authoritarian states have had longer ruling horizons
that have helped them to experiment with different types of investors. They were therefore able to
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test the boundaries of what attributes to include in negotiations, and what deals were in fact impossible
to strike. In contrast, countries with democratic backgrounds that were supported by the West and
took the advice to open up their economies in the 1990s and then had different parties or ruling elites
in power missed the same long-term learning opportunity. They therefore experimented less with
policies that they perceived to be out of the feasible policy range.
5.2.1

Authoritarian/One-Party Dominant Systems Versus Competitive Democracies
Ethiopia, Tanzania and South Africa’s ruling parties have been in power at least since the early

1990s, which coincides with the start of China’s “Going Out” policy. Since 1991, Ethiopian politics
have been dominated by the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a political
coalition between four parties (TPLF, ADP, ODP and SEPDM) and continued since November 2019
under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed under the new name Prosperity Party, which excludes the TPLF.
The only threat to the ruling power of the EPRDF emerged in the 2005 elections, when the opposition
claimed victory but the EPRDF repressed them and consolidated its power in future elections. As
mentioned in the introduction, Tanzania’s Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) is the second longest ruling
party in Africa after the National Party of South Africa, formed in 1977 as a merger between the
Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) operating in mainland Tanzania and the Afro-Shirazi
Party (ASP), operating in the semi-autonomous islands of Zanzibar. Since the creation of a multi-party
system in 1995, the CCM has still won every election since then. Finally, in South Africa, the African
National Congress was originally founded on 8 January 1912 as the South African Native National
Congress (SANNC) with the aim of bringing all Africans together, to defend their rights, and from
1948 onwards, to end the system of Apartheid. The ANC has been South Africa’s ruling party since
the election of Nelson Mandela in 1994 and has consistently won more than 55% in all general
elections until today.
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In contrast, Kenya and Nigeria’s political histories since the 1990s have been characterized by
two- or multiparty party systems and a more frequent change in the ruling political parties that were
far less ideology- than ethnic-based in nature. Kenya started out as a multi-party system in 1992 and
has effectively had a two-party system since 2007, with two mergers of opposing parties usually
confronting each other. While the Kenya African National Union (KANU) had been in power since
1961, they started to face more competition in the 1990s with the introduction of multi-party politics,
and KANU candidate Uhuru Kenyatta, from the largest ethnic group Kikuyu, lost the 2002 elections
to Mwai Kibaki from the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC). When the coalition fell apart in 2005,
former ally Raila Odinga, from the Luo tribe, Kenya’s fourth largest ethnic group, competed against
Mwai Kibaki, Kikuyu, in the 2007 elections, which were strongly marked by tribal hostility and a large
outbreak of violence with Raila Odinga finally emerging as the president (and with KANU only
coming in fourth in terms of vote share). The first elections under the new 2010 constitution were
held in 2013, and Uhuru Kenyatta from the Jubilee Alliance defeated Raila Odinga with 50.5% of the
vote, and has been re-elected in 2017 with 54%.
In Nigeria, the People's Democratic Party (PDP) had controlled the presidency since the
transition to civilian rule in 1999 until Muhammadu Buhari with the All Progressives Congress (APC),
a merger of the three biggest opposition parties in 2013, won the presidential elections in 2015. The
PDP can still not be characterized as a classic dominant party since it has always faced another party
that had serious chances of winning. This is mainly due to regionalism and ethno-religious voting,
where - depending on whether the PDP promoted a candidate from the South or the North - the
party lost significant votes with the APC gaining them.. Before Nigeria’s return to republic rule in 1999,
most national leaders were born in the North. Founded in 1998, the PDP then saw leadership from
both the North and the South of Nigeria that were able to appeal to different ethnic groups in the
country. President Olusegun Obasanjo, the first PDP-nominated presidential candidate and winner of
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the 1998 elections, was born in the Southern state of Ogun, is Yoruba, and Christian. In the 2003
elections, the Northern states of Nigeria predominately voted for Buhari while Central and Southern
states cast their votes for Obasanjo, revealing a clear pattern of ethnic voting. His successor, President
Umaru Musa Yar'Adua who came to power in the 2007 national elections against his fellow
Northerner Muhammadu Buhari, was born in the Northern state of Katsina, was Fulani and Muslim
and was able to capture the Northern vote. He was only in office for three years (2007-2010) before
he died.
His then Vice-President Goodluck Jonathan, a Southerner born in Bayelsa State, Ijaw and
Christian, took over and also won the 2011 elections against Muhammadu Buhari, a Northerner from
Katsina State, Fulani and Muslim. In the 2011 elections, Jonathan, although also party member of the
PDP, now captured most of the Southern states while Buhari was strong in the North. In the elections
of 2015, Buhari, with the All Progressives Party (APC) founded in 2013, finally defeated Jonathan.
The 2015 election map shows that Buhari was for the first time also able to capture the majority of
votes in several Southern states but overall, it is still the candidate’s tribal attribute rather than their
party membership that is highly predictable of voting patterns in the South and the North.
5.2.2

Historical Relationships Between African Parties and China
How have these different party politics influenced countries’ interactions with the Chinese

government and, later on, with private Chinese companies? Ethiopia’s relationship with China was
rocky during the Cold War due to the CCP’s ties to Eritrea and the Ethiopian military junta’s
increasingly close relations to the Soviet Union. Yet, relations significantly improved once the EPRDF
took power in 1991. On a visit to Beijing in June 2001, Ethiopian deputy foreign minister expressed
support for the “One China” policy and in December 2003, the second Forum on China-Africa
Cooperation, and the first one on the African continent, was held in Addis Ababa. In December 2004,
an Ethiopian delegation was sent to Beijing, and in a joint statement the two counties declared that
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they wanted to expand all aspects of cooperation. Since then, Ethiopia has become an even more
important strategic partner to China, which is visible, for example, in large infrastructure projects in
Addis Ababa, or the fact that Jack Ma sent his protective gear donations to Ethiopia first at the
beginning of the Covid-19 outbreak in March 2020, from which they were distributed across the
continent.
The relationship between Tanzania’s CCM and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) traces
back to 1961, when Tanganyika (mainland Tanzania that had at the time been a separate part to
Zanzibar before they united in 1964) became the tenth African state to recognize the People’s
Republic of China, and the first one to do so within a few days of independence. During the Cold
War, President Julius Nyerere and the CCP were natural allies bounded by their socialist ideologies
(and Nyerere’s visit to Beijing in 1968, where he was welcomed by Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai,
became a famous photograph). One of China’s first aid projects in Tanzania was the TAZARA
Railway built between 1970 to 1975. As the permanent secretary at the Tanzanian Ministry of Industry,
Trade and Investment suggested, the interaction between China and Tanzania, compared to China
and other African countries, has been “much more structural”, where two “brothered nations are
helping each other out.”106
The relationship between the South African ANC and the CCP is younger than the
relationship between the Tanzanian CCM and the CCP but has intensified since 1998, when the ANC
announced that it would switch recognition from Taiwan to the People’s Republic of China (President
Nelson Mandela had previously argued in favor of a 'Two Chinas' policy that was incompatible with
the Beijing's One China policy). Since then, trade and investment relations between China have
skyrocketed. In December 2010, South Africa joined China in the BRICS group of emerging
economies and in the 2010 Beijing Declaration, South Africa was upgraded to Strategic
106
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Comprehensive Partner by the Chinese government. Relationships between the ANC and the Chinese
government deepened further when the ANC started to send party officials for trainings in China and
the CCP built the ANC’s new political leadership school in Venterskroon, a former gold-mining town
South-West of Johannesburg. South Africa was also invited to co-chair the 2018 FOCAC meeting
together with China, right after China had announced a 14.7-billion-dollar investment to South Africa,
signaling that China views South Africa as a “brother” on the African continent through which it
could penetrate other African markets.
The relationships between Kenya and Nigeria’s different ruling parties with China are naturally
less consistent due to different presidencies. Every president certainly did sign economic agreements
and built diplomatic relations with China. But while Nigeria and Kenya received consistent political
and economic support from China, until today, every new presidency also had to define a new
relationship with Chinese players. In Kenya, during the Mao-Kenyatta Era, the radical left-wing of the
ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU) party led by then KANU vice president and Minister
for Home Affairs Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, sought closer relations to China. Yet, the movement
found strong resistance by the KANU right wing and later disappeared when Odinga, who, in 1966
formed an explicitly socialist-oriented opposition party, the Kenya People's Union, was arrested and
detained.
Daniel arap Moi had accused China of plotting a revolution in Kenya in the 1960s. Yet, once
he came to power, he intensified relations to China, with the two countries signing an “economic and
technological cooperation” agreement in 1980, and trade between the two countries increased,
especially for Chinese imports to Kenya in the second half of the 1990s. Under President Kibaki, the
“broad governance and economic reform program” resulted in the longest period of sustained growth
(2003–2007) since the roaring Kenyatta years (Chege 2007). Most of the investment spurring the
growth was interestingly domestic, with only 50.1 million of $4.1 billion in gross capital formation in
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2006 originating from foreign direct investment. China-Kenya economic relations had first started off
with high-level political contacts and a series of agreements. Yet, for the first time, independent
operators from Kenya and China were also part of the act, which is reflected, for example in President
Kibaki’s state visit to China in August 2005, with eleven Kenyan trade- and investment-seeking
delegations (Chege 2007). Finally, under President Uhuru Kenyatta, economic relations to China have
been further intensified, with Kenyatta for example famously using large Chinese financed prestige
infrastructure projects such as the Standard Gauge Railway during his election campaign in 2017 (Kuo
2017).
Like in Kenya, every different Nigerian presidency also had to newly define their relationship
with China up to today. During military rule 1966-1979, Nigeria established formal diplomatic
relations with China in 1971 following the Nigerian Civil War of 1967-70, where China had expressed
its effective support for Biafra. Nigeria was a member of the Frontline States and supported Southern
African independence movements, siding with the Soviet-backed MPLA while China was supporting
the FNLA, backed by the U.S. Under military rule 1983-1993, General Ibrahim Babangida largely
supported the World Bank and IMF’s structural adjustment programs. While the PDP had then been
in power between 1999 to 2015, the party’s relationship to China was still more defined by the
individual presidents rather than a shared ideology between the PDP and the CCP as was the case in
Ethiopia, Tanzania and South Africa. In fact, the PDP only entered a formal relationship with the
CCP in 2013, when PDP Chairman Bamanga Tukur, on a visit to China, was reported to have asked
the CCP to train its political public office holders on party supremacy, governance, and management
of the political staff. Interestingly, only three years later in 2016 after Muhammadu Buhari had won
the 2015 elections, he announced that the APC would also “enter into partnership with the
Communist Party of China” (Seteolu and Oshodi 2017). This signals that President Buhari is interested
in maintaining a solid diplomatic relationship with China but there also appears to be no particularly
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strong party alliance between the CCP and the APC, and both the APC’s and PDP’s party relationships
to the CCP are very young.
5.2.3

“Africa Opening Up”– From an Inward to an Outward Focused Strategy
To be clear, despite the closer political alliances between the CCM, the EPRDF and the ANC

with the CCP, Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa have still received more amounts of Western and
Chinese investments, while Tanzania and Ethiopia have secured relatively small amounts of foreign
capital. In 1996, Tanzania and Ethiopia were also on the World Bank and IMF’s list of Highly Indebted
Poor Countries (HIPC), where in order to receive debt relief, countries had to reform their economies.
Despite their former alliances with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, starting in the 1990s,
Ethiopia and Tanzania did therefore also work closely with the World Bank and the IMF to adopt
structural adjustment programs to be able to raise their trade and investment volumes.
Pitcher (2012) focuses on explaining different privatization trajectories in 27 African countries
based on the degree of democratic quality and the nature of party systems between 1988 to 2005. Her
analysis shows that during that time, Tanzania was in fact more committed to privatization - one
measure for economic reform - than Nigeria or Kenya. Importantly, Tanzania privatized 72% of SOEs
between 1988 and 2005 and had an agency in place solely tasked with privatization. Certainly, and as
Pitcher argues, the CCM had survived the transition to democracy by sheltering its base from the
negative effects of privatization while also capturing stakes in the new arrangement. But the degree of
privatization and commitment to market reforms was quite impressive. As one opposition leader
pointed out in his interview with me,
“The country decided to liberalize the economy first in 1992, and then more actively in 1996
because we had a serious debt problem, we were spending more money than social services covered…
so the IMF and the World Bank recommended and forced the further structural adjustment and, from
1997, we knew we needed FDI.. and the area that was more lucrative for that was mining…when
Mkapa was president, he brought it to parliament to open up the mining sector. So, you saw the first
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changes in 1998 when the mining law was legislated, and from then we saw massive FDI, five gold
mines opened in a period of five years. We saw that the reforms were working.”107
In contrast, Pitcher (2012) notes that Kenya and Nigeria had in fact low commitments to
privatization and did not set up institutional “lock-in mechanisms” that would bind them for a longer
time. Kenya and Nigeria privatized 45 and 24 percent of SOEs, respectively, between 1988-2005. With
fragmented party loyalty and a limited democracy, Kenya’s private sector developed ad hoc,
comparable to Zambia. Nigeria was more comparable to Zimbabwe or Guinea, where governments
continued to intervene arbitrarily in strategic sectors.
On South Africa, Pitcher (2012) writes that the privatization process was shaped by two
opposing forces. On the one hand, privatization was central to finding a common ground between
the state and capital for the expansion of black ownership. On the other hand, concerns over
employment equity, preferential procurement, and unemployment forced the state to form parastatals
in the early 2000s and in doing so, to abandon the privatization of state assets. South Africa then,
unsurprisingly, had only privatized 9 percent of SOEs as the high-quality democracy paired with a
stable party system led the government to keep commercialized and corporatized parastatals and
financed public work projects to appease its supporters.
Due to its undemocratic nature, Ethiopia is not part of the 27 African economies that Pitcher
(2012) studied. Ethiopia would certainly rank low for privatization, especially for the period that
Pitcher studied (1988-2005). Yet, Ethiopia’s motivation to switch to a market-led strategy was arguably
even stronger than Tanzania’s given the amount of reforms that were conducted in the 1990s: Between
1991-1999, Ethiopia adopted three phases of IMF/World Bank structural and economic reform
programs and subsequent liberalization of trade and a market-led economic strategy; in 1998 an export
promotion strategy and support of high value agricultural exports (e.g. horticulture products and
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meats) and labor-intensive manufacturing products (clothing, textile and leather) (Gebreeyesus 2013);
and formulated an official Industrial Policy Strategy (IPS). In the words of an employee at the
Ethiopian Investment Commission, “Back then we were so poor that we just had to develop, we knew
we had to switch to capitalism… it was the only way out of poverty.”108
5.2.4

Long-Term Learning About Bargaining Power and Policy Options
Interestingly, however, Ethiopia, Tanzania and South Africa later on retracted reform policies,

or never fully opened up in the first place. Two reasons stand out for these developments: First,
beginning in the early 2000s and especially after the financial crisis 2008, Western over-confidence in
capitalism famously took a big hit (Kurlanzick 2016), with some countries retracting to models that
more closely resemble China’s state-capitalism, where the government typically owns firms in strategic
industries. Along with this shift also coincided the (re-)introduction of local participation requirements
in countries such as Ethiopia and arguably Tanzania, which had initially signaled that they had
subscribed to the capitalist model. Ethiopia’s economic reforms in the 1990s and early 2000s were
certainly guided by the advice of Western institutions (for example, in 2002/03 – 2004/05, the
Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program, providing great emphasis on smallholder
agriculture; or in 2005/06-2009/10, the Plan of Action for Sustainable Development and Eradication
of Poverty, stressing urban and industrial sector development). But the reforms captured in the
country’s Growth and Transformation Plans I and II in the second decade of the 21st century
resembled much more the Chinese and South Korean models. From 2010/11-2014/15, the Growth
and Transformation Plan I was meant to deepen the stress on urban and industrial sector
development, and in 2015/16 – 2019/20, the Second Growth and Transformation Plan had the goal
of improving physical infrastructure through public investment projects and transforming the country
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into a manufacturing hub, with formal incentives menus and informal expectations of local
participation of foreign investors. As one retired Ethiopian party member of the EPRDF, who met
with me over coffee, shared with me:
“In the 90s, the EPRDF knew it had to deliver.. so we looked out there in the world and the
West offered us a hand… but so did China, we knew they had supported us for a long time. So we
initially listened to what the World Bank had to tell us, and we implemented some of that stuff. But
we had also been looking towards the East, and we knew that they had done it differently… if someone
develops so fast that they can then put money in your country, that is impressive and we wanted to
be like them… we wanted to play [sic!] the East Asian Miracle in Africa […] Their model was more
convincing… and it became more and more clear that the Western model of capitalism wasn’t going
to be ideal for us.”109
While I have less concrete evidence from Tanzania, what is perceived as a return to “socialism”
by scholars and journalists could in fact also be a form of “state capitalism.” One of the concerns
about John Magufuli’s presidency is that he has an inward-focused strategy that discriminates against
foreign investors and is actively “kicking them out.”110 Yet, I perceived the opposite on my visit to
Dar es Salaam – all ministries and government agencies I interviewed in fact expressed exceptional
interest in providing a favorable environment for foreign investors. This was visible in direct questions
by interviewees on whether I personally know any investors that Tanzanian interviewees could try to
lure to Tanzania; or by the actions of senior economists at ministries who were ready to conduct
multiple day interviews with me on Maundy Thursday and Good Friday, in-between holding meetings
with investors (who I also got to meet). One senior-level interviewee said he had worked until 4am in
the morning on Good Friday, went home for an hour to shower, and came back to meet more
potential investors and me. Asked why they were so extremely motivated to attract investors, he said:
“It is all part of President Magufuli’s strategy, we need investment to grow.”111 In addition, articles are
emerging where the government is defending its policies and publicly saying that “We're Not
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Venturing Into State Capitalism” (AllAfrica 2017), thereby providing indirect evidence that their
economic program in fact does resemble state capitalism.
Second, and relatedly, public pressure has also certainly led Tanzania and South Africa to
implement stricter local participation requirements. Probably the most famous example are South
Africa’s Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) regulations that emerged out of a
need to rectify the racial inequalities that Apartheid had produced. Or, in Tanzania, After President
Mkapa had opened the mining sector to foreign investment in the late 1990s, public grievance emerged
around locals not benefitting from the growth. The government eventually responded by
implementing an act that places mining rights in the hands of Tanzanian nationals and required mining
companies to list with the Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange as well as restricted participation of nonTanzanians in small scale mining, dealing in minerals and gemstone operations. Several interviewees
confirmed that the Mining Act of 2010 inspired local participation requirements in other sectors (e.g.
in 2016, the CCM instituted significant measures on foreign investment to encourage the hiring of
Tanzanian citizens over foreigners, and protect/grow local industry).
Yet, what is interesting is that again, contrary to a pure “return to socialism and inward-focused
strategy”, government officials and opposition leaders displayed a high level of confidence that
attracting FDI from Chinese investors was unharmed by their local participation policies. So, rather
than facing a tradeoff between local participation requests and attracting FDI, the CCM appears to be
confident that Chinese investors would still enter and stay Tanzania under local participation
requirements. As one interviewee summarized: “It was for sure to some extent public pressure… but
how could we have implemented these stricter rules if we knew we had no chance of actually keeping
that investment? It would have been political suicide in the long-term to have policies that would shy
all foreign investors away.”112
112
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While motivations for reforms differed, the central question for the analysis conducted here
is: Why have Nigerian and Kenyan government officials lower perceptions of bargaining power with
China despite being the top-receivers of Chinese investments on the continent, and why did the
Ethiopian, Tanzanian and, to some extent, the South African governments all carry confidence that
they would not deter Chinese investors from entering their economies even if they never fully
reformed and opened up their economies or later retracted some economic reforms? The analysis
below shows that ruling parties that had longer-standing relations with China observed that Chinese
investments had consistently flown into their economies, thereby sending a signal that Chinese private
companies would be less sensitive to economic shocks or supposedly unfavorable investment
conditions. The CCM, the EPRDF and to some extent the ANC have been politically aligned with
China and this political alliance translated into economic benefits during the first two phases of
Chinese engagement with Africa even when they were not (yet) economically attractive to China. As
a result, now where there are also substantial economic benefits from private Chinese players in the
third wave of Chinese engagement, these countries carry more confidence that Chinese investors will
come despite relatively strict regulations.
And as Chapter 2 illustrates, China’s signaling of its willingness to enter African economies
under subpar conditions was not subtle. Bräutigam (2009) also provides two fitting examples on the
Tanzanian case. The first one is about a small factory called Tanzansino United Pharmaceuticals (T)
Ltd:
“Originally built as a Chinese aid project in the 1970s and set up to produce tropical vaccines
and medicines, it was initially operated directly by the Tanzanian military. It was not run successfully,
so Chinese managers were asked to come back and a $3 million joint venture was set up in 1997
between the New Technological Applications Center of northern China’s Shanxi province and the
Tanzanian Ministry of Defense. The factory was still not profitable until in 2006, a Chinese
entrepreneur who had started Holley Pharmaceuticals saw an opportunity to grow Artemisia annua, a
plant used as a Malaria medicine, in Tanzania. They invested more than six million dollars to build an
Artemisia annua plantation in Tanzania because it was too expensive to import medicine from China.
As the managing director said: ‘This creates an opportunity for us to produce locally. And the
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Tanzanian government gives a 15 percent preference for local products for its medical stores.’” (pg.
72).
The second story is about a stadium: In 2000, then President Benjamin Mkapa promised as a
departure gift to the population that he would build a 60,000-seat stadium before leaving office in
2005. Yet, since Tanzania was on the list of Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), the country had
to stick to a strict regime of austere spending if it wanted the IMF and the World Bank to cancel some
of its debt. As a result, Mkapa turned to the Chinese: The Chinese government agreed to offer a grant
of $20 million which covered half of the costs while Tanzania would pay for the rest. While the
stadium turned out to be considerably smaller than first envisioned by President Mkapa, he was still
granted his wish. As Bräutigam writes:
“The stadium, and the pharmaceutical factory sitting in its shadow, represented the political
side of China’s aid (the joint venture with the Ministry of Defense, the stadium [was] a politically
important “prestige project”). But the factory is now in its third life: first as a traditional aid project,
second as one of the joint ventures that rose in the consolidation experiments of the 1980s, and now
part of the wave of Chinese companies going global.” (pg. 73f)
This gradual evolution of Chinese cooperation with Africa is central to the argument advanced
in this project. As mentioned earlier, the CCM is a strong party with party members having to typically
serve 29 years113 before advancing to senior positions within the government. The vast majority of
government officials that I interviewed in all three countries have been holding their positions for at
least ten years and have been party members for at least 15 years, reflecting the need to demonstrate
high party loyalty before anyone could assume higher office, and a low turn-over rate among office
holders. As one Tanzanian senior official shared: “You actually need to serve more than 29 years to
[get my current position] […] I got promoted here after 13 years […] but that was exceptional, because
I got a PhD in Japan in industrial economics, the government really needed me.”114 Of all the senior
officials I interviewed in Tanzania (19), 91% had been party members for more than 15 years and 83%
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had an active position in government for at least 10 years, which outdates the Magufuli administration.
Members therefore experienced all phases of Chinese expansion that were first politically and then
economically motivated. As a result, the CCM had a reason to believe in China’s long-term
commitment and interest. Several interviewees confirmed this before even been asked about it directly.
In the words of one respondent: “In the beginning, we were valuable for political reasons. But since
the early 2000s, we have been valuable for our economy as well.”115
The comment of a Tanzanian key negotiator that was mentioned in the introduction of this
chapter that probably another Chinese company would come around to build the port appears logical
then. As Chapter 4 outlines in detail, I observed a very similar attitude among Tanzanian politicians
regarding local participation requirements that have become even stricter under the Magufuli
administration. And its former socialist orientation certainly helped build this confidence. In the words
of a ministry senior government official: “Tanzania is proud of its socialist past, and President
Magufuli is reminding us and bringing back that past… why would we change policies now? They
have been working! We have attracted so much Chinese investment, and Chinese investors value us
for our labor, and they know they have to contribute, it isn’t an issue.”116
In Ethiopia, the picture looks similar. Again, of the 21 senior officials I interviewed, 76% had
been party members for more than 15 years, and 81% had been holding an active political position
for more than 10 years. Asked about the Ethio-China Polytechnic College that was opened in late
2009 and funded by Chinese aid that I discussed in Chapter 3, and about why the Ethiopian
government is negotiating more aggressively around local participation, one government official said:
“We know we have to, and it is being received well with the Chinese. Ethiopia is coming from
a tradition where we gave out food to the population, we had food subsidies, housing subsidies… and
the government is trying to slowly get away from that to a market economy but we know we have to
strike a balance, especially with all this growth, there also comes a lot of inequality, a lot of rising food
prices, housing prices, inflation… especially because of our past, we need to ensure that the people
115
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benefit from the growth because you see, there is a lot of expectation in the government to provide
reliefs… And we invite investors to participate in this tradition, and if you want to be part of it and
gain the benefits, you will also contribute. The Chinese have always appreciated, or should I say
respected us for our development style […] Yes, you could certainly say that the EPRDF learned that
over time.”117
Another officer was even more explicit:
“As a country, we have always been experimenting with local content, that’s a legacy of our
communist past… We know we can ask for it with the Chinese because we already did it in the 80s,
in the 90s… there is one lesson I took from back then: If things get harder, American companies are
the first to leave, but Chinese companies stay.”118
In contrast, evidence from Nigeria and Kenya shows that different ruling powers have been
working with much shorter time-horizons than in Ethiopia or Tanzania and did not engage in the
same learning process about Chinese behavior and their long-term interests in their respective
countries. This is not to say that China tried to engage significantly differently in its three part strategy
with Nigeria and Kenya. For example, already in the latest phase of the colonial period, China hosted
students from Kenya, Uganda, Malawi, and other colonies that were fighting for independence. And
even before colonialism came to an end, Nigeria took out a loan with China for $80 million for a
hydropower dam on the Niger River. In August 1979, the Chinese State Council allowed some Chinese
companies to invest abroad, and a Chinese aid team took on construction projects for profit in Nigeria
in the same year. Chinese premier Zhou Enlai visited ten newly independent African countries
between December 1963 to February 1964, where he committed around $120 million in aid to CongoBrazzaville, Ghana, Kenya, Mali and Tanzania. And as Chapter 2 highlights, since the early 2000,
Nigeria and Kenya have been among the absolute top-receivers of Chinese investments (Bräutigam
2009).
Yet, the Chinese strategy was met differently on the receiving end. Due to the two- or
multiparty nature and competitive elections in Nigeria and Kenya that were discussed earlier, a change
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in ruling powers led to a large re-staffing of government offices that was absent in Ethiopia, Tanzania
or Kenya. The reason was that each new president and the ruling elite around them wanted to ensure
that they had allies within the government rather than keeping potential non-allies in the inner circle
of power that could threaten the ruler. These dynamics arose due to ethnic or regional competition
that was not tamed by an overarching national political ideology. As multiple interview partners shared
with me, with every new presidency, ministries get almost completely re-staffed, thereby preventing
“technocrats” to keep their positions for a longer time and learning about the amount of Chinese
money flowing into Nigeria and developing a more aggressive negotiation policy. Out of 45 Nigerian
senior officials that I interviewed, only 24% had been party members (of one of the parties that merged
into the PDP in 2013) for longer than 15 years, and only 36% had been holding a political position
over the past 10 years. Most were appointed to their current positions under the Buhari administration
in 2015.
In the words of a Nigerian senior-level government official:
“You see, in Nigeria, there is no such thing as party loyalty… you can switch from the PDP
to the ANC and back to the PDP, many state governors have done that, they first run for the PDP,
then the ANC… but in a political system like that you have to watch out for yourself, not the party,
you need to form alliances with individuals who have your back… so that means whenever somebody
new is elected, you need to get rid of the old administration and bring in someone you can trust,
especially when there are so many regional blocks and interests… Jonathan changed everything when
he came to power, Buhari changed everything when he came to power, his successor will do the
same… it is always the same. There is no such thing as trust or political ideology here period. How
can things change?”119
I did interview a senior official who has been in his position for 23 years, and I asked him how
he managed to hold the position for so long. His answer was that he switched party membership and:
“I know 23 years is quite unusual… I guess I got lucky because I used to work for a long time
in [named foreign country, omitted here to protect the interviewee’s anonymity] since I was the
Nigerian appointee for [name of the international organization omitted here to protect the
interviewee’s anonymity], and they tend to keep employees based abroad for longer than if you were
in the country… And then when I got older I managed to get back to this ministry. I knew it was
119
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always important to stay close to a few key players. And you have to be loyal and ready to negotiate
whatever your new president is asking you to. Otherwise, you are gone.”120
This re-staffing of political personnel then overall leads to a sporadic rather than a consistent
interaction with foreign players, where the relationships need to be defined again from the beginning.
This was confirmed by the majority of interviewees. As a Nigerian Foreign Ministry officer told me:
“The PDP was never strategically aligned with China, they sold our country in 2011 and then
in opposition they complain about China – look at their Covid response, back in March they were
mad when Buhari invited these doctors to help us with the crisis. And it is the same with the APC,
obviously they all talk to China, and China is more powerful so you essentially see the APC and the
PDP acting similarly, sign deals that aren’t ideal for us. But yes, there was not much information
sharing between the different administrations when it comes to the investment deals we discussed or
what policies would be the best for the country.”121
In Kenya, a member of parliament shared a similar sentiment with me:
“If you ask me, Tanzania has an advantage because it was always ruled by the same leadership.
Democracy is great but the way we practice it with so many different tribes, it might be inefficient…
because you see, we can’t rally the nation around one cause, we can’t even rally the government around
one cause… there is an election and the political landscape, the set-up of each office completely
changes… one of our issues is that we are unable to build a bureaucracy that can maintain the
knowledge we accumulate over longer time, we always learn from scratch.”
When the strategy of the new player China was unclear to governments, the evidence below
suggests that governments then defaulted to the narrative of the dominating investors, the Western
ones, which had always conveyed that local participation requirements were out of the feasible policy
space for African players. Asked why they have never experimented with local participation policies,
several Nigerian officials referenced the local participation requirements for oil and gas but said they
felt like in any other sector, they would not be helpful for attracting foreign capital. One Nigerian
official respondent said: “These policies are not what’s feasible for us if we want to grow through
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investments.”122 As a Kenyan member of parliament said: “Local participation requirements – “We
have never tried them. But it’s not something that would work here.”123
As mentioned earlier, in South Africa, perceptions on bargaining power were largely shaped
by an interplay of the ANC’s relationship with China and the need to address inequalities of Apartheid
by granting economic privileges to the black population. As Pitcher (2012) describes, South Africa
kept a relatively large amount of parastatals that serve to fulfill the government’s commitment to the
BB-EEE. Asked whether Chinese companies in South Africa that are interacting with the parastatals
are following the black ownership and employment regulations, a senior-level employee at a South
African national development finance institution shared: “Yes, everyone has to. South Africa is very
strict here.”124 Yet, when asked whether Chinese companies in South Africa that are private and not
interacting with parastatals are following BB-EEE regulations, the person said: “Well… labor costs
here are very high, and we have already industrialized… so I would expect them not to follow the
regulations… I can imagine it is a tough place for companies that need cheap labor.”125 The sentiment
was echoed in several interviews that I conducted with other government offices, where I observed
relatively high confidence that Chinese companies would be following the BB-EEE framework if they
were of higher-profile while in the purely private sphere, interviewees were doubtful of their
bargaining leverage.126
One conversation with a senior-level employee at the National Planning Commission was
particularly enlightening on why that may be the case:
“The ANC is “young” in the sense that we have only been in power since the end of
Apartheid… We are still learning how to position ourselves with the West and China. We see with
our eyes that the Chinese are okay with BB-EEE regulations, the regulations have definitely helped us
there to figure out what we can demand… And that they offer us a lot of money and they also let us
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co-chair FOCAC… But we don’t know about the private sector and the BB-EEE, whether they [the
Chinese companies] stick to them or not. How can I know about something that I have not seen with
my own eyes or heard with my own ears? Maybe it takes more time for mutual learning to trust that
the Chinese are different to our experience with the West… but yes, you are right, they act differently,
I have never given it enough thought.”127
That they have not given it much “thought” was echoed in several other interviews across
government bodies. “I think we are only slowly realizing now what we are worth… with the ascent to
becoming a full BRICS-member in 2010, and you say we get so many Chinese investors that are private
now… you have raised a good point, there may be more leverage for us than we have realized.”128
Overall, South African government respondents therefore appeared to have confidence in probed
methods, the BB-EEE regulations, but were skeptical about entering new territory with imposing local
participation requirements on purely private B2B interactions.
The analysis above suggests that countries with authoritarian rule or one-party dominant systems
incrementally moved towards more open economies but were very selective, and also chose to retract
some policies later on. In contrast, countries with multiple party systems and short-term horizons
were much less likely to implement stricter policy regulations or experiment with them in case-by-case
negotiations. This section described how the domestic political dynamics interacted with China’s
expansionary quest in Africa. The next section addresses countries’ historical relationship to the West,
and how the Weak Bargaining Power Narrative appears to have penetrated some countries more than
others.
5.3

Enabling Environment 2: Countries’ Historical Relationship to the West
In 2015, something unusual happened in Kenya. President Kenyatta signed the new

Companies Act (2015), which contained language requiring all foreign companies to demonstrate at
least 30 percent of shareholding by Kenyan citizens by birth. The move was drastic as this would have
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been the first time that Kenya placed any ownership restrictions on foreign companies. Yet, while the
law was supposed to go into effect in June 15 2016, United States’ business associations, including the
American Chamber of Commerce, quickly raised concerns over the bill and pointed out that this could
run against Kenya’s commitments under the WTO. As one interviewee said: “We wanted to push this
bill through. But from the responses we received, we felt a lot of pressure to abandon the law… a lot
of Western companies told us that they would want to exit the country if we went through with it.”129
Finally, the U.S. government also directly intervened with the Kenyan government until in the end,
the clause was repealed the same year.
The story raises larger questions on how countries define their bargaining power through
longstanding relationships with the West and China, how countries that have historically been closer
aligned with the West have been exposed to the Weak Bargaining Power Narrative, and through what
channels it has informed their understanding of bargaining power with Chinese investors. One causal
mechanism could be that countries that have positioned themselves closer to West have naturally also
received more aid and investment from the West. They might therefore also choose to play by Western
capitalist rules regardless of what Chinese investors would offer them under stricter regulations as the
absolute amount of Western investment still surpasses the Chinese one. Finally, it also begs the
question whether national governments have any bargaining space if the global capitalist regime,
through international organizations, anyway dictates rules. As Ramamurti (2001)’s two-tier bargaining
model illustrates, a second causal mechanism could therefore be that developing countries may be
“locked into” the global capitalist rules without any real space to demand own conditions.
Both arguments assume that deal conditions have to be fixed through formal national policies
across all types of investors and that countries know that private Chinese investors would be willing
to agree to stricter rules. Yet, the evidence I describe below casts doubt on both assumptions. Based
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on my interviews, I argue instead for the validity of a third causal mechanism - that governments
generally know that in weak institutional settings, there is both room for case-by-case negotiations
with deal conditions that can differ between investor types; but because some governments have so
much internalized the Weak Bargaining Power Narrative, they also believe that private Chinese players
would not enter, or exit their markets under stricter policy regulations. As a result, they have relatively
little strategized around how to position themselves with formal FDI policies and informal case-bycase deal conditions with private Chinese players.
5.3.1

African Countries’ Relationships to the West Since Independence
Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa have had strong economic and political ties to the West and

are naturally also among the top-receivers of Western investment, which is mostly concentrated in
five African countries. During the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union expressed
a strong interest in Nigeria due to its large reserves of oil, and Nigeria chose a position of nonalignment with a leaning towards the West. Between 1966-1977, the United States and Nigeria were
conflicted over southern African liberation, the U.S. pro-Biafran stance, and by the U.S. refusal to sell
weapons to Nigeria during the civil war. When Jimmy Carter became president in 1977, however,
relations between the U.S. and Nigeria suddenly improved since the U.S. started to recognize Nigeria
as a stabilizing force in Africa and moved closer to Nigeria’s position on southern Africa. Reagan’s
presidency again led to a diplomatic conflict with Nigeria over southern Africa but Namibia's
independence and the opening of debate for eliminating Apartheid in South Africa in the early 1990s
removed the largest obstacles to closer relations with the U.S. (The Library of Congress Country
Studies and the CIA World Factbook) that have been strong until today (e.g. as visible in multiple
million-dollar trade and investment deals and state-visits).
Kenya and the United States have been close allies since Kenya’s independence while
relationships to the Soviet Union never fully picked up. Similar to China, Soviet leaders were perhaps
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the closest to Vice-President Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, when contacts between the Soviets and the
more radical elements within the Kenya African National Union had been made immediately before
Kenya was granted independence from the United Kingdom. When Odinga was arrested and detained
in 1966, relationships broke off. President Moi then sought to further strengthen relations with the
United States by joining the U.S.’ Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, thereby inviting U.S. military
installations in Kenya. Yet, tensions over human rights issues in 1991 led the United States to join a
coalition of other nations who gave financial assistance to Kenya to pressure for reforms, and the U.S.
even suspended its aid in 1992. This pressure led to multiparty elections in 1992 and relations
significantly improved during Kenya’s democratic transition in 2002 and new president, Mwai Kibaki
was honored as the first African head of state to be invited to Washington D.C. for a state visit.
Diplomatic relations have been solid until today, as visible in the shared experiences of terrorism (e.g.
with the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Nairobi in 1998, or the Westgate Mall Attack in 2013) and
an increased trade and investment relationship.
South Africa’s white minority was haunted by the fear of communism during the Cold War,
and rallied Western support around the idea that any opposition party would overthrow capitalism
and nationalize the private sector. As a result, the West was willing to accept institutionalized racism
and minority rule government in exchange for keeping commercial and mining investments safe from
nationalization. The ANC’s relationships to the U.S. improved after the threat of communism was
diverted with the fall of the Soviet Union, and South Africa is today the #1 receiver of U.S.
investments on the continent, with particularly strong collaboration in the areas of health, education,
environment, and digital economy.
5.3.2

The Promise of Western Investments in the 1990s
While Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa are among the top-5 receivers of Western investments,

Ethiopia and Tanzania were on the list of heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) that were not
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receiving significant amounts of Western investment until today. As a result, it was the relatively more
attractive countries that first got to engage with Western investors and that developed policies on FDI
based on the Western narrative that they would have to liberalize and privatize in order to receive
more FDI. These relatively larger receivers of Western investment in the 1990s clinged to the promise
that with more investment-friendly policies, more investment would follow. As one Nigerian business
elite member shared, before the IMF and the World Bank stepped in, “We had tasted what Western
investment would look like… but Western investors were nervous about political instability and
whether returns were really there. But they told us if we well behaved just a bit better and followed
their rules, they would start flocking in en masse. But once they were completed, there was still no
Western investment.”130 This experience exacerbated the perception that the added value of each
country was small and that governments could impose few requirements regarding human capital and
technology transfers on foreign investors if they wanted to grow their economies with the help of
foreign capital.
The sentiment appears to have been fundamentally different in countries who were small receivers
of Western investment. Countries like Ethiopia and Tanzania could from the beginning not rely on
any amounts of Western investments. As an officer at an Ethiopian ministry shared with me:
“We started worse off than Nigeria, than Kenya, than South Africa… we had a huge amount of
debts, and never had that allyship during the Cold War. So, we felt like we would have had to wait for
another 20 or 30 years to see any investments from the West pour in. So, I think policy makers back
then knew they had to look towards what other countries in the East were doing so we had any chance
at development.”131
And in the words of an Ethiopian policy advisor:
“There was no Western investment coming, period. In most African countries, there is no Western
investment coming… I know that media probably tells otherwise, but they are sending no money. But
we observed that there was Chinese presence, growing presence, they seemed to be okay with the
poor living conditions, the lack of electricity. We saw that at least someone wanted to come. So oddly,
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our model was working and attractive to someone and so we thought we should keep going with it
rather than wait for more promises from the West. We couldn’t count on the fact that once we did
what the West was telling us, Western investment would actually come, other countries had better
chances than us, they had more to offer, like Nigeria, like South Africa, they already received Western
money… But there was also a second consideration behind the shift in reforms… you see, China
developed 40 years ago, South Korea developed 60 years ago… When did the West develop? How
can Western actors still tell us what to do, when there are actors in this world who have just made it
happen within the past century? And I think China respects us for what we are doing, “being
aggressive” as you call it, they respect it because they were aggressive themselves and it paid off.”132
In Tanzania, a similar sentiment around Western “dis-engagement” in the 1990s was visible. When
asked whether the 1990 reforms were working for attracting Western investment, interviewees
generally said yes but also that the West could not as much be counted on as a natural ally as China.
“The West came in as a ‘father’, to tell us what we should do and what we can’t do, but to be frank, it
was very unreliable… no one knew whether after all the reforms, Western investors would actually
decide to suddenly pop up, and there were a lot of threats and conditions involved. But we had always
been allies with China, and we knew that China was a brother, they treated us on a more equal level if
you will.”133 These accounts suggest that countries which were relative small receivers of Western
investment in the 1990s were more distrustful of Western promises attached to structural adjustment,
and appear to have sought to find a closer engagement with alternative forms of capitalist development
while relatively larger recipients of Western investment tried to gradually improve and kept up hope
that they would receive more Western capital thereafter.
5.3.3

Perceptions of Bargaining Power and Deal Flexibility

If deal conditions were fixed through national policies, this might also suggest that countries with
closer relationships to the West could have simply chosen to play by Western rules in the 1990s, which
has effectively “locked them” into the international capitalist regime with little room to alter conditions
today. Yet, in countries with weak formal institutions, deal negotiators do know that in theory, they
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have room for case-by-case demands. Perhaps one of the most striking examples I encountered was
a story that an NIPC officer told me during a group interview: An Algerian134 company had
approached them in the Spring of 2019 that they would like to open a paper production company in
the North of Nigeria and insisted on wanting to work with a local partner through a Joint Venture
contract. Yet, as the NIPC officer proudly said: “We explained to them that they can have a 100%
foreign owned company according to the NIPC Act of 1995. We did not stop arguing with them until
they agreed to operate fully 100% foreign owned.”135 Asked why they insisted on a weaker deal, he
responded: “It is a forced marriage if it is a 60%-40 % with a local partner. If you read
recommendations by the World Bank, by UNCTAD, you will understand, we regularly get their
reports… it makes more sense like this.”136 Asked whether he felt pressured by the World Bank or
UNCTAD to implement these policies, he simply said: “No, they wouldn’t know about individual
deals like these… we just felt like it made sense, we don’t want to force marriages, we were worried
they would decide in the end not to come.”137
When I told Kenyan and Nigerian government officials that in Ethiopia, the government has
informal expectations of foreign investors to add to local content with the investment, they almost
unanimously said that in theory, that would also be possible in their countries but they choose not to
because they feel like it would hurt their overall attractiveness. Asked in Kenya whether it would be
possible to have Chinese investors obey to different rules, an officer at a ministry tasked with attracting
investment said:
“Oh, they already do… when they build the SGR, we had discussions on the costs… they initially
wanted to bring in a machine to dig the whole tunnel but then they did not bring in the machine and
hired locals… they had the idea, it was more expensive for them but I think they wanted to have a
balance, they knew it would look better if they hired locals.”138
Country changed to protect the company’s anonymity.
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Kenyan officials also signaled that Kenya could have implemented an informal dual strategy
through an incentives menu with foreign ownership requirements around the new Companies Act in
2015 but that President Kenyatta received a lot of pressure from the U.S. not to. Asked whether they
know how the Chinese government reacted to the foreign ownership plans, respondents said they did
not know, with one respondent saying:
“I was advising our President at the time [when he signed the Companies Act]… I know that some
Chinese companies were not happy with it but we didn’t hear anything from the Chinese embassy or
the Chinese Chamber of Commerce… […] Because the United States was so against it, we thought it
would be the best idea to get rid of the requirement… but yes, you are right, the Chinese would have
probably stayed anyways, they really want to be here, they would have made it work... Maybe it was a
missed opportunity. We just didn’t think of it that way.”139
5.3.4

Permeation of Ideological, Educational and Intellectual Spheres by the West

This focus on Western needs and preferences compared to a relative absence of information
regarding Chinese preferences was very common across the interviews I conducted in Nigeria, Kenya
and to a lesser extent in South Africa. While China has emerged as a new trading and investment
partner for all the five case studies, the behavior of Chinese companies appears to still be understudied
in Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa compared to the one of Western companies, and therefore also
receives less policy attention. Why is that the case? One reason appears to be that the Western narrative
has permeated ideological, educational and intellectual spheres in Nigeria and Kenya as well as to some
extent South Africa that has perpetuated a Western-centric focus despite China’s presence in their
countries.
First, where respondents were educated and what development books they have read can be
informative of what has influenced their understanding of their own bargaining power. In the Kenyan
and Nigerian examples, a slight majority was educated in their own countries while the rest received
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their education in the United Kingdom or the United States, and one person went to university in
another African country. In contrast, in Ethiopia and Tanzania, most respondents were educated in
their home countries, 1/3 were educated in the United Kingdom and three respondents received an
advanced degree in China or Japan. One senior official at a ministry in Tanzania told me that he had
always been interested in industrial policy, so he decided to get his doctorate in Japan, which he had
heard was the best place to study the subject. “Productivity improvement in manufacturing and the
public sector was my dissertation… and when I came back, the government wanted to hire me
immediately.”140 While this is just one example, the interviewee holds a senior position in the ministry
and enjoys significant power to influence investment deal outcomes. In South Africa, most of the
politicians I interviewed were educated in South Africa, probably because South Africa has a
disproportionally large amount of universities, compared to the rest of the continent.
Second, countries that received biased information on their bargaining power with foreign
investors over an extended period of time also continued to predominantly engage with the Western
narrative, not the Chinese one. Observations from my interviews shine light on the rationale around
this Western-centric focus: First, among Tanzanian and Ethiopian government officials, I observed a
surprising level of familiarity with the “Chinese model” that was less visible in Nigeria, Kenya and
South Africa. Asked what development model their country is following, most respondents across
countries unsurprisingly replied that their country was not “copy pasting” any one model but trying
to learn from development successes around the world. In the words of a Tanzanian interviewee: “For
us, we study situations and then we try to localize our needs, we aren’t following any countries’
model… if something is adapted by many countries, you study what’s good about it.”141
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Asked, however, what the “Chinese model” meant to them, answers considerably differed across
countries: While respondents almost unanimously cited special economic zones to be characteristic of
the “Chinese model”, only respondents in Tanzania and Ethiopia also listed “industrial policy”, “state
capitalism”, “protection of infant industries” and “gradualism”, with two respondents in Ethiopia
citing Deng Xiaoping’s famous saying: “You cross the river by feeling for the stones.”142 Perhaps the
most striking experience I had was when I attended the Financial Times Nigeria Summit 2018 and
interviewed a senior-level official in the federal government, who had just recently been tasked with
attracting foreign investment. He listed “special economic zones” as emblematic of the “Chinese
model” after which I said whether they would also characterize industrial policy, or gradualism as
being part of the Chinese model, and that in fact countries like Ethiopia are experimenting with these
two features based on China’s approach. He replied: “Yes, we just learned [in a session at the
conference] earlier today that Ethiopia was doing that, they have a full industrial policy… we will look
into it.”143 Only by attending a Western conference, where the Financial Times chose to address the
Ethiopian development model, was he updated about another African country’s strategy.
Third, again in Nigeria, where I had time to establish stronger relations to my interviewees, I
observed a correlation between the books my respondents liked, and how they perceived their
bargaining power with Chinese investors. For example, I was quite surprised by the intensity by which
Jeffrey Sachs’ work seems to have penetrated government thinking in Nigeria, with many respondents
saying “yes” when I asked whether they found Sachs’ work on poverty traps “inspirational” for
Nigeria. The only person who found more critical words for Sachs was the director-general of a leading
federal government agency, who was also the only one of my interviewees in Nigeria who said they
believed Nigeria possessed bargaining power with private Chinese players. He invited me to his house
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for dinner, and on his bookshelf, I saw famous titles such as: “How Asia Works: Success and Failure
in The World's Most Dynamic Region” by Joe Studwell (2014). He later sent me a WhatsApp message
with a link to a talk by Jeffrey Sachs on Covid-19 in the African region, with the note: “Not a big fan
of Jeffrey Sachs, has done a lot of terrible things for Africa.” While this is of course only anecdotal, I
did find striking that the only person from my interviews who said that they believed Nigeria is
underselling its economy due to a misperception of power is also the one who openly criticized Jeffrey
Sachs’ work.
Finally, what metrics do governments use to assess their “policy fitness”? Interestingly, the World
Bank’s Ease of Doing Business (EDB) rating was mentioned by two interviewees in Nairobi. One
Kenyan official said the government is “working tirelessly on improving the investment climate,”144
which has indeed witnessed an unprecedented improvement in the World Bank's Ease of Doing
Business Index with Kenya's rank moving from 136 in 2014 to 56 in the 2020 ranking. The other
interviewee listed Kenya’s EDB ranking when I asked what countries Kenya aspired to imitate in their
FDI policies. In Nigeria, no one mentioned the EDB index but government respondents kept
referring to “official recommendations” by third party advisors. When I kept asking who these
advisors were, I was told the UNDP, AfDB, the World Bank, and the UK’s Department for
International Development (DFID). In South Africa, when asked about South Africa’s EDB ranking,
one respondent said: “Yeah we have fallen a bit behind and this is certainly a concern with foreign
investors… We need to be very careful because of the Middle-Income Trap, foreign investors won’t
want to come unless we provide a suitable environment for them… I think they [foreign investors]
do check the EDB index.”145
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Interestingly, in Ethiopia and Tanzania - both ranked low on the EDB index - I observed that
they were concerned about their performance regarding capacity; e.g. rapidness of investment
approval by their agencies, which is also captured by the EDB. An interviewee at an Ethiopian ministry
shared with me that the Investment Commission is sometimes still struggling to effectively meet
promised turnaround timelines for investment approval: “This is certainly a capacity issue, and we
know it hurts our attractiveness. We are always striving to become faster but we do not have the
human capital yet to get there today. But tomorrow we will.”146 Yet, I observed very little concern for
other areas included in the EDB like minimum capital requirements to open a business.
5.4

Conclusion
Overall, the evidence presented here suggests that government officials from one-party system

or authoritarian regimes that got to engage with local participation requirements early on learned over
time that private Chinese investors would also stay under these stricter regulations. In contrast,
government officials from countries more exposed to the Weak Bargaining Power Narrative have also
tended to perceive their bargaining power with Chinese investors to be weak, regardless of their actual
relative attractiveness to private Chinese investors on the continent. If conceived as a negotiation
game, this chapter has highlighted what information and historical frames countries have started the
game with - it described the interplay of domestic and international forces that matters for how
governments have experimented with local participation requirements before, how much they were
exposed to the Weak Bargaining Power Narrative, and how both forces have influenced how
governments perceive their own bargaining power with foreign players. The next chapter focuses on:
What information do different domestic actors share within the game? It describes different
players’ incentives to report investment-related information “up” to the central government. These
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incentives then influence how well governments are able to accurately count private Chinese
investment flows into their economies, which in turn also shapes their perceptions of bargaining
power.
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CHAPTER 6: INFORMATION-SHARING
INCENTIVES AROUND BARGAINING POWER
6.1

Introduction
In the Spring of 2015, business leaders, trade and finance officials of Laikipia County in Kenya,

around a four-hour drive to the North of Nairobi, embarked on a one-week trip to visit Liaoning
province in China. The journey was only one part of the county government’s larger efforts to attract
Chinese investment to the region’s trade, tourism, infrastructure, cattle, dairy and leather industries.
The county government advertises its ambitions online with the hashtags “#Laikipiaonthemove” and
“#DestinationLaikipia”, and there is a formal investment committee and a one-stop information desk
established to assist investors with settling and operating in the county. The government also has
ambitious plans of building a 200-hectare airport to facilitate exports and flow of Chinese tourists
coming to visit Laikipia in the future.
The story about Laikipa County is not unique. In March 2018, Oyo State in Nigeria received
a four-star rating for its efforts to attract foreign investment to its region in a certification process
scored by the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission (NIPC) and international and domestic
consultants. The state was ranked fourth best investor-friendly state in the country. Finally, in 2017,
Amahara Region in Ethiopia signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Chinese company
Maxter Group for the construction of a special economic zone in the area. The MOU came amidst of
the construction of twelve industrial parks throughout the country.
The accounts of Laikipia County, Oyo State and Amhara Region raise important questions
about the dynamics within the central government and across sub-divisions in their negotiations with
foreign investors. While the introductory chapters 1 and 2 illustrate that there is less need for cross-

country competition for Chinese investments, I argue that within-country cross-regional and interministerial competition turns out to still be a real concern for perceptions of bargaining power and
the resulting quality of investment deals. As pointed out in Chapter 2, this is because most private
Chinese entrepreneurs either enter African countries through Chinese SOEs or are referred through
a friend to a specific location in Africa. Chinese public investments and aid projects that SOEs attend
to are often strategically allocated through the diplomatic relationship between the respective African
federal government and the Chinese government. Yet, He and Zhu (2018) and my interviews suggest
that private Chinese companies, who have later ventured off from SOEs, often actually have very little
knowledge on where to invest within a country, and that private Chinese companies that come directly
from China tend to go by their Chinese friends’ advice who have already established a presence in a
particular African country. The respective African ruling government may then not be directly
involved in the process, and may have very little information on the amount of private Chinese
investment pouring into the economy if not clear counting mechanisms are set in place that create
transparency.
I define political centralization as the concentration of government's power. Centralization
emerges either out of strong centralized parties or strong de facto centralized institutions. Riker (1975)
measures party centralization according to first, whether the party that controls the central government
also controls the regional governments and second, the strength of party discipline. In addition,
institutions – or in other words, the strength of the centralized “state” itself - matters: Central
governments that are strong can either reward or punish local administrations, reducing both the risk
of local capture and the scope of competition for rents (Huang, 1998). Yet, if the state and its
institutions are weak, government’s power is naturally less concentrated, and more players will be able
to capture and compete for rents (e.g. Blanchard and Schleifer 2001).
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Centralization played a large role in the development trajectories of countries in East and
Southeast Asia: In South Korea and Singapore, specialized elite agencies (e.g. the Singapore Economic
Development Board or the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency) were tasked with investment
promotion and coordinating investment policies for the entire economy. Yet, in sharp contrast, China
has employed a more diversified approach (Ang 2016). As Oi (1999) writes, China demonstrates a
new variety of developmental state with “local [emphasis added] governments in the leading role” (pg.
3).
Yet, what both the Chinese, the Singaporean and South Korean strategies have in common is
that the central government still had enough power to centrally collect information on how much
investment was flowing into the economy and could base their policy decisions on this piece of
information. As Ang writes, “local investment bureaus in China do not (or did not, depending on
location) actually bear sole responsibility for investment work. Instead, all party and state offices
regardless of nominally assigned functions, are required and rewarded for participating in courting
investors. Each agency has to perform its formal functions […] but at the same time they are all
enlisted to prospect for investors for their home states.” (pg. 29) Counties had to track investment
targets for county agencies, which then reported up to central officials, and counties that met and
exceeded targets received bonuses while others were penalized. The central government consequently
had information on how much money was flowing into the economy, and this information directly
informed China’s Foreign Investment Catalogue that maintained national local participation
requirements on foreign investment.
These findings suggest that competition among regions may only be beneficial when the
central government is still strong enough to be able to track how much investment is flowing into the
economy, and what national policy restrictions are feasible to implement given the overall amount of
FDI flows. In other cases, I argue that if there are a lot of actors competing for investment, and they
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generally have incentives not to cooperate and share information and the central government is not
able to “force” information sharing through strong parties or centralized institutions, this can lead to
a race-to-the-bottom in deal quality when in fact, the country would have the bargaining power to
impose stricter regulations.
The same logic holds true for individual central government ministries and agencies. If there
are incentives in place to employ a collaborative approach in attracting investment, they are also more
likely to share how much investment comes in through their collaborative effort. In contrast, if
government bodies have incentives to employ a Machiavellian approach, then they are less likely to
share investment-related activities with other government bodies, who are competing in the same
environment. This chapter is therefore overall about competition between entities that have disincentives to share information on what investment is entering their sub-regional unit. There is then
a lack of complete information about how much investment the country is making at the central level,
which leads to lower perceived bargaining power compared to the actual level.
6.2

Enabling Environment 3: Centralization and Information-Sharing Incentives
As mentioned in the introduction, I argue that centralization may emerge either from strong

parties or strong de facto centralized institutions. Chapter 5 has shown that Ethiopia, Tanzania and
South Africa all have strong parties that control the central and regional political spheres and have
strong party disciplines (e.g. a clear path from years of membership to higher political positions)
compared to Kenya and Nigeria. In the next section, I am therefore focusing on de jure and de facto
centralized institutional systems and strength of the state that determine the overall degree of
centralization of each country.
Nigeria, Ethiopia and South Africa are certainly the longest standing and most prominent
federal experiments on the African continent. Yet, the discussion below shows that the centralization
through the concentration of government power significantly differs between Nigeria on the one hand
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and Ethiopia and South Africa on the other hand. I then compare these two types of centralization to
the political systems in Kenya and Tanzania and afterwards show that the degree of centralization
seems to matter for the flow of information between the central government and sub-regions and
how competition across central government offices further exacerbates the flow of information on
Chinese investments. Finally, I present the case of hidden village industrial parks in Nigeria as one
example of how information sharing up to the central government is blocked in a highly decentralized, competitive environment.
6.2.1

Experiments Around De-Centralization Across Africa
Federalism in South Africa, Ethiopia and Nigeria is all de jure present in political (subnational

elections), administrative (decentralization laws) and fiscal dimensions (formula-based transfers)
through territorial upper chambers, elected subnational officials and constitutional protections for
sub-national units. Yet, as Dickovick (2014) points out,
“federal dynamics in Africa are complicated by the long-running argu- ment that state power
in Africa is paper-thin and that governing authorities are connected to society mainly via informal
mechanisms (e.g. patronage and clientelism) rather than well-institutionalized legal-rational structures
(cf. Bayart et al., 1993; Chabal and Daloz, 1999). Per this argument, federalism may have some
implications for identity and for resource division, but it is subordinated as a causal variable. In short,
federalism will matter little where institutions themselves have little import. (pg. 555)
At the same time, Dickovick (2014) points out that this image arises due to a lack of
comparative work on African federalism, and points out that there is in fact a clear distinction between
South Africa and Ethiopia on the one hand and Nigeria on the other hand, which resembles the closest
other federal countries worldwide. In Ethiopia and South Africa, the “powers of SNGs [subnational
governments] are quite limited de facto by fiscal, political and administrative centralism” (Pg 561).
This centralism plays out through dominant party governance (limiting the political dimension of
federalism), state control over expenditures (limiting the administrative dimension), and limited ownsource revenues (limiting the fiscal dimension). In contrast, Dickovick argues that de jure and de facto
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regulations overlap much more significantly in Nigeria’s federalist experiment, where federalism is
embodied in a clearer vertical separation of powers and more substantial autonomy of SNGs. I offer
a discussion below on the differences between Ethiopian, South African and Nigerian de facto
federalism that translates into relatively more centralization in Ethiopia and South Africa and a more
de-centralized system in Nigeria.
Ethiopia’s regional states as well as the lower-level woredas (districts) and kebeles (localities)
effectively have very limited local tax bases (e.g. Sorsa 2018, Dickovick 2014). Meanwhile, in South
Africa, an obstacle to de facto fiscal federalism is the division of tax collection. Provincial tax revenues
are mostly concerned with vehicle taxes and limited user fees, while property taxes are the principal
source of income for municipalities. Yet provinces are responsible for providing substantial services
such as education and health, so they depend on the federal government to fil the expenditure gap.
In addition, as Chapter 5 illustrates, both Ethiopia and South Africa have been ruled by
dominant parties since the 1990s, who have been able to extend and manifest their powers to the
subnational levels, which effectively limits political federalism. The strength of parties is also
manifested and re-enforced by institutions: After the 2005 elections, the EPRDF introduced a reform
aiming for more “participatory democracy” by increasing the number of candidates who can run in
the kebele and woreda councils. As a result, all parties that wanted to run had to register 3.6 million
candidates, which only the EPRDF had the capacity to do. The EPRDF then unsurprisingly won
almost all seats (Tronvoll 2009). As Green (2011) writes, the EPRDF has thereby achieved vertical
extension of its power to the local level. In South Africa, the ANC has won all provincial elections in
2019 except to one (Western Cape). Naturally then, the National Council of Provinces, one of the two
houses of parliament, is also dominated by ANC representatives, and since 1997, the president has
also had the power to appoint and dismiss ANC provincial premiers and other officials.
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Finally, forces of both fiscal and political centralism in Ethiopia and South Africa also limit de
facto administrative federalism. De jure, sub-national divisions are empowered to choose expenditures
according to local demands. Yet, dominant one-party systems and the party penetration of all subdivisions of governance has led to de facto national state control over regional expenditures (e.g. see
Vaughan 2006, Meheret 2007). One finding from individual woredas suggests that over 90% of
spending is earmarked for the use on administrative and operational rather than capital expenditures
(Dickovick and Gebre-Egziabher 2014, Meheret 2007). In South Africa, when some provinces
engaged in overspending after the federation was set in place in the late 1990s, the federal government
implemented stronger controls over sub-national spending that effectively limited the spending
autonomy of provinces (Wehner 2000). These controls include a set of administrative procedures
determined by the Finance Ministry and the National Treasury, among other government bodies, to
include the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), which requires multi-year budgeting
across all public service sectors.
“The availability of this sort of multi-year budget enables the […] National Treasury […] to
coordinate across sectors and levels of government, and to approve SNG [subnational governments’]
budgets on specific compliance with centrally deter- mined priorities such as pupil-teacher ratios,
health care standards, and the like. Central – provincial relations are also regularized through meetings
of national and provincial ministers […], in which the latter communicate provincial needs, but are
essentially subordinate to the central minister, since all are typically members of the ANC and
provincial officials are fiscally dependent on resources from the centre.” (Dickovick 2014 pg. 563)
In contrast, de jure federalism has translated into significantly more de facto regulations in
Nigeria’s federalist experiment. First, as Chapter 5 illustrates, there is far less pronounced national
party dominance that would be able to permeate subnational units. The PDP’s influence has been
much more contingent than the one of the EPRDF or the ANC, with a real possibility of losing
elections to the APC. The PDP was in power between 1999 to 2015 but was replaced by the APC in
the 2015 elections. The PDP currently controls 15 out of 36 states, and there is a clear North-South
division, with the North consistently voting for the PDP and the South usually electing the APC.
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Overall, this creates a degree of electoral competitiveness that has important effects on the practice of
federal governance (see Wibbels 2005).
In addition, state divisions of the PDP or APC are more independent of the national party
compared to Ethiopia or South Africa. For example, against the concerns of the national government
and state governments in the South, Sharia law has constituted a main body of civil and criminal law
in nine Muslim-majority states, and in some parts of three Muslim-plurality states since 1999, when
then-Zamfara State governor Ahmad Sani Yerima began the advocate for the institution of Sharia at
the state level of government. Consequently, “although it lacks many of the regional autonomy
features of the Ethiopian constitution, the Nigerian federation appears to exhibit greater political
decentralization because of the benign nature of PDP dominance of the federation in comparison to
EPRDF hegemony in Ethiopia” (Suberu 2001, pg. 85f).
Second, Nigerian states have a higher local tax base compared to those in South Africa and
Ethiopia since they are able to collect taxes on land, land registration, estates and licenses combined
with a favorable fiscal federal dispensation. Third, they also enjoy less top down control on state
expenditures due to federal institutions and clientelistic politics: “With regard to spending
intergovernmental transfers, substantial portions of the Federal Account are used for capital
expenditure and subnational personnel at the discretion of the state. With regard to clientelism, the
prevalence of rent-seeking in Nigeria by subnational politicians itself suggests a degree of autonomy
from central government oversight a[t] least as traditionally defined.” (Dickovick 2014, pg. 565)
Overall, centralizing forces that balance out de jure federalism are therefore significantly less present
in Nigeria compared to Ethiopia and South Africa.
How do these different realities of centralization in the three case studies compare to Tanzania
and Kenya? With the advent of independence, the United Republic of Tanzania (formerly United
Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar) started off as a two-sided federalist system under the union of
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Tanganyika and Zanzibar. Tanzania can today still overall be classified as an example of a centralized
country with a strong presidency and a dominant party that exercises centralized control. For
administrative purposes, mainland Tanzania is divided into regions. Each region is administered by a
commissioner who is appointed by the central government. At district, division, and ward levels, there
are popularly elected councils with appointed executive officers.
Kenya experienced a highly federal-like system – also often referred to as ‘Majimbo’, with
seven regions with certain autonomy in the run up to independence from 1960-1963. The 1964
constitution then established a Unitary Republic Kenya that had some elements of federalism that
became less de facto exercised in the 1990s and 2000s (Negussie 2016). Kenya again started to more
seriously experiment with majimbo in 2010, where the new constitution devolved power from the
central government to 47 new elected county governments. Kenya’s federalism, compared to the
Nigerian one, is certainly more limited (e.g. in land administration functions) and much younger, where
county governments are still in the process of building capacity. Even so, the new constitution did
establish Parliament with two Houses: the National Assembly responsible for national concerns, and
the Senate of 47 county representatives with special powers in relation to the allocation of a fair share
of resources to county governments. The World Bank (2019) has described Kenya’s developments
“as among the most rapid and ambitious devolution processes going on in the world”, with countries
like Senegal or Mozambique using it as an example case for its own devolution processes.
Interestingly but perhaps not surprisingly, the degree of centralization across the case studies
also overlaps with how collaborative or competitive investment-related federal government bodies
(e.g. ministries or investment commissions) are in relation to each other. The reason is probably again
the closest related to party strength that I describe in Chapter 5: If individuals’ career is linked to how
long they have been party members, competing against each other is less needed. In contrast, if anyone
who happens to be aligned with the president is able to get a political position, there will be more

201

competition with other “newcomers” who try to cut in. A more detailed description of these
mechanisms and how they relate to the flow of investment information is offered below.
6.2.2

Information Flows in Centralized Versus De-Centralized Systems
How does de-centralization hinder information flows on the amount of Chinese investments

up to the central government? I argue that if ministries compete for funding and loyalty from the
president to stay in power, they are less likely to collaborate and share information around investment
deals. In contrast, if ministries are rallied under a shared party ideology and longevity of party
membership determines pay-offs, they are more likely to cooperate and share information. In addition,
de facto political de-centralism stalls information sharing because it lessens the trust among
government officials who would otherwise be working towards a shared goal. If politicians are
frequently competing in subnational elections in a multi-party system, they gain legitimacy “from
below” over the unit they govern. In contrast, if there is one strong party that also dominates local
elections, politicians gain legitimacy “from above” through trust and party loyalty.
Finally, de facto administrative and fiscal de-centralism are also an obstacle to information
flows because they decrease the need for assistance from the central government. If subnational units
are able to raise their own revenues and are not dependent on central government directions for
spending, they are also less likely to be transparent about their revenue inflows. In contrast, if subregional units need funds from the central government, they will be more likely to ask the central
government for assistance and share information on their revenues and investment inflows. Elements
of all three forces were visible in the interview responses that I collected and are presented below.
6.2.2.1 Inter-Ministerial Competition and Information Flows
Nigeria’s and Kenya’s inter-governmental agencies at the federal level compete for funding
and loyalty of the president, which appears to have serious implications for information-sharing
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incentives around foreign investments. In Nigeria, the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission
(NIPC), the Ministry of Budget and National Planning (MBNP), the Ministry of Industry, Trade and
Investment (MITI), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) perform formal facilitating roles in
attracting FDI, and several industry-specific ministries are directly approached by investors or later
pulled in to sign investment deals if it concerns their department. Individuals considering to invest in
Nigeria are free to address all government offices and ministries but are generally met with a nonstandardized approach to facilitating the investment deal.147
This is because in practice, alliances within the government seem to have led government
offices to try to capture investors without pulling in other government offices. The NIPC was founded
in 1995 to encourage, promote and co-ordinate investments and as a parastate directly reports to the
Vice-President of Nigeria. One senior employee shared with me that the NIPC views itself as:
“the private sector in government. Specifically to Nigeria we have government institutions that
are not receptive to investors, they are not aware of the value of investment…so they put in all bottom
necks, they don’t understand what FDI does to the country… Investors approach different ministries
separately and yes, there certainly is an inter-agency rivalry… we want to make it as easy as possible
to make business and we make other offices obsolete, we give tax wavers etc., so we compete… all
these ministries see our organization as counterproductive… but all deals, permits and licenses are
done through us.”148
The NIPC and the MPNP generally operate as a block because they are both under the direct
supervision of Yemi Osinbajo, the Vice-President of Nigeria.149 As an officer at NIPC told me: “The
NIPC has the last say on all investment matters as it reports to the office of the VP.”150
Yet, other ministries that are not part of this alliance appear to have a strikingly different view
on the role and importance of the NIPC. When I asked about the relationship between MITI and
NIPC, a senior officer at the MITI responded:
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“The ministry makes policy while the agencies implement policies, the NIPC is effectively only
an agency under our ministry. They think they are special because they do not technically report to a
ministry but the Vice-President. But if you look at NIPC, they are only reporting to the President’s
Office because the person who headed NIPC then was once a minister of this ministry [MITI], and
when he then was about to head the NIPC, he just wasn’t comfortable reporting to another
minister.”151
I asked interviewees to draw an organogram of the government bodies tasked with attracting
foreign investment, and interestingly, the NIPC respondents unanimously drew the President’s Office
and the NIPC next to it, with all the federal ministries below. In contrast, the majority of the ministry
respondents drew the President’s Office on top, below the ministries (four interviewees drew their
ministry significantly larger than the others), and again below the NIPC, with only one interviewee
drawing the NIPC on the same level as the ministries.
When asked to list the government offices that they had worked together with on the last
investment deal they were involved in, the majority of interviewees implied or directly confirmed that
generally, they set up deals as a ministry without necessarily pulling in or sharing information with the
NIPC or the MITI, and that the key negotiators were always from their ministry. This seemed to be
partially sector-specific: For example for oil and gas related matters, President Buhari, who appointed
himself as the Minister of Petroleum Resources, seems to send communiqués to the NIPC but does
not formally invite them to sit on the table or offer background expertise while the MITI is more
frequently asked to send an advisor.152 For agricultural matters, the NIPC and the MITI are sometimes
asked to advise with background information at the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development.153
And at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I was told that they are the ones “making the larger deals”154
while the NIPC is responsible for the “execution of smaller deals with maximum 1 million dollars”,155
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so their “spheres do not overlap and we don’t really engage.”156 Nigeria does not have its own ministry
on industrialization, a gap which the NIPC appears to want to fill. Asked whether there are any other
ministries highly invested in industrialization, they mentioned the Ministry of Labor and Employment
and the Nigeria Export Processing Zones authority but even then, they did not collectively attempt to
count the amount of manufacturing that has entered Nigeria: “We attempt our best but it is very decentralized, because companies aren’t required to sign up with us, we can help them but only if they
reach out… so we are alone in this quest of trying to have a good database of foreign manufacturers
in Nigeria.”157
Asked why they felt the need to compete and not pull in other ministries, one respondent
laughed and said: “This is Nigeria. There are a lot of people who will want to take credit for your
work… and there are also many alliances within the government… Osinbajo is from the South… but
many people in government are from the North… you need to pick your alliances right and show that
your ministry is performing… we are all out for ourselves.”158 Asked whether party loyalty and
longevity of party membership mattered at all, another respondent said: “No, you need to be good
with the President’s Office, they give you funding, they determine your political career, regardless of
how long you have been a party member. So ministers naturally want to take credit for whatever
investment deals they can get.”159 I mentioned to interviewees at other ministries that I heard this
answer in one interview, and the sentiment was confirmed by several other respondents.160
In Kenya, responses looked quite similar. Asked who usually sits on the negotiation table with
foreign investors, a former employee at KenInvest said: “Most of the time, we have different ministries
negotiating different deals and we weren’t really pulled in […] because each ministry has a different
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project and it is so specific to their field of operations”161 and that “investors can come to Kenya
through us but they don’t really have to… we have a list of investors who are registered with us, but
of course that is not all investors in Kenya.”162 At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I was told that they
were in fact the ones primarily responsible for setting up business deals. “KenInvest is being contacted
if investors want to have some extra assistance… but it is us who organize the delegation visits to
China, who work with the Chambers of Commerce in Kenya, the embassies… We work the closest
with the President’s Office and making sure we attract investments, that is one of our main tasks, and
we co-ordinate the ministries and who gets to negotiate what.”163
Yet, at the Ministry of Industry, Trade & Co-operatives, I was told: “No, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs is not involved in getting us investments, we usually are being approached by investors
themselves, or we send someone from our ministry to China.”164 And on KenInvest: “I think they act
more as an advisory role, if investors have any problems, they can go there.”165 When asked whether
party loyalty and longevity of party membership mattered at all, most respondents said that you had
to be a party member but it did not matter how many years you had been a member, and that you
could rise quickly by performing well,166 with one interviewee saying:
“This is an environment where you can become minister in one day and they kick you out the
next one if something happens […] no, there are no particular rewards for working together as
ministries, I think every ministry is trying to do their best and attracting investment deals to show to
the President’s Office… yes you can say they are competing and that’s sort of it.”167
When asked to draw organograms of the ministry constellation for attracting and negotiating
investment deals, most interviewees drew ministries next to each other, in same sizes or their ministry
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in bigger size, but with KenInvest below them. This shows that like Nigeria’s approach, Kenya’s
strategy to attract investment also appears to be rather de-centralized.
The fact discussed in Chapter 5 that ministries got largely re-staffed with the rise of a new ruling
party is also relevant for the argument advanced here. While Chapter 5 highlights that the re-staffing
led to sporadic rather than consistent interactions with foreign players, where relationships need to be
defined again from the beginning and the African side is learning again “from scratch” about the
Chinese strategy, re-staffing is also hindering information sharing incentives between different opposing
ruling powers. For example, I received the opportunity to talk at a café in Nairobi to a senior officer
who used to work at a ministry under former President Mwai Kibaki. He was part of the negotiation
committee that signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 2011 with the China Road and Bridge
Corporation to build a standard-gauge railway between Mombasa and Nairobi, the largest
infrastructure project in Kenya since independence.
Asked how the transition of the project to the Kenyatta administration went, he said: “This was a
deal negotiated by us, under President Kibaki, it was our win. And then it was handed over to the
Kenyatta administration, handed over the official paperwork, and we left… Kenyatta is getting a lot
of political praise for this but this was essentially our win.” Asked whether any new staff had asked
them for advice on how they negotiated, and how to approach China as a negotiation partner, he said:
“I was personally never approached… Kenyatta had his own new staff, his own allies… and I am
proud of the work I have done with the Chinese but I would not have wanted it to be used by
Kenyatta’s administration.” Asked whether generally, ministries were re-staffed, he replied: “Yes,
absolutely.”
In contrast, Tanzania and Ethiopia’s ministries efforts around investment promotion and
facilitation appears to be more collaborative due to party loyalty that needs to be demonstrated in
years. In Tanzania, the Tanzania Investment Centre, the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Investment
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and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and East African Cooperation are all formally tasked to attract
investors. While the NIPC and the KenInvest offices I visited were empty, when I stepped into to the
Tanzania Investment Centre for the interviews, it was full of applicants. “If you want to open a
business in Tanzania, you have to go through us, we are the first stop,”168 as one senior employee at
the Investment Center told me. This was confirmed by a senior officer at the Ministry of Industries,
Trade and Investment who asked me at the beginning of the interview whether I had been to the
Investment Center since they “will also have all the information for me.”169
At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and East African Cooperation, I was also first told that I
should go to Investment Centre.170 Asked how different ministries negotiate with foreign investors,
all three agencies told me the same set-up, that investors would first have to approach the Investment
Centre, which, if necessary (usually for larger investments), then invites different ministries to the
negotiation table.171 If investors happen to address a federal ministry first before the Investment
Centre, the ministry is supposed to inform the Investment Centre, which then coordinates pulling in
ministries for the negotiations.172 Asked why there appears to exist such a high amount of collaboration
and a clear structure on negotiations, one interviewee said that President Magufuli had just sent out
another communiqué to all government offices the week prior to the interview reaffirming that “we
talk as one government, that is one of the principles of his presidency but really the CCM’s strength
in general.”173 I also asked whether ministers would be able to gain credit for striking deals with
investors and then report their work to the President’s Office, and how the President’s Office assesses
ministry performance in general. I was told: “I don’t understand your question… I don’t know why a
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ministry would want to negotiate by itself if you can ask the Investment Centre, the Ministry of
Industries for help”174 and that “you have to be a party member for a long time, to show that you can
be trusted with a more senior role… and once you are the minister, you are still part of the whole
CCM apparatus. The expectation is that you collaborate, the president does not like if a minister does
their own thing… it is not viewed well.”175
When asked to draw organograms of the ministry constellation tasked to negotiate investment
deals, the vast majority of respondents interestingly drew the ministries next to each other in a circle
around the President’s Office, and then an extra circle (“where they all meet”176), the Tanzania
Investment Centre, right next to the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Investment, with the Ministry in
a larger size than the Centre. Compared to the organogram drawings from Nigeria and Kenya, these
ones showed a “center” where negotiations took place and “information was collected.”177
In Ethiopia, the Ethiopian Investment Commission is an autonomous government institution
accountable to the country’s Investment Board, which is chaired by the Prime Minister, and mainly
responsible for attracting and facilitating investment, including handling permits, business licenses,
and technology transfer agreements, among other functions. Like in Tanzania, all investors must
register with the Commission. When I visited the Commission, there were fewer applicants present
than in Tanzania, perhaps because applications can also be submitted online. Like the Tanzania
Investment Center, the Ethiopian Investment Commission views itself as a “one-stop shop”178 that is
the main organ responsible for investor-related issues in Ethiopia.
I also interviewed individuals at The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Finance and the
Ministry of Trade and Industry to better understand the de facto role of the Commission, and
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individuals at all three ministries confirmed that the Investment Commission is the first point of entry
to Ethiopia.179 I asked all interviewees to please draw an organogram if they had to describe the
investment negotiation landscape, and they all either placed the Investment Commission on top of
the sheet, with the ministries below, lined up next to each other, or the ministries and the Investment
Commission all next to each other, with arrows pointing to and from each ministry to the Investment
Commission. Asked why the arrow also leads from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Investment
Commission, a senior officer at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did say that sometimes, investors,
especially larger ones sent by the Chinese government, would approach them first, or a diplomatic
delegation from Ethiopia would involve the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in investment deals before
the Commission. Yet, he also said that even if they happen to be the first point of entry, “we will
involve the [Investment] Commission.”180 Asked whether there may also arise competition for funding
or prestige with the government, I was told: “we have clear performance targets, and it is easier to
fulfill these targets if we work together… you also get credit if you help set up a deal.”181 Party loyalty
and longevity of party membership again appear to significantly matter: “Yes, you need to demonstrate
that you support the government’s development agenda, and it is mostly long party members that get
to fill higher positions… that is necessary if you want to ensure that we are implementing the Growth
and Transformation Plan as a government.”182
In South Africa, responses were somewhat similar to Ethiopia and Tanzania, where ministries
did not appear to actively compete. At the same time, there seems to be no central organ that would
deal with investment-related matters, especially for smaller, private investors. I was told that under the
Jacob Zuma administration (2009-2018), the President’s Office often directly negotiated large loan
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and investment deals with the Chinese government.183 Yet, when Cyril Ramaphosa came to power in
2018, he actively started to pursue a slightly more de-centralized model, where he tasked South African
parastatals to negotiate large loan deals with Chinese banks, including the billion dollar deals promised
by China for South Africa in 2018.184 As one officer at one of the parastatals shared with me: “We are
trying this new model, mostly because of Zuma’s corruption history… Ramaphosa wants more checks
and balances, and to move negotiations away from the traditional beneficiaries of these deals.”185
Asked whether there is oversight on the amount of investments entering South Africa, he said: “Yes,
certainly, because it always goes through the President’s Office first… they are then the ones
delegating it then for the actual negotiations but they always keep an oversight and check in with what
and how much money is being discussed.”186 Asked whether the B-EE regulations have always been
successfully enforced with foreign investors, or whether the government makes concessions
depending on the size of the deal, interviewees at the President’s Office, two parastatals and the South
African Department of Trade, Industry, and Competition (DTIC) confirmed that B-EE regulations
were “not up for negotiations”187 since they are “so engrained in South Africa’s institutions.”188
At the same time, negotiations with small, private investors appear to be highly de-centralized,
and there seems to be no office that would count the amount of private investment in South Africa.
InvestSA is a division of the South African Department of Trade, Industry, and Competition (DTIC)
and tasked with the attraction and facilitation of investment in South Africa, with one stop shops in
Western Cape, KwaZulu Natal and Gauteng. Yet, several interviewees confirmed that many private
companies in South Africa are not registered with InvestSA.189 “You are only on the government’s
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radar if you do business with the government.”190 I also asked whether private South African
companies doing business with Chinese investors would enforce B-BBEE regulations, a professor at
a South African University told me: “No, if it is B2B relations, and not business to government, no
business has to care about B-BBEE. All they care about is profits, and it isn’t properly enforced.”191
What is central to the argument advanced here is that while larger loan and investment deals are
becoming slightly more-decentralized, information is still being reported up and down between the
ministries, parastatals and the President’s Office, which keeps an oversight of investment amounts. In
contrast, there appears to be no central collection of information regarding private investments.
The discussion above shows that in Nigeria and Kenya, federal government offices tend to
compete while their interactions in Tanzania, Ethiopia and South Africa tend to be more collaborative.
How do these interactions then influence what information the central government is able to collect
on Chinese investment inflows? I asked all government officials where they generally receive their
information on Chinese investments, and respondents significantly differed between the “centralized”
and the “de-centralized” systems. In Nigeria, the vast majority of interviewees said that they either
received information on Chinese investments “from Nigerian newspapers” (42 out of 45), from deals
they are directly involved in (45 out of 45), or their own ministry (39 out of 45).
The NIPC also sends out an almost-daily newsletter on its activities, for which anyone can
sign up – six interviewees (four of them NIPC employees) said that they are receiving the emails while
39 said that they had not heard of any NIPC newsletter. I tracked for Chinese-investment related news
between May 20 2019 to May 20 2020, and 46 emails included Chinese investments, of which 39
addressed an investment of a Chinese SOEs in the raw material or industry sector (with five emails
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on the Lekki FTZ). These deals were again mostly set up with Chinese SOEs, not with private
companies.
In Kenya, most respondents said that they receive information on Chinese investments “from
Kenyan newspapers” (21 out of 23) from deals that they are directly involved in (23 out of 23), and
their ministry (20 out of 23). These deals were again reportedly mostly set up with Chinese SOEs, not
with private companies. What is particularly worth highlighting here is that in both countries, the vast
majority of respondents indicated that they receive their information from newspapers or their own
ministry, not internal government communiqués or from other ministries.
In Tanzania and Ethiopia, only three and five interviewees respectively reported that they
would consult the newspaper for information on Chinese investments while the majority referred to
deals they are directly involved in, their own ministry, and internal newsletters that are being sent out
by the prime minister and presidents’ offices as well as the investment centers (17 out of 23
interviewees in Tanzania and 19 out of 21 interviewees in Ethiopia) and from other ministries (18 out
of 23 interviewees in Tanzania and 20 out of 21 interviewees in Ethiopia). In South Africa, the majority
of interviewees said that they receive information on Chinese investments from “South African
newspapers” (14 out of 19 interviewees), deals they are directly involved in and their ministry (19 out
of 19 interviewees), and the national development plan (10 out of 19 interviewees).
Finally, and most importantly, I asked the key ministries tasked with formulating investment
laws what investment-related information they receive from other ministries to base their
recommendations to the legislature on. Respondents at the Nigerian Ministry of Industry, Trade and
Investment and at the Kenyan Ministry of Industry, Trade and Co-Operatives shared with me that
other ministries do not send them information on investment amounts. I asked why they have not set
up a system where they would track and share information across ministries and the Nigerian response
was: “We have been trying to ask them to send us information but it is really up to the ministers how
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they want to engage with us.”192 And in Kenya, KenInvest said: “We tried to come up with something
more central in 2017, my boss was the lead initiator behind this… but he ran against walls. We are
asking for information that ministries don’t like to share.”193 In contrast, at the Ethiopian Ministry of
Trade and Industry and at the Tanzanian Ministry of Industry, Trade and Investment I was told that
they did have central systems in place that track investments that also capture smaller investors. “Yes,
we have tasked the Investment Center and the Export Processing Zone Authority with collecting
information for us that is vital. We receive a lot of small companies.”194
I wanted to test the claim that the Export Processing Zone Authority is collecting information
for the central government. So, I randomly selected one of the export zones in Dar es Salaam and
interviewed the managing director. What was the most puzzling was that, without me even asking, he
pulled out a document with statistics on all the firms operating in the zone, and said: “The government
takes this information very seriously.”195 Overall, these responses suggest that how ministries and other
federal government bodies interact with each other influences what information is being shared on
the inflow of foreign and Chinese investments. The next section focuses on information flows
between the central government and sub-regional units that differ between de-centralized and more
centralized government systems.
6.2.2.2

Communication between Central Government and Sub-Regional Units
Responses in Nigeria and Kenya show that regional electoral competition and more

independence in raising revenues has led states and counties to engage separately in attracting foreign
investors while both forces are less present in Tanzania, Ethiopia and South Africa. Competition
among Nigerian states is a famous concern among nation building efforts. As a senior aid to the Lagos
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State Governor shared with me: “The North always receives government support, extra money, and
where does it go? The North is in a worse economic state than 50 years ago. Meanwhile, we in Lagos
raise our own funds, domestic and foreign, we create own growth. The North should just separate,
we would be better off.”196 An Ogun State official shared a similar sentiment with me: “Effectively,
Ogun State has to compete for investment all by itself, we send delegations to China, we try to make
them come here […] A mutual strategy? We can do it ourselves, and probably better.”197
In this environment, some states then become very entrepreneurial. For example, Edo State
in the South of Nigeria set up a full website to attract investors and also has an Edo State Investment
Office. Governor Godwin Nogheghase Obaseki, a business man who has for a long time worked in
investment banking and also founded AfriInvest (a large investment banking firm), is a PDP member.
One of his employees shared with me at a visit to Lagos that the county’s relationship to the APC as
the federal ruling party is difficult. “We can’t count on receiving support from the APC... the Governor
is very skilled in investments, so he took on the task to lead investments to Edo State, otherwise we
might be left out. He is a very smart man and he was elected on the promise to bring in more money
to the state.”198 Asked whether they are working together with any federal government agency, he said
that they take advice from the NIPC. Interestingly, as mentioned before, the NIPC is also associated
with Vice President Osinbajo, a Southerner, so the trust of the Edo State Governor in the NIPC might
be higher than in the MITI. Asked whether governors are supposed to submit investment reports to
the federal government, representatives of Lagos, Ogun and Edo State told me that they need to
submit “revenue reports” and that investments are sometimes captured there but that there are no
checks on accuracy or completeness. “No, you do not need to keep count of state investments… yes,
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the NIPC technically tracks it but we don’t really submit anything detailed… I wouldn’t trust the other
states’ numbers, Edo State is doing really well.”199
Asked about in what capacity Kenyan counties collaborate with KenInvest, the KenInvest
representative said that if counties want, they can work with KenInvest but that counties also host
their separate events and that he has heard that some counties are now starting to attract investments
in “blocks.”200 Due to time constraints, I was unable to do more subnational research in Kenya but
the fact that a senior official at KenInvest apparently knew very little about these blocks suggests that
there is little cooperation between the federal and the county level.
Asked whether KenInvest helps to match investors with counties, one officer said: “Well they
are responsible for their own investments… since 2010, counties have more responsibilities there..
they are elected to raise their own revenues, and investments are part of that.” Interestingly, the
Governor of Laikipia County mentioned in the introduction of this chapter used to work as Assistant
Minister for Industrialization under the Kibaki administration between 2007-2013, where he was
involved in reforms to improve the business environment through policy incentives. He ran as an
independent candidate for the Laikipia county elections and is therefore not affiliated with the Jubilee
Party, the current ruling party at the federal level. While I do not have direct evidence, Laikipia
County’s exceptional quest to directly attract investment resembles the story of Edo State, where the
Governor is from a different party to the federal government, has an investment (policy) background
and is implementing an entrepreneurial approach to attracting investment to their region.
In contrast, in Tanzania and Ethiopia, regional elections are dominated by one party, and subregional units are also significantly less able to raise their own revenues, which tends to lead to a more
centralized effort to attract investors. As the senior economist at the Tanzanian Ministry of Industry,
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Trade and Investment told me: “The Investment Centre gives investors suggestions on where to go,
we have regional quotas to fill…the quotas ensure that each commissioner gets investments for their
region… and our investment activities depend on the five year development plans, and all ministries
and sub-regional units are supposed to work towards that… or it is the same with the SDGs, we have
a very similar approach there.”201 I also asked why different Tanzanian regions do not simply venture
off to attract investments themselves: “They simply can’t, you have to know that some regions are
very poor… and so they rely on the government to distribute investment.”202
In Ethiopia, the government has also been driving industrialization very centrally through the
Growth and Transformation Plans. As mentioned in the introduction, in 2017, Amahara Region in
Ethiopia signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Chinese company Maxter Group for the
set-up of a special economic zone in the area. The MOU came amidst the construction of twelve
industrial parks throughout the country, including Bahir Dar, Gonder, Jimma, and Mekele. Asked why
the central government is so involved in re-distributing investments across the country and what role
kebele and woreda governments play in attracting investors, one interviewee was confused and said:
“There is just one government”,203 probably alluding to the fact that the EPRDF was also ruling in
most local councils. Another respondent said that the central government is so involved in attracting
foreign investment “because they [local councils] can’t do it themselves, some regions are very poor
and it is the task of the government to help out with funding.”204 His response confirms Djockovic
(2014) that some regions are too poor to raise funds themselves.
Finally, in South Africa, there appears to be a counting system in place that captures the
amount of official Chinese investments, promised by the Chinese government, and private Chinese
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companies that settle in special economic zones across the country. National, provincial or municipal
authorities or Public Private Partnerships (PPP) need to formally apply and meet defined criteria for
recommendation by the Special Economic Zones Advisory Board to the Minister of the Department
for Trade, Industry and Competition.205 “All business is done with the government”,206 I was told by
a professor of a South African university.
But what about private companies that are not procuring to the government or are not located
inside a special economic zone? He said that as a company, “once you have ventured off, there is no
agency that would have any oversight, we don’t have a classic mandatory one-stop-shop system like
in Ethiopia, InvestSA has fewer mandates… they are only starting to learn now to set up counting
systems in the provinces… before, they thought there wasn’t any private money coming in but you
are right, there are a lot of companies in the provinces that we all need to know more about.” South
Africa therefore appears to be a more nuanced case, where information on larger C2G deals is being
collected by the President’s Office but where awareness around the magnitude of private Chinese
investments is developing slower, and provinces or InvestSA have not been tasked to pay particular
attention to this relatively new type of investor.
In countries where sub-regional units have incentives not to share information “up” to the
federal level, the central government will have less information on what sub-regional units attract what
kind of investments. When I told respondents at the Nigerian Ministry of Industry, Trade and
Investment that the NIPC gives out star-ratings to Nigerian states based on how much investment
they attract, they all seemed surprised and said that they would like to see the states’ rankings, and that
they had no similar system in place.207 I also asked about the rating at the NIPC and what numbers
they base their rankings on. I was told that the NIPC had to include international and domestic
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consultants for the project because “we had to get independent figures… otherwise, states would just
tell you any numbers… we had to make sure these estimates are somewhat reasonable.”208 In Kenya,
I also asked for county-specific investment numbers but all interviewees told me that they do not
know whether such a database exists, and they could not tell me what counties except to Nairobi
attracted the largest amount of manufacturing and service investors.209
If government officials receive biased or incomplete information on the amount of Chinese
investment flows, they will misperceive what sectors companies have invested in and overstress the
importance of SOEs that also may get more attention through the high-profile diplomatic relationship
between the respective African country and China. As Chapter 4 describes in detail, Nigerian and
Kenyan respondents indeed largely underreported the amount of small and medium Chinese
companies in manufacturing and the service sector in their economies. Interestingly, those offices that
reported to hear about Chinese investments through the newspaper also tended to conflate Chinese
official investments, done through SOEs, and smaller private investments under the umbrella term
“Chinese investments.” When I asked interviewees in Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa whether they
perceive any differences between official Chinese investments, decided by the Chinese government,
and smaller private Chinese investors, the vast majority told me that they did not really know what the
difference was, and that there is predominantly Chinese official investment in their respective country
while they estimated the amount of private Chinese investors to be very small.
In contrast, the interview responses presented in Chapter 4 show that there is significantly
more awareness around the presence of private Chinese investment in Ethiopia and Tanzania. This is
probably because all types of investors are required to sign up with the investment centers, which then
report to the ministries. While I was waiting in the lobby of the Investment Centre in Tanzania, I
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chatted with a few applicants. Their companies ranged from small kettle businesses to ceramics
factories, indicating that also smaller, private businesses did indeed go to register with the government.
At the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Investment, I also got a chance to talk to two investors who
wanted to build a global supply chain for nuts and fruit from Tanzania. The senior economist met
directly with them (and me) but they also told me that they had registered with the Investment Center
and are now trying to see if the senior economist can help with additional business contacts and
suggestions on where to invest.
Overall, the analysis above demonstrates that more centralized systems may be able to more
effectively collect information on small, private Chinese investments compared to de-centralized
systems. At the same time, the described experiences in Tanzania, Ethiopia and South Africa are of
course not supposed to imply that investment data collection is always working perfectly across the
three cases. I was only able to interview Chinese companies located in or around the capitals and in
highly urban areas across all cases. What supports the theory advanced here is that of the 38 Chinese
companies I interviewed in Lagos, Ogun and Oyo State in Nigeria, only 5 responded they had
registered with the NIPC. In Kenya, of the 15 Chinese companies I interviewed around Nairobi, two
had registered with KenInvest. In Ethiopia, of the 13 Chinese companies I interviewed around Addis
Ababa, twelve said that they had registered with the Ethiopian Investment Commission. In Tanzania,
of the 16 Chinese companies I interviewed around Dar es Salaam, 14 reported that they had registered
with the Investment Centre. Finally, in South Africa, of the two Chinese companies that I interviewed
around Johannesburg that had interacted with the government in some capacity, both were registered
with Invest SA. In contrast, of the three private Chinese companies I interviewed around
Johannesburg, none told me that they had registered with InvestSA.
At the same time, capacity constraints are certainly an issue, and it was outside of the scope of
this project to study more rural regions, where realities of actual service delivery could be substantially
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different. In Ethiopia, for example, one interviewee at the Investment Commission told me: “It is a
mess sometimes… licenses still come late, or they use wrong addresses… We are still learning how to
improve our services and build capacity.”210 My interviews do reveal, however, a clear difference across
the structural set up around investment promotion and facilitation across the five studies cases that
does seem to lead to different information inflows that influence perceptions on bargaining power.
Chapter 4 shows that respondents in countries with a central organ tasked to track investment flows
and a collaborative government culture provided significantly more accurate estimates on the amount
and type of private Chinese investments in their countries, compared to the ones with de-centralized
structures. As a result, I conclude that while investment-related institutions do not always have the
full capacity to track all investment inflows, they appear to be able to track “enough” inflows to
provide governments with a good enough idea of the magnitude of private investments that in turn
influences perceptions on bargaining power.
6.3

“Hidden” Village Chinese Industrial Parks - Sub-National Evidence from Nigeria
The aim of this study is to explain cross-national variation in perceptions of bargaining power

across five African countries. But in the context of federal political systems, it is also important to ask
how de-centralized systems feed federal, state and traditional leaders with different cues about
bargaining power that then influence views of the federal governments. I received the opportunity to
visit “hidden” village Chinese industrial parks in Nigeria after an interviewee in Lagos State had shared
with me that a private Chinese business man had set up an industrial park in his village in Ogun State,211
of which the federal government was not aware. I was able to visit the village for two days and to
conduct interviews with seven Chinese businesses (out of 17 fully operating), 10 villagers as well as
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the king and his ruling family. I was then also able to interview two members of two other villages
with Chinese parks in the same state, who are now based in Lagos.
First evidence from these “hidden” village Chinese industrial parks in Nigeria suggests that
players at different government levels do have different perceptions of bargaining power, but they
have few incentives to share their information “up” with other government bodies, which overall
results in low perceptions of bargaining power at the federal level. These findings further support the
theory advanced in the first chapter but also shine first light on sub-national variation in bargaining
power and open a new avenue for future comparative research on the topic.
When I visited the interviewee’s village in March 2019, the village king kindly invited me to
his palace to have tea, and he told me the following story that was also confirmed by several villagers
and Chinese company managers operating in the village: In 1992,212 a private Chinese man came to
this specific village because it had a pond, “and the man was interested in fishing”,213 and because it is
located on a road that is conveniently connecting the South with the North. The Chinese business
man talked to the village king, who seized the opportunity and asked the Chinese man to build him
two additional houses to his palace in exchange for allowing him to use some of the village land. The
Chinese man agreed to the deal, opened up a foam (mattress) company and soon brought more
Chinese companies (foam, shoes, ceramics and fishing) from China.
What are some of the motivations of these Chinese companies to settle in the village industrial
park? This industrial park is completely independent from the official Chinese industrial parks in
Nigeria (Lekki Free Trade Zone and Ogun Guangdong Free Trade Zone (OFTFZ) and offers
different incentives. OGFTZ spans an area of 10,000 hectares and the land is leased for 99 years. As
a joint venture between the China African Investment Company (CAIC, under the control of the
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Chinese Guangdong Province, 82% ownership) and the Ogun State Government (18% ownership),
the CAIC has 100% management control of the zone (although the zone had undergone different
phases of state-owned and private Chinese management that had led to conflict in the past).
When asked why they preferred to operate in this village and not in OGFTZ, the Chinese
companies in the village park told me that they would have to pay management fees in the official free
trade zones, that they also received tax incentives here, that they liked the close relationship to the
king, the little bureaucracy and that their complaints were attended to quickly, and that they also liked
to be located on the road that connects the North and the South. I also carefully mentioned the
conflict over management in the OGFTZ and the Chinese government’s final rule to reinstate stateowned management after a private Chinese company had led the zone for a few years. Six out of seven
Chinese managers said they did not know what I was referring to. When I hinted at it, they said they
were not worried that this would happen to them because the Chinese government is not involved
with their park. One Chinese interviewee hinted that they are too small, so the Chinese government
effectively does not care.214
Certainly, the companies also had complaints about electricity shortages and water supply, and
especially about the high rate of kidnapping in their area. “Last week, a Chinese man in a different
village was kidnapped”,215 one manager told me, “many Chinese now have police men that go with
them.”216 But when I asked whether they would consider leaving the region because of the safety
issues, she said: “No…. I have heard of the ones kidnapped, they often pack their bags and go on the
next plane back to China [laughs]… but most Chinese stay.”217 Asked why they would stay, she said:
“This just happens, it’s part of life, we just go back to work.”218
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What are the concrete conditions under which these companies are allowed to operate in the
village? I asked the king how he is able to keep attracting Chinese companies. He said that he
convinced the Ogun State Government not to tax the small, growing Chinese companies but to make
them pay once they are already bigger. “That was really attracting a lot of companies.”219 At the same
time, he said he is very strict around local contributions. “They have to help us in the village, they
have to employ the people, they have to build wells, they have to help fixing what’s broken.”220 Asked
how readily the Chinese are complying with the demands and whether there were any complaints, he
said: “No, no complaints, they know it is expected, and it is natural in our relationship… we give them
land, they give us help.”221
What about competition from other villages? After all, there is plenty of land in Ogun State,
with different village kings that could simply engage in a “race-to-the-bottom” in luring in companies.
At least the kings in the three villages that I studied do not appear to feel pressure to compete against
each other because each one has their own Chinese company community in China that, through
existing Chinese contacts in the Nigerian villages, picked theirs.222 The other two village industrial
parks are located 67 km and 122 km, respectively away from the first one. Their first points of contact
with Chinese companies was also through adventurous, entrepreneurial Chinese business men.223 I
asked about inter-village competition but as the interviewee who had shared the location of the first
village with me said: “No the trust and the relationship is everything… Chinese don’t know anything
about Nigeria when they first come here, so they will go to wherever their friend is. And once they
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are here you build relationships with them, too. But they usually don’t go to a village that they don’t
know, they are very careful.”224
Why are the three village chiefs that I studied able to negotiate local participation with the
Chinese companies? Like at the national level, several explanations stand out as to why the village
chiefs would negotiate strong deals with Chinese business owners. In Chapter 4, the experiment results
suggest that at the federal level, electoral incentives did not influence government
respondents’ willingness to sign deals, probably because there is very little transparency around these
deals in media. At the same time, at the local level, electoral, party, or social incentives may certainly
still influence whether people seek out broadly public benefits or aim for private payoffs. For example,
chiefs’ embeddedness in local communities may encourage them to cut better deals than elected
officials. Baldwin (2015) famously calls such individuals “development brokers,” who help their
communities resolve collective action problems and make sure they have access to development
projects such as improved roads, clinics, schools and water wells.
These factors certainly play a role. After all, the king did first ask for improvements of his
personal home. He also then later ensured that his village was benefitting from the Chinese presence
by ordering local participation in the Chinese factories. Yet, the central point put forward by this
project is that the village king was aware that he could ask for local participation in the first place. In
particular, he was surprisingly very aware about the policy attributes that Chinese companies were
sensitive to (taxes), and the ones around which he could be more aggressive (local participation)
without deterring valuable Chinese capital. The king had realized that his village had bargaining power
due to its cheap land and location, and he is using it to ask for personal and village benefits. While we
were drinking tea at his palace, I asked him why he thinks he can ask the Chinese company community
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to contribute to his village’s development. He seemed surprised that this would even be a question,
and he confidently said: “They want to use our land, so we can set the rules.”225
The reasons as to why the kings had high perceptions of bargaining power can again be related
to the three variables pointed out to matter also for the federal level. Baldwin (2015) argues that the
long-time horizons of chiefs and the repeated nature of their interactions with local society lead to
different incentives compared to those of elected politicians. She writes that “traditional leaders have
a unique ability to organize community contributions to these projects... because they expect to rule
for life and thus have an incentive to make up-front investments in institutions that will improve the
ability of their communities to act collectively over the long-term.” (pg. 10) I argue that, similarly, long
time horizons of the three chiefs that I studied and the repeated nature of their interactions with
Chinese companies helped them to learn over time that they do possess bargaining power around
local participation and that they can in fact ask for these up-front investments from Chinese
companies, which has led them to set up institutions that will improve the ability of their communities
to act collectively in negotiations with the Chinese over the long-term. The village chief therefore
provides a contrasting example to the replacements and re-staffing happening at more central levels
of government in Nigeria.
As one prince in the first village shared with me: “My father has seen continued interest of the
Chinese coming since the 90s, so he set up a whole committee of us to talk to them… sometimes it’s
him who does the talks, sometimes it’s us… but we are ready as the next generation to take over.”226
That long-term learning has been taking place since the 1990s is visible in the quality of deals that
appears to have become stronger over time. “Yes, in the beginning I didn’t ask the Chinese man for
much, the two houses for my palace, then he would get some land… when he brought in more
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companies, the conditions changed, I started to ask more for the village, repairs, some material… and
then when we saw even more coming, I started to ask them to employ people. And it’s the same with
taxes, for now some have tax holidays but once they are bigger, we will ask them to pay state taxes.”227
In addition, the villages’ relative isolation from Western influences may have also been
beneficial for the confidence in the value of their land. The first village king used to work in marketing
for Heineken Nigeria but has otherwise no reported connection to Western thought. Asked what he
learned at Heineken, he said: “If you do it right, you can make a lot of business in Nigeria, and I
wanted the same for my village.”228 I asked whether Ogun State government has ever sent advisors on
how to negotiate with the Chinese companies, which he negated. I also asked whether he had taken
any inspiration from the “Chinese model” of development, and he said no, he just saw the interest
and that he could make money off of the companies. The other two village kings apparently have lived
their whole lives in their villages and have also mostly only interacted with the state government (and
not with the federal one).229 They were therefore probably also relatively more isolated from the Weak
Bargaining Power Narrative compared to politicians at the federal level.
Finally, the villages themselves are very small and centralized under the king’s rule. I also asked
whether it had occurred that any villagers had set up “side deals” with the Chinese companies, or
whether there is any competition for cooperation with Chinese companies in the village. The prince
responded: “It wouldn’t be possible or in the interest of villagers to set up side deals, and also for the
[Chinese] companies.”230 The other two villages are even smaller than the first one, and I received
very similar responses to my questions on centralization, where both interviewees said that due to size
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and power of the king’s family, it would not be possible for villagers to set up separate side deals with
companies.231
As a result, I argue that this is again a story about one dominant ruler in power for a long time,
who was able to test out different deal conditions with Chinese companies while having small exposure
to the Weak Bargaining Power Narrative. In addition, it is also a story about a very centralized system,
where power rests in the king and it was very transparent how many Chinese companies were in fact
operating in the village. The reported experiences from the three villages are certainly not enough to
draw larger inferences about the universe of villages in Southern Nigeria, let alone the negotiation
rationales of traditional rulers in the African region more broadly. Yet, there may exist an important
comparison between incentives of traditional rulers and (elected) politicians in authoritarian or oneparty dominant state with communist/socialist histories that lead to different incentives and to more
awareness around bargaining power that would be interesting to study in the future.
6.4

Conclusion
The findings described in this chapter suggest that information around investment flows may

be captured more effectively in political environments that have a high degree of centralization.
Federalist experiments are often touted to lead to more democracy and accountability, and to reduce
the risk of one single agency abusing political power for their own purposes. Yet, the findings in this
chapter suggest that federal experiments should be carefully designed to prevent competition between
sub-regional units if this competition hinders information sharing up to the federal government. This
may only be possible in systems with strong parties or strong institutions that are able to extend their
control to all regions of the state. If parties or institutions are weak, the federal government will be
underinformed on the amount of investments flowing into the country. They may then underperceive

231

VB1, VC1.

228

their actual bargaining power with foreign investors, which is then harmful to the quality of deals that
political actors would otherwise collectively be able to negotiate.
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CHAPTER 7: AFRICAN BARGAINING POWER,
FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
- A CONCLUSION
7.1

Introduction
This project was motivated by an empirical puzzle: That some African governments with relatively

lower bargaining power – with bargaining power defined here by economic and political structural
variables that are less replaceable by exit options for the investor – ask private Chinese investors to
contribute more to developing local content than some African governments with relatively higher
bargaining power, and that private Chinese investors are in fact willing to accept these stronger deals
around local participation.
The Weak Bargaining Power Narrative, supported by the traditional development schools,
suggests that African countries should act as deal takers and is unable to explain the second part of
the empirical observation described above, that private Chinese investors are in fact willing to accept
these stronger deals. As a result, this project developed a new explanation, the Power of Weak
Economies Theory in Chapter 1. I posited that due to a shift in the global economic and political
landscape, private Chinese investors are attracted to the African region and perhaps surprisingly willing
to comply with local participation regulations in exchange for large prospective returns.
The empirical evidence provided in Chapter 2 is inconsistent with the Weak Bargaining Power
Narrative and supportive of the Power of Weak Economies Theory. Total and private Chinese
investments are wide-spread across the continent, and uncorrelated with the strength of local

participation requirements. The analysis suggested that there is indeed space for counties to negotiate
more aggressively with Chinese investors, and with private investors in particular.
Chapter 3 tested this proposition more directly by comparing the results of two complementary
conjoint experiments conducted with technical advisors and key investment negotiators to the
Nigerian government as well as Chinese companies in Lagos and Ogun State. Both government and
company respondents were presented with hypothetical deals with randomized policy attributes that
they were asked to rate for attractiveness. By highlighting a statistically significant gap between what
the government believed they could ask for regarding local participation (ownership and employment)
and what Chinese companies would in fact be willing to give, these results also supported the Power
of Weak Economies Theory. Chapter 4 extended the experimental findings from Nigeria to
observational evidence from additional four African countries (Kenya, Ethiopia, South Africa and
Tanzania) and described interview results highlighting perceptions of low bargaining power in Kenya
and Nigeria, perceptions of medium bargaining power in South Africa, and perceptions of strong
bargaining power in Ethiopia and Tanzania.
Chapter 3 and 4 established that a gap exists between perceptions and actual bargaining power in
some African countries while Chapter 5 and 6 then dived into why the gap exists and persists. If
countries possess bargaining power with Chinese investors regarding local participation, why would
some choose to use this power while others would not? I established that what information political
actors start the game out with, and what incentives actors have to share information within the game
largely determines perceptions of countries’ bargaining power. Chapter 5 honed in on the historical
relationships between the selected countries and the West as well as with China. It highlighted that
cases with authoritarian or one-state dominant systems and a socialist past have learned over time that
Chinese investors are staying under stricter local participation regulations. In contrast, such regulations
were seemingly always out of any feasible policy range for countries with closer relations to the West
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and competitive multi-party systems that - with every new party in power - led to information-erasing,
constant new learning and re-defining of a relationship to the West and the East.
Chapter 6 then showed that centralized political systems - that either emerge from strong parties
or strong de facto centralized institutions – encourage political actors to share information on Chinese
investment flows, while de-centralized systems with high levels of political competition and clientelism
tend to disincentivize politicians at various sub-levels to share information on Chinese investment
flows “up” to the central government. Overall, out of the cases studied, it is therefore governments
of authoritarian or one-party dominant systems with a longer ruling party like Ethiopia or Tanzania
who are very confident in their bargaining power with private Chinese investors, while governments
in competitive democracies like Nigeria or Kenya lack the same confidence.
The main contribution of this piece is the finding that several African governments can in fact
act as price setters around local participation with private Chinese investors, and that perceptions of
bargaining power – that are shaped through both historical frames and incentives to share information
with other political actors - fundamentally matter for investment deal outcomes. With the crisis of the
West, which started with the financial crash in 2008, China stepped in to “fill the void” that the West
had left behind in Africa, and has been increasing its presence until today. Since then, China-Africa
studies have asked many questions around the Chinese strategy in Africa. For example, is China only
interested in oil and other natural resources? Is China directly supporting authoritarian regimes such
as Sudan and Zimbabwe? Is China hurting efforts to promote democracy and human rights? Or, is
China making corruption worse? This one-sided perspective in literature may have given the
impression that the African region is one passive unit that is essentially a price taker of global economic
and political power dynamics. After all, the whole strand of literature is called “China-Africa studies”,
not “Africa-China studies” although the phenomenon is taking place on the African continent.
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This project strongly questions this perspective and shows that questions such as: “Will China
develop or exploit Africa?” are the wrong ones to ask. I provided evidence that whether the rising
Chinese presence in Africa leads to positive or negative development outcomes fundamentally
depends on the development strategies that individual African governments decide on. As a result,
this project calls for a shift in the China-Africa literature to pose fewer absolute questions that assume
that one China-Africa story exists on the continent, and to instead study different China-Africa stories
that may vary depending on host countries’ strategies.
Further, the findings of this study contribute to the literatures on political regimes, centralization
and party politics, and democracy and economic development. A key question in China-Africa studies
is whether China is actively trying to support and strengthen authoritarian regimes (e.g. Broich 2017,
Dreher and Fuchs 2011). But my findings suggest that the influence may be more indirect, where
African authoritarian or one-party dominant states are, on average, more aggressive in negotiating
investment deals around local participation than multi-party democracies, which may or may not be
re-enforcing their performance legitimacy and political rule.
In addition, since the 1990s de-centralization and power-sharing experiments have popped up
across the African continent as there was much hope that they would present a pathway out of poverty
and conflict in Africa (e.g. Fombad and Steytler 2019, Crawford and Hartmann 2008). Yet, systems
without a strong central government (which I argue arise from either strong parties or strong de facto
centralized institutions) appear not to be able to control competition among ministries and across subregional units. Political actors will then have less incentives to share vital information on Chinese
investment inflows “up” to the central government that in turn bases their perceptions of bargaining
power on incomplete information. Strong parties or strong de facto centralized institutions therefore
may be necessary pre-conditions for African governments to negotiate with “one voice” that has
complete information about the amount of Chinese investments flowing into the country.
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Relatedly, literature on party politics suggests that inter-party competition should lead to better
policy outcomes if there are two or more strong parties competing with each other (e.g. Rosenbluth
and Shapiro 2018, Bizzaro et al. 2018, Simmons 2016). Yet, I show that when parties are weak,
fractioned and clientelist, party competition can be harmful. In that case, rivalrous relationships and
re-staffing of government offices stunt political actors’ learning about bargaining power through their
historical relationship with the West and China, as well as dis-incentivize these actors to share
information regarding Chinese investment inflows with each other. It is then one strong party with a
history of local participation policy experimentation that has an advantage at negotiating aggressive
investment deals compared to two or more weak ones.
Finally, in light of the findings here, how should we think about how political regimes influence
economic development? There are few questions in political economy that have attracted more
attention than how economic and political development influence each other. Literature suggests that
democracy fosters growth by improving the accumulation of human capital, and by lowering inflation
and income inequality (e.g. Doucouliagos and Ulubaşoğlu 2008, Tavares and Wacziarg 2001). But in
environments with little transparency, ethnic voting and weak institutions, the promoted benefits of
democracies may have less room to come into play. In addition, I show that at least the democracies
studied here have strong historical relationships to the West, which has promoted the view that local
content requirements that would foster additional human capital transfers are out of the feasible policy
range for many African countries. Further, the de-centralized nature of these democracies may
constitute an additional disadvantage in which information sharing is inhibited. It is then perhaps
surprisingly one-party dominant systems or authoritarian countries that have looked towards the East
and implemented more state-led models that also include human capital transfer requirements.
At the same time, Rodrik’s (1997) seminal analysis that democracies yield more predictable longrun growth rates, that they produce greater stability in economic performance, and that they handle
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adverse shocks better as well as pay higher wages certainly also produces important questions on the
long-term viability of countries’ political regimes and development strategies studied here. It is out of
the scope of this project to study or make claims about general long-term viability of democratic versus
authoritarian systems for development prospects in the African region, which is certainly mediated by
the de facto strength of democratic institutions in Africa in the first place. But there are still important
lessons to be learned from the theory advanced here that may give us an indication about the future
of economic and political environment in the selected cases, and on the continent more generally. The
next section focuses on this question in more detail.
7.2

The Future of African Economic and Political Development
What are the implications of my theory for economic and political development on the African

continent? More research is certainly needed to answer this question but this section will provide a
first assessment on the future of African economic development and the survival of democratic and
authoritarian regimes in the region.
I have shown that African governments have space to strategize around private Chinese
investments in their economies. What should these governments use this space for? I argue that there
are three variables that are key to both economic and institutional development: first, economic
growth; second, economic diversification; and third, an export-oriented focus. There are numerous
reasons as to why countries should focus on these three variables. First, manufacturing generates more
economic activity per dollar of production than any other sector in the economy (IFC 2020). Empirical
evidence shows that without building a path of industrialization, very limited long-term economic
development will follow (e.g. Haraguchi et al. 2017). Second, while literature can still say surprisingly
little about the advent of democratization, Przeworski et al. (2000) show that democracies are more
likely to survive with a per capita income of $14,300 (2019) and a diversified economy. Also, in places
where politics is usually the only sector to earn a significant amount of money such as Nigeria, a
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diversified economy suddenly offers lucrative exit options to ruling politicians in the private economy.
In turn, this creates room in the political sphere for individuals motivated by other factors that are less
monetary in nature. So, investing in growth and diversification should stabilize existing democratic
states in the African region.
Third and finally, one of the major flaws of import substitution industrialization starting in the
1950s was that it was not export-focused, which should be set in place now together with a more panAfrican view towards development. An export focus is important especially for developing nations as
they can strategize around manufacturing products for a global consumer markets rather than being
limited by the often low purchasing power of their own population and insufficient supply channels
due to high transportation costs. In addition, exports also serve the purpose of earning foreign
currency.
When assessing the longer term economic and political development in the African region, we
therefore overall need to ask whether - based on the theory advanced here - different African countries
are likely to set in place policies to grow and diversify from agriculture and raw material to more
sophisticated forms of agriculture and manufacturing that are export-oriented.
7.2.1

Growth and Diversification
I have shown that background conditions in countries like Ethiopia and Tanzania have so far

been more conducive to building an FDI policy ecosystem that allows for local human capital and
technology transfers that help to grow the economy and to diversify towards industry. In contrast,
countries like Nigeria and Kenya have been held back by their legacies of close relations to the West
and de-centralization. Notably, Nigeria does not even have a stand-alone Industrialization Plan. At the
same time, any path-dependent theory needs to account for over time waning. So, we need to analyze
how Western influence in these countries, and dynamics of competition across ministries and subunits may be changing for the discussed country cases. Based on the theory advanced here, will
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countries like Nigeria and Kenya start to utilize this space more in the near future? And will
governments like the Tanzanian and Ethiopian ones continue to substantially benefit from the more
aggressive stance that they have taken with private Chinese players?
The analysis of U.S. and Chinese investment patterns around policy shocks across six African
countries in Chapter 2 suggested that U.S. firms may be significantly less willing to providing local
transfers compared to Chinese firms. And as my interviews show, the Western narrative is still highly
visible in the ideological, educational and intellectual sphere in Nigeria and Kenya. At $2.2 billion in
2017, Nigeria is still the second largest U.S. export destination in Africa, followed right by Kenya. An
example of continued Western influence is the plastic industry, with plastic being the U.S' biggest
export source to Kenya with sales totaling Sh6.21 billion (around 60 million dollars) last year. The
country banned plastic bags in 2018 but has recently been considering to lift these policies amidst new
trade talks with the United States in 2020. The U.S. is now pushing for relaxed policies through the
American Chemistry Council (ACC), a trade association with members such as Shell, Exxon and Total,
as it would enable them to build a platform for expanding exports to new growth markets across SubSaharan Africa (Olingo 2020).
Yet, with the rapid rise of Chinese investments in both countries, there certainly is a possibility
that this Western influence will slowly wane. For example, Kenya and Nigeria have started to become
more aggressive now around raising tax revenues. In July 2020, both countries announced that they
would begin taxing Silicon Valley’s global tech companies Facebook, Google or Uber in their
economies (Kazeem 2020).
Another example is that China had notably sent a team of medical experts to Nigeria in April
2020 during the first Covid-19 induced lockdown while a Western response to the virus outbreak in
Africa was missing (certainly also because the West was dealing with their own domestic outbreaks).
Kenya has also publicly praised the support it received from China to combat the Covid-19 crisis.
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These developments stand out as interesting since it had traditionally been the United States that had
provided fast humanitarian assistance and, with that, soft power influence that now China appears to
want to be taking over.
Certainly, the relationship between Nigeria and China has also been complicated by the
maltreatment of Nigerians in China during the outbreak, where Nigerians were evicted from their
houses out of fear that they were carrying the virus. Or, in Kenya, where a racial slur by a Chinese
business man against his employees in 2018 was widely covered by the media and resulted in his public
deportation from Kenya. Then again, in early April 2020, right after the announcement of the hard
Covid-19 induced lockdown in Nigeria, the company Enterprise Limited (LPLEL) received the
infusion of $221,047,248 (N83.997 billion) equity funding from China Harbour Engineering Company
(CHEC) for the Lekki Free Trade Zone Port. Or, in Kenya, also amidst the Covid-19 outbreak in
August 2020, both governments hosted a China-Kenya online Investment and Cooperation Dialogue
on healthcare and light manufacturing sectors (XinhuaNet 2020). All these events may be signals that
the Chinese government is pushing its expansionary investment quest despite the recent downturn of
its domestic economy.
The discussion above shows that Nigeria and Kenya are one of the most important strategic
investment destinations for both private and state investment on the African continent, so we may
observe more economic rivalries between the U.S. and China in these two countries soon. At the same
time, there are no clear signals that the lack of cooperation across ministries and states (in Nigeria)
and counties (in Kenya) will wane anytime soon. Both countries would need to solve their issues of
unifying countries that are still largely split by ethnic (and religious in Nigeria) identities that hinder
information sharing incentives between political actors. The countries would also need to invest more
financial resources in building stronger centralized institutions that are able to keep oversight of
investment inflows beyond the immediate reach of influence.
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On the other extreme of the spectrum, Ethiopia and Tanzania appear to have been reaffirmed
in their development strategies by their high growth rates over the past 20 years. Their economic
success has equipped them with confidence to carry on with their more state-centric development
models. For example, the Ethiopian Ambassador to China, Teshome Toga Chanaka, announced at
the end of April 2020 that his country would be pursuing even closer relations to China after the
Covid-19 outbreak, and that its Belt and Road projects (including the Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway,
the economic corridor, and the development of industrial parks) would have been slowed but would
still be brought to completion. In Tanzania, President Magafuli, during his election campaign in 2020,
battled against Canadian mining giant Barrick Gold Corp for a 60% share for the government in three
of its gold mines to end the "exploitation" of Tanzania's resources. He eventually settled for 16% but
also canceled two Chinese infrastructure projects, the building of Tanzania's first electric railway line
linking the main commercial city Dar es Salaam to the capital Dodoma and the construction of East
Africa's biggest port in Bagamoyo at a cost of $10bn. He stated in local news that only a “madman”
would accept the financial conditions offered in the deals. So, overall it is likely that the Ethiopian and
Tanzanian development strategies will be reinforced and strengthened by their strong parties and
unitary states although it remains to be seen how experiments such as in Tanzania, where President
Magafuli is testing out Chinese investors, will eventually play out.
These trajectories then also have different implications for growth and diversification, which
in turn influence economic and political development. The Ethiopian and Tanzanian government have
noticed the Chinese interest in manufacturing, and are using local participation policies to force
technology spillovers and human capital development that are needed in order to create multiplier
effects for industrialization. In contrast, a study conducted by Johns-Hopkins University’s ChinaAfrica Initiative on Chinese manufacturing in Nigeria shows limited technology transfers due to a lack
of a “more coherent strategy…to leverage this new, growing source of capital and the potential
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resources it brings.” (Chen et al. 2016, pg. 1) Together with other forces (for example that the Nigerian
economy is also largely dependent on oil and therefore exposed to the risk of the oil curse), growth
and diversification appear more likely in countries such as Ethiopia and Tanzania in the near future.
Similarly, with small growth and diversification, the survival of democratic regimes seems to also not
be directly fostered through Chinese and foreign investment in Kenya or Nigeria.
7.2.2

Survival of Authoritarian Regimes
While growth and diversification can provide us with insights on economic development and

the survival of democratic regimes, what can the theory offered here tell us about the future of
authoritarian regimes? China is often accused of actively pursuing an expansionary political mission
where it is supporting authoritarian regimes and making democratic transitions less likely. The
argument advanced here shows that the incentives of at least the small and medium private Chinese
players in Africa are non-political in nature, and that these firms are also small enough to eschew the
direct control of the Chinese government. I have argued that the influence of these firms on political
regimes is therefore more indirect and again driven by the respective development strategies advanced
by individual African governments. This is because as modernization theory suggests, growth in itself
can be an inherent threat to the survival of authoritarian regimes: Growth may lead to socio-economic
changes (e.g. the formation and organization of a middle class) that is conducive to democratic change.
At the same time, and as China has also shown, the government’s ability to suppress as well as their
performance legitimacy also play a role. Since growth and inequality move into opposite directions at
early stages of development, governments may then have to perform a balancing act between growth
and distribution in order to stay in power.
The one authoritarian example studied here is Ethiopia. Many of my interviewees told me that
as a result of the rapid annual growth rate of around 10% between 2007 to 2018 (compared to a
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regional average of 5.4%),232 the government is dealing with inflation that brings about rising food and
housing prices. Emerging from a socialist tradition, where the government used to provide food and
housing subsidies, the attempted switch towards a more market-led strategy has created winners and
losers that in theory may pose a threat to the rule of the current government. At the same time, the
mechanisms pointed out in Chapter 5 and 6 that determine how Ethiopia strategizes around foreign
investment are also at play for the government’s ability to strategize around other policy areas, and to
quickly adapt to new economic realities that require a political response. Many interviewees shared
with me that they look towards South Korea and China’s development model, which are famous for
their exceptional policy agility around economic and social changes. For example, the government is
holding monthly meetings with different stakeholder groups in industries and labor unions in order
to gauge sentiments from the population and special interest groups. The survival of the Prosperity
Party (former EPRDF but excluding the TPLF) as the ruling power in Ethiopia therefore certainly
depends on how the party manages different domestic interests and ethnic groups (and tensions are
certainly visible, e.g. in the recent Tigray conflict in November 2020), but the outlined favorable
background conditions around centralization may render the survival more likely in the near future.
7.2.3

Smaller Receivers of Chinese Investments
This study deliberately focused on African countries with strong or very strong bargaining

power with private Chinese investors who are the top-receivers of Chinese investments. Meanwhile,
I deliberately leave out countries with weak or medium bargaining power (please see Chapter 1 Table
1 for examples). Although I do not have enough data from other African countries and more
systematic research needs to reach conclusive evidence, an analysis of general trends suggests that
smaller receivers are also allocated an investment pie from China that is dependent on economic and
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diplomatic factors but importantly independent of countries’ local participation policies. As a result,
there is also room for some these countries to strategize more around private Chinese investment
projects.
This is also relevant to Francophone West Africa, a region where the term “Françafrique” is
still commonly used to describe the sphere of France’s influence over its former colonies in Africa.
What may be surprising, though, is that China has in fact already displaced France as the leading
exporter to most of these countries. Beijing has explicitly supported Senegal as the “gateway to West
Africa”, with President Xi visiting the country in 2018, baptizing it a Comprehensive Strategic Partner
and the first West African state to join the Belt and Road Initiative, and selecting it as the first
Francophone and West African country to host the FOCAC Summit (to be held in Dakar in 2021).
Private Chinese investors are more concentrated in West African countries with natural resources
endowments but also present in those without (Chen et al. 2018), and have entered sectors that have
traditionally been occupied by French firms, such as civil engineering, extractives, and telecoms.
How is Francophone West Africa responding to these shifting dynamics with such a strong
historical relationship to France? Soulé (2019) is one of the first scholars to focus on the relationship
between the Francophone West African region and China, which has received relatively less attention
in China-Africa studies. She analyzed infrastructure deals in West Africa and put forward four
recommendations to governments on how to negotiate better deals around local participation (“1.
involve everyone, 2. empower the negotiators, 3. keep the public onside, 4. increase knowledge”).
While these recommendations are applaudable, this project has argued that we first need to understand
driving forces of weak deals, and that countries’ strategies could also still be heavily influenced by the
French narrative. A more systematic study on perceptions of bargaining power and drivers of weak
deals in the Francophone African region would therefore be very valuable.
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Other smaller players on the African continent are also coming up with strategies around
private Chinese investors. Rwanda, a small landlocked country with limited natural resources, is a
fitting example: In 2013, the Rwandan government adopted an Economic Development and Poverty
Reduction Strategy II (2013-2018), which aims to increase “export orientation of firms in Rwanda’s
manufacturing” under a “Made in Rwanda” push into global textiles. As part of the plan, Rwanda,
together with the East African Community, proposed a plan to ban the import of second-hand clothes
from the United States in 2015. Yet in 2017, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania backed out amidst threats
from the U.S. government to withdraw their status from selling clothes to the U.S. duty free under the
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Rwanda's President Paul Kagame remained firm:
"This is the choice we find that we have to make. As far as I am concerned, making the choice is
simple [although] we might suffer consequences […] Rwanda and other countries in the region that
are part of AGOA, [sic] have to do other things - we have to grow and establish our industries."
(Africanews 2017)
Kenya's benefits from AGOA are certainly considerably more important than Rwanda’s:
Exports from Kenya to the U.S. amounted to nearly $600m (£450m) in 2017, compared to just $43m
(£32m) for Rwanda. At the same time, this offers smaller countries like Rwanda an opportunity to
build a strong local manufacturing base and to grow their relative industrial importance in clothes,
from which to export to markets in Europe or Asia. My interviews reveal that with the Covid-19 crisis
in 2020, Chinese companies in Nigeria have been considering even louder now to move manufacturing
out of China, and to build more resilient supply chains. So, the current crisis may also offer an
opportunity to smaller countries like Rwanda to attract more Chinese investments, to specialize in one
industry and to also emphasize local content.
Similar to the Chinese Polytech School in Ethiopia, Rwanda is currently building a Luban
Workshop, a vocational skill training center, a pledge made by Xi Jinping during the Forum on China-

243

Africa Cooperation in 2018. Evidence like this suggests that the Rwandan government is aware of its
bargaining power with China, and actively using it to accomplish its “Made in Rwanda” plan. The
reasons for the high awareness can again be traced back to the causal mechanisms outlined in Chapter
5 and 6: Rwanda’s relationship to the West was severely stained by the lack of Western response to
the Rwandan genocide in 1994. While the United States and Europe have since then paid arguably
disproportionally high attention to Rwanda given its small size and landlocked position, Paul Kagame
has sought a development course that more resembles China’s developmental state and state-directed
capitalism. The strongly centralized nature of the state certainly helped him to rally political
representatives around advancing the agenda; and to gain information from across regions in a
comparably very small country. Overall, the Rwandan example therefore appear to be supporting the
theory advanced here. Yet, more research is certainly needed to substantiate these claims with more
empirical evidence.
7.2.4

Future Research Areas
I have on purpose focused only on small and medium private Chinese investors as the

incentives on the investor side can be isolated from political incentives in a rather clean fashion.
Certainly, Chinese private investments are only a small part of Chinese engagement in Africa, and
there is definitely much more to learn from how African players behave around other types of Chinese
engagement (loans, trade and aid). Fraser (2010) made an important start by analyzing aid negotiations
of African governments with international donors against economic, political, ideological and
institutional conditions under which these negotiations occur. Swedlund (2017) also shared insights
on Chinese aid negotiations by focusing on the presence or absence of credible commitments from
both donor agencies and recipient governments for successful aid delivery over the long-term. Once
we have insights from different types of negotiations (trade, investment, loans and aid), we can then
pull together how these negotiations are interlinked.
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Since the Chinese banks that provide loans to African players are large, based in China and
under strong political control of the Chinese government, the CCP’s political aspirations are certainly
significantly more present in loan and aid negotiations. I therefore expect the bargaining space around
loans and aid to be smaller, relative to the one around investments, although there are clear and recent
examples, where governments have successfully re-negotiated loan conditions with China. This
includes Ethiopia’s successful requests for the extensions of loan payback time around a multitude of
Belt and Road projects that should be studied in more detail in the future.
Overall, I show for the first time that there is substantial space on the African side to influence
the “China-Africa” story and call for a shift in China-Africa literature towards a more Africa-focused
perspective. While studies often compare and contrast African development models with either
Western or East Asian approaches, there is also a striking lack of focus among scholars and
policymakers around what African countries could be learning from each other. In particular, my
interviews with African government officials revealed a significant lack of comparison within the
continent. The majority of respondents listed Western capitalist thought or Chinese and South Korean
development models as inspirational to their countries’ own development trajectory, but few
mentioned inspirational examples coming from within the African continent itself. Especially some
Nigerian government officials were surprised to hear about Ethiopia’s Industrialization policy, or
when I told them that countries like Ethiopia, Rwanda, or Cote d’Ivoire were among the fastest
growing countries in the world. Scholars and practitioners should therefore place more emphasis on
African success stories in comparative perspective on the continent, and study the lessons that could
be useful for and applied to a broader set of countries in the region.
7.3

Conclusion
Development literature tends to take a pessimistic view on the bargaining space of African

countries. And even if governments had space to negotiate stronger deals for their countries, debates
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around poor governance dominate research and suggest that corruption is the first hurdle to overcome
if African countries want to develop. The findings presented here challenge the assumption that
governments are always aware of their bargaining power with different investors. The project instead
highlights that some countries in the African region may have an “image problem” that perpetuates
perceptions of weak bargaining power both externally (Western thought and perceptions of the
regions) and internally (perceptions of African leaders themselves).
As mentioned in the introduction, China’s image in the world has changed dramatically over
the past 40 years. When Western companies first started to invest in China, products manufactured in
China had a reputation of being cheap in price and rather poor in quality. Yet, fast forward to today,
China is actively competing with the United States’ high-tech industry, and even triggering a trade war.
Interestingly, the literature on China’s development is not called “The West in China.” We instead use
terms such as “China Rising”, “China’s Growth Miracle” or “China’s Development Model” to
describe China’s impressive economic transformation over the past 40 years.
Similarly, the findings here show that what we should not only ask questions about China’s
strategy in Africa. Instead, the “China-Africa” story is fundamentally about how several African
countries strategize around the changing international political and economic order and its impact on
domestic and foreign investment (of which Chinese investment is one part) in order to grow, diversify,
export and ultimately develop in the long-term. What we have learned from other successful
development stories over past 40 years is that having one national strategy is paramount to this success.
I have argued that countries are more equipped to come up with such a strategy if they are able to
overcome coordination problems across ministries and sub-regional units as well as if they are able to
detach themselves from the narrative imposed by traditional development thought about the region.
In view of the rise of a new global player, it is time for the African region to adopt new strategies that
respond to the new global geopolitical dynamics and emphasize growth, diversification and export-
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orientation. It is the hope that we can then talk about a “Nigerian”, “Ethiopian”, “Kenyan”,
“Tanzanian”, “South African”, “Rwandan” – or more broadly, a “pan-African” – stand-alone
development model that will hopefully lead to sustainable growth and long-term prosperity of the
region.
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APPENDIX
CHAPTER 1:
Figure 1: GDP Per Capita in Africa vs. China

Figure 2: Chinese FDI vs. US FDI to Africa, Flow

Figure 3: Small and Medium Private Chinese Investment in Africa (number of projects)
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CHAPTER 2:
Methodology:
The IFC’s “FDI Regulations” database provides summary scores (in italix below) for subquestions. Wherever qualitative or outside data was used to describe a summary score, I employed
a standard -5 scale scoring method to quantify the data. In order to do so, I first graphed the data
or analyzed word groupings to understand country clusters and natural cut-offs before I then
determined how many levels of restrictiveness (0, -5, -10 etc.) to use. For example, the three cutoffs with “tariffsscore” depended on the tariff rate (applied, weighted mean, all products (%)
(WB)) and were 1. 0-5%, 2. 5-10%, and 3. from 10% to infinity. Countries in the first group
received a score of 0, countries in the second group received a score of -5, and countries in the
third group received a score of -10. I then aggregate summary scores to calculate five Sub-Indices
(please see summary scores used per sub-index below), that averaged, lead to the Deal Quality
Score (please see Table 1 and 2 below).
I.

Sub-Index 1 - Converting and Transferring Currency:
a.

inflowscore (receiving investment flows)

b.

outflowscore (repatriating investment and income)

c. payscore (making payments abroad and holding foreign exchange)
II.

Sub-Index 2 - Starting a Foreign Business:
a. foreignscore: % foreign equity ownership allowed, where I average all ownership
allowances across the 11 sectors listed for each country into one score
b. addprocscore: where I give out scores (0, -5, -10, -15) for each sub-question based on
level of restrictiveness. I then add the sub-scores up for the overall score:
1. Total number of additional procedures
2. Additional days required to establish for foreign- owned companies
3. Authentication of parent documentation overseas
4. Foreign investment approval
5. International trade license
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6. Authorization of imported foreign capital (Actual approval, Mere
declaration, Required only for incentives)
III.

Sub-Index 3 - Employing Skilled Expatriates:
a. workpermwuotascore: where I give out scores for the following sub-questions and
then add them up for the overall score:
"Are Quotas applicable?" (No: 0, Yes: -0.5)
"Is there a path to permanent residency?” (No: -0.5, Yes: 0)
"Is there a path to citizenship?" (No: -0.5, Yes: 0)

IV.

Sub-Index 4 - For Arbitrating and Mediating Disputes:
a. amdscore (the database provides three summary scores for: Strength of ADR laws
and institutions, Ease of Initiating and Conducting Arbitration Proceedings, Ease
of Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, which I average into
the amdscore.

V.

Sub-Index 5 -Taxes, Tariffs and Property Ownership:
Taxestariffsandpropertyownership: where I give out scores (0, -5, -10, -15) for the following
sub-themes and then add them up for the overall score.
a. taxscore
b. tariffscore
c.

ffposcore
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41.25
20.00
56.25
62.50
75.00
75.00
100.00
56.25
100.00
20.00
75.00
75.00
100.00
56.25
100.00
56.25
47.50
68.75
75.00
56.25
68.75
75.00
66.25
100.00
100.00

25.00
20.00
100.00
87.50
45.00
45.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
37.50
100.00
100.00

57.50
100.00
100.00
75.00
25.00
75.00
87.50
100.00

62.50
87.50
57.50
100.00
100.00

Algeria
Angola
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Chad
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Côte d'Ivoire
Egypt, Arab Rep.
Ethiopia
Ghana
Kenya
Liberia
Madagascar
Mali
Mauritius
Morocco
Mozambique
Nigeria
Rwanda
Senegal
Sierra Leone
South Africa
Tanzania
Tunisia
Uganda
Zambia

Outflow Score:

Inflow Score:

Country:

Table 1: Scoring

62.50
75.00
62.50
100.00
100.00

93.75
68.75
100.00
62.50
58.33
56.25
75.00
68.75

50.00
43.75
68.75
56.25
62.50
62.50
87.50
68.75
100.00
62.50
75.00
75.00

Payment Score:

25.00
53.75
50.00
100.00
100.00

53.75
12.50
100.00
37.50
25.00
75.00
75.00
12.50

37.50
56.25
12.50
56.25
6.25
6.25
75.00
12.50
100.00
6.25
56.25
100.00
75.00
73.67
75.00
70.67
83.33
79.00
79.67
81.33
50.67
85.00
66.67
79.33
83.00
74.67

62.00
63.67
80.67
56.67
86.00
65.33
74.67
78.33
69.00
61.33
84.33
78.00

70
80

50
45
75
85
60
80
55
80
80
50
55
85
65
100
70
70
75
65
60
75
70
75
65
80

Foreign
Additional
AMD Score:
Exchange Score:
Procedures Score:

85

90
95
100

90
100
85
90
100
90

90

90
95
100

100
95
95
90

95
85

Work Permit/Quota
Score:
100
90
95
95
85
85
85
100
100
95
100
95
100
95
100
95
90
95
95
100
90
95
95
95
95

95
95
95
95
95
90
95
95
95
95
95
90
90
95
95
100
100
100
95
95
95
95
100
90
95
95
100

Tax Score: Tariffs Score:
90
90
90
90
100
90
90
90
100
90
100
95
90
95
100
95
100
90
95
95
100
90
100
100
90
90
90

64.58
60.87
74.80
76.02
71.48
69.41
85.72
77.08
93.78
60.76
83.56
89.30
86.25
85.50
75.13
92.50
76.69
67.42
78.90
85.72
76.38
81.13
75.38
81.79
77.29
92.25
92.19

Property Rights Deal Quality
Score:
(Raw Score):

90.28
99.73
64.23
61.11
72.69
77.96
36.40
58.40
15.86
100.00
41.90
27.27
35.04
36.95
63.38
19.11
59.40
83.04
53.77
36.40
60.19
48.08
62.75
46.40
57.88
19.75
19.92

Deal Quality
(Final Score):

271

Overall Deal Quality Index
(Raw Score):

93.78
92.50
92.25
92.19
89.30
86.25
85.72
85.72
85.50
83.56
81.79
81.13
78.90
77.29
77.08
76.69
76.38
76.02
75.38
75.13
74.80
71.48
69.41
67.42
64.58
60.87
60.76

Country:

Egypt, Arab Rep.
Mauritius
Uganda
Zambia
Kenya
Liberia
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Rwanda
Madagascar
Ghana
Tanzania
Sierra Leone
Nigeria
Tunisia
Côte d'Ivoire
Morocco
Senegal
Burundi
South Africa
Mali
Burkina Faso
Cameroon
Chad
Mozambique
Algeria
Angola
Ethiopia

Egypt, Arab Rep.
Mauritius
Uganda
Zambia
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Kenya
Rwanda
Ghana
Madagascar
Tanzania
Nigeria
Burundi
Burkina Faso
Côte d'Ivoire
Mali
Senegal
Tunisia
Morocco
South Africa
Cameroon
Chad
Mozambique
Algeria
Angola
Ethiopia
Liberia
Sierra Leone

Country:

Component 1 DQ Index:
Converting and
Transferring Currency
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
90.63
87.50
78.13
76.56
76.25
72.81
68.75
65.63
59.38
59.38
59.38
59.38
59.06
57.81
54.69
47.19
47.19
38.96
38.44
35.00
31.56
N/A
N/A
Country:
Madagascar
Tunisia
Burundi
Chad
Zambia
Kenya
Côte d'Ivoire
Rwanda
Egypt, Arab Rep.
Uganda
Senegal
Morocco
Sierra Leone
Mauritius
Burkina Faso
Mali
Nigeria
Liberia
Mozambique
Cameroon
South Africa
Ghana
Tanzania
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Angola
Ethiopia
Algeria

Table 2: Deal Quality Index and Sub-Indices
Component 2 DQ SubIndex: Starting a Foreign
Business Across Sectors
100.00
95.58
92.50
90.00
90.00
89.58
87.92
87.50
85.38
85.00
84.79
84.63
84.58
83.33
82.73
82.67
80.00
78.85
78.13
78.04
77.50
77.21
75.71
74.71
67.46
58.75
48.08
Cameroon
Kenya
Morocco
Rwanda
Tunisia
Algeria
Chad
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Ghana
Tanzania
Côte d'Ivoire
Ethiopia
Madagascar
Mauritius
Nigeria
Senegal
South Africa
Angola
Mozambique
Zambia
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Egypt, Arab Rep.
Liberia
Mali
Sierra Leone
Uganda

Country:

Component 3 DQ SubIndex: Employing Skilled
Expatriates
100
100
100
100
100
95
95
95
95
95
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
85
85
85
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Cameroon
South Africa
Ghana
Mozambique
Uganda
Senegal
Burkina Faso
Rwanda
Tunisia
Nigeria
Côte d'Ivoire
Kenya
Madagascar
Mauritius
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Zambia
Mali
Morocco
Egypt, Arab Rep.
Tanzania
Chad
Angola
Algeria
Ethiopia
Burundi
Sierra Leone
Liberia

Country:

Component 4 DQ SubIndex: Arbitrating and
Mediating Disputes
86.00
85.00
84.33
83.33
83.00
81.33
80.67
79.67
79.33
79.00
78.33
78.00
75.00
75.00
74.67
74.67
73.67
70.67
69.00
66.67
65.33
63.67
62.00
61.33
56.67
50.67

Egypt, Arab Rep.
Ghana
Mali
South Africa
Mauritius
Morocco
Rwanda
Algeria
Côte d'Ivoire
Madagascar
Mozambique
Nigeria
Senegal
Tanzania
Zambia
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Ethiopia
Kenya
Liberia
Sierra Leone
Tunisia
Uganda
Angola
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Chad

Country:

Component 5 DQ SubIndex: Taxes, Tariffs and
Property Ownership
98.33
98.33
98.33
98.33
96.67
96.67
96.67
95.00
95.00
95.00
95.00
95.00
95.00
95.00
95.00
93.33
93.33
93.33
93.33
93.33
93.33
93.33
93.33
92.50
91.67
90.00
88.33

272

273

274

275

Table 11: Private Chinese FDI Stocks Rankings - Five Different Approaches (continued
on next page)
RANKING 1:
Mc Kinsey Case Studies
Nigeria
Zambia
Tanzania
Ethiopia
South Africa
Kenya
Cote d'Ivoire
Angola

Number of Private Firms
874
775
759
620
547
317
247
186
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McKinsey Private Ranking
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Countries Number of Projects
Nigeria
404
South Africa
280
Zambia
273
Ethiopia
255
Egypt
197
DRC
193
Ghana
192
Angola
189
Zimbabwe
167
Tanzania
149
Sudan
148
Kenya
137
Algeria
123
Mozambique
94
Uganda
89
Gabon
71
Mali
68
Namibia
66
Mauritius
65
Cameroon
60
Botswana
55
Madagascar
55
Guinea
53
Libya
51
Morocco
45
Sierra Leone
43
Equatorial Guinea
42
South Sudan
36
Togo
36
Congo, Rep.
33
Benin
33
Liberia
30
Cote d'Ivoire
27
Chad
18
Mauritania
18
Senegal
18
Niger
15
Djibouti
15
Rwanda
13
Eritrea
13
Seychelles
12
Malawi
10
Lesotho
9
Tunisia
6
Cape Verde
4
Gambia
3
Burundi
1
Sao Tome and Principe
1

RANKING 2:

Ranking, Number of Projects Countries Projects in Services
1
Nigeria
241
2
South Africa
182
3
Ethiopia
152
4
Zambia
134
5
Ghana
131
6
Egypt
117
7
Angola
108
8
DRC
96
9
Tanzania
95
10
Kenya
94
11
Sudan
93
12
Zimbabwe
91
13
Algeria
89
14
Mozambique
60
15
Mauritius
55
16
Uganda
54
17
Mali
49
18
Gabon
43
19
Cameroon
42
20
Namibia
42
21
Madagascar
36
22
Morocco
36
23
Libya
33
24
Guinea
31
25
Botswana
30
26
South Sudan
27
27
Sierra Leone
27
28
Benin
25
29
Togo
24
30
Equatorial Guinea
24
31
Congo, Rep.
21
32
Liberia
19
33
Cote d'Ivoire
19
34
Chad
13
35
Senegal
13
36
Mauritania
12
37
Djibouti
12
38
Rwanda
12
39
Niger
10
40
Malawi
9
41
Eritrea
9
42
Seychelles
9
43
Lesotho
6
44
Tunisia
4
45
Cape Verde
3
46
Gambia
1
47
Sao Tome and Principe
1
48
Burundi
1

RANKING 3:
Ranking, Projects in Services Countries Projects in Manufacturing
1
Nigeria
98
2
Egypt
76
3
South Africa
69
4
Ethiopia
54
5
DRC
42
6
Zambia
39
7
Angola
32
8
Zimbabwe
32
9
Ghana
27
10
Sudan
24
11
Tanzania
24
12
Kenya
24
13
Uganda
15
14
Algeria
12
15
Gabon
10
16
Mali
10
17
Mozambique
9
18
Guinea
9
19
Togo
7
20
Namibia
6
21
Mauritius
6
22
Cote d'Ivoire
6
23
Sierra Leone
6
24
Morocco
6
25
Botswana
4
26
Madagascar
4
27
Benin
4
28
Cameroon
3
29
Congo, Rep.
3
30
Lesotho
3
31
Libya
3
32
Equatorial Guinea
3
33
Liberia
3
34
Chad
1
35
Mauritania
1
36
Senegal
1
37
Tunisia
1
38
Djibouti
1
39
Gambia
1
40
Burundi
1
41
Malawi
1
42
South Sudan
0
43
Niger
0
44
Rwanda
0
45
Eritrea
0
46
Seychelles
0
47
Cape Verde
0
48
Sao Tome and Principe
0

RANKING 4:
Ranking, Projects in Manufacturing Countries Projects in Raw Material
1
Zambia
101
2
Nigeria
65
3
DRC
55
4
Ethiopia
50
5
Angola
49
6
Zimbabwe
44
7
Ghana
34
8
Sudan
31
9
Tanzania
30
10
South Africa
30
11
Mozambique
25
12
Algeria
22
13
Botswana
21
14
Uganda
20
15
Kenya
19
16
Gabon
18
17
Namibia
18
18
Madagascar
15
19
Libya
15
20
Equatorial Guinea
15
21
Cameroon
15
22
Guinea
13
23
Sierra Leone
10
24
Mali
10
25
Congo, Rep.
9
26
South Sudan
9
27
Liberia
7
28
Egypt
5
29
Niger
4
30
Eritrea
4
31
Mauritania
4
32
Togo
4
33
Mauritius
3
34
Benin
3
35
Morocco
3
36
Seychelles
3
37
Chad
3
38
Senegal
3
39
Cape Verde
1
40
Cote d'Ivoire
1
41
Rwanda
1
42
Djibouti
1
43
Malawi
1
44
Gambia
1
45
Tunisia
0
46
Burundi
0
47
Sao Tome and Principe
0
48
Lesotho
0

RANKING 5:
Ranking, Projects in Raw Material
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Table 11 (continued) Private Chinese FDI Stocks Rankings - Five Different Approaches
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Figure 1: The Top Investor Economies in Africa 2011 and 2016 (Billions of Dollars)

Figure 2: U.S: Investment Stocks in Africa, 2012

281

Figure 3: Chinese FDI vs. U.S. FDI to Africa, Flow and Stocks
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Figure 4: Chinese Investment Stocks in Africa, 2015

Figure 5: Distribution of Small and Medium Private Chinese Enterprises in Africa
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Figure 6: The 30 Low-Income Countries With the Most Debt to China
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CHAPTER 3:
Figure 1: Question 1 (Government Perceptions): Perceived Likelihood of Both Parties
Signing the Deal (0-3)

Figure 2: Question 2 (Government Perceptions): Will the Government Sign the Deal?
(Y/N)
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Figure 3: Question 3 (Government Perceptions): Will The Company Sign the Deal? (Y/N)

Figure 4: Question 4 (Company Responses): Likelihood to Sign the Deal (0-3)
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Figure 5: Differential Effect of Attribute on Chinese Respondents' Reports of Whether
Company Would Sign

Figure 6: Heterogeneous Effects by Type “Perceived Bargaining Power” (0 = low perceived
bargaining power, 1= high perceived bargaining power)
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Figure 7: Heterogenous Effects by Type “Corrupt” (0 = not corrupt, 1 = corrupt)

Figure 8: Heterogenous Effects by Type “Liberal Ideology” (0 = no liberal ideology, 1 =
liberal ideology)
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Figure 9: Government Respondents - Heterogenous Effects Pre- Versus Post-Covid-19
Induced Lockdown (Question 1)

Figure 10: Company Respondents - Heterogenous Effects Pre- Versus Post-Covid-19
Induced Lockdown (Question 4)
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Subgroup Results by Remaining Government Background Variables:

290
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Subgroup Results by Company Background Variables:

292
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SURVEY MATERIAL

Survey
number:

Investment Deal
Numbers (4):

GOVERNMENT SURVEY:
Interviewer:
Ministry/Office:

Date:

Please introduce yourself using the following script:
Good morning/Good afternoon, my name is [insert research team member’s name] and I
am from the Public and Private Development Center, a Nigerian NGO. We are working
together with Christina Seyfried, a PhD candidate at Yale University, on a research project
concerning the attractiveness of Nigeria’s investment policies to foreign companies.
Participation will involve answering some questions about your experience operating in
Nigeria’s foreign investment policy environment and rating some hypothetical investment
deals. You are not obliged to answer any questions you would prefer not to, and your
involvement would require 20 minutes of your time.
There are no known or anticipated risks to you for participating. The answers are completely
confidential, anonymous and will only serve the research project. Your responses will be
handwritten and not shared with third parties.
The anonymous survey forms will be stored in a locked cabinet and will be immediately
destroyed once the study is completed.
Participation in this study is completely voluntary. You are free to decline to participate, to
end participation at any time for any reason, or to refuse to answer any individual question.
Your decision whether or not to participate in this study will not affect your relationship
with PPDC or Yale. We hope that the results will help us to learn more about the role of
effective policies to attract foreign businesses.
If you have any questions about this study, you may contact the investigator, Christina
Seyfried, christina.seyfried@yale.edu.
If you would like to talk with someone other than the researchers to discuss problems or
concerns, to discuss situations in the event that a member of the research team is not
available, or to discuss your rights as a research participant, you may contact the Yale
University Human Subjects Committee, 203-785-4688, human.subjects@yale.edu. Additional
information is available at https://your.yale.edu/research-support/humanresearch/research-participants/rights-research-participant
Do you have any questions at this time? Would you like to participate in the study?
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Note: The person must give his or her informed consent by answering positively. If
participation is refused, walk away and record this here - Reasons for Unsuccessful
Meeting:
If consent was given, please proceed to the questionnaire. If a respondent firmly refuses to
answer any question, write “refused” in the answer space and continue to the next question.
BACKGROUND QUESTIONS:
Interviewer: “Let’s begin by recording a few facts about yourself.”
1. What region in Nigeria do you come from? (please circle what is applicable)
North Central
North East
North West
South East
South South
South West
2. Did you also go to school there, or somewhere else?
3. What is your specific role here at [name the ministry/office that you are visiting]?
4. How long have you been working here? Did you work at any other government offices
before? If yes, where?
5. Have you advised on investment or trade deals before, or any other deals? If yes, in what
capacity?
6. (Only if 5. Was answered with yes) Could you please tell us a bit about the negotiation
processes?
– Who are the actors usually involved?
- How do you usually hear about the investor? Who does the investor approach first?
- How does the decision-making progress work and what is your role as an advisor in the
negotiations?
PLEASE DO NOT ASK THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS DIRECTLY BUT
WRITE DOWN AND ESTIMATE BASED ON YOUR PERCEPTION:
7. Age:
8. Gender:
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Interviewer: Ok, thank you. Let’s briefly talk about your opinion on the following. Please
answer all the questions based on what you have experienced in your day-to-day work.
1. Have voters in the past asked your office about the conditions specified in the deals? If yes,
what were they interested in? (please circle one and take notes if answered with yes)
Yes
No
2. Judging from your past experience, what are important drivers of voters’ decision making
during elections?
3. (if not mentioned in the list above) Are investment deals an important driver of voters’
decision-making during elections? (If respondent says no) - Why not? (please circle one and
take notes if answered with no)
Yes
No
4. Judging from your past experience, have Nigerian business men asked your office about
investment deals set up by your government office with foreign investors? If yes, what were
they interested in? (please circle one and take notes if answered with yes)
Yes

No

5. Do you believe that the government should generally follow economic deregulation? Can
you elaborate on why you think so? (please circle one and take notes)
Fully agree
Somewhat agree
Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree
6. Do you believe that the government should generally follow privatization policies? (please
circle one and take notes)
Fully agree
Somewhat agree
Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree
7. Do you think Nigeria should participate as much as possible in open trade? (please circle one
and take notes)
Fully agree

Somewhat agree

Somewhat disagree

Strongly disagree

8. Do you believe the individuals negotiating on behalf of Nigeria with foreign investors are
generally skilled negotiators?
Yes

No

9. What makes you believe so and what could be some challenges?
10. Do you think they are generally experienced negotiators?
Yes

No
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11. What makes you believe so and what could be some challenges?
12. Do Nigerian actors coordinate across relevant government bodies when negotiating with
foreign investors?
Yes
No
13. If yes, how does that work? Do you find it effective? If not, how could it be improved?
14. In your opinion, does Nigeria receive little, same or a lot of Western money compared to the
rest of the African continent? Why do you think so?
Little

Same

A lot

15. In your opinion, does Nigeria receive little, same or a lot of Chinese money compared to the
rest of the African continent? Why do you think so?
Little

Same

A lot

16. Does Nigeria have no, few or a lot of competitors for foreign investment on the continent?
Who are they?
A few

A lot

17. Which of the following statements do you think are true? (please show them the list, printed
on a separate document, and let them circle what is appropriate to them. Please attach the
form to this survey at the end of the interview.)
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.

It is easier to negotiate with Western investors than with Chinese ones.
It is easier to negotiate with Chinese investors than with Western investors.
Nigeria and the West are equal partners.
Nigeria and China are equal partners.
Nigeria offer land, labor or raw material but foreign investors bring the money. So foreign
investors should have most of the say in investment negotiations.
Nigeria is a dwarf and China is a giant.
Nigeria has little say in investment deals with the West.
Nigeria has little say in investment deals with China.
The Chinese are everywhere in Africa, and very aggressive, they will not come to your country
if they don’t get their way, so you can’t negotiate with them.
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CONJOINT EXPERIMENT:

Interviewer: “I am going to read two investment scenarios to you, you will can also look at
them yourselves after. I would like to hear your opinion on these two deals afterwards”
(Interviewer: Please read both scenarios, then hand them over to the respondent)
Interviewer: “Please take as much time as you need to look at these two investment
scenarios.”
Time needed to read through the deal pairs: ________
(Once the interviewer looks up) Interviewer: “Do you have any questions? (Pause) Let’s
proceed to a few questions regarding your opinion on these two deals”
1. You want to maximize the chance of an agreement between the government and the
company. If you were confronted with one of these two deals in your daily work, which one
do you think would both the state government and the Chinese company be more likely to
sign?
1

2

2. In scenario 1, how likely do you think would the government and the company be to both
sign the deal?
Why?
3. In scenario 2, how likely do you think would the government and the company be to both
sign the deal?
Why?
4. Given your experience, which deal would the government be likely to prefer?
1

2

5. Why?
6. How likely on a scale from 0-3 are you to recommend to the state governor to push Deal 1
forward?
0

1

2

3

Why?
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7. How likely on a scale from 0-3 are you to recommend to the state governor to push Deal 2
forward?
0

1

2

3

Why?
8. Do you think the company would sign Deal 1?
Yes
No
9. If yes, why? If no, why not?
10. Do you think the company would sign Deal 2?
Yes
No
11. If yes, why? If no, why not?
12. How many of the following changes would you make to maximize the chances of the
company side signing Deal 1?
a. Get rid of local participation requirements
b. Offer more tax incentives
c. Get rid of license fees
d. Offer more attractive property rights regulations
e. Reduce facilitation payments
f. Reduce environmental regulations
g. Offer no change in terms for a more extended period of time
13. How many of the following changes would you make to maximize the chances of the
company side signing Deal 2?
a. Get rid of local participation requirements
b. Offer more tax incentives
c. Get rid of license fees
d. Offer more attractive property rights regulations
e. Reduce facilitation payments
f. Reduce environmental regulations
g. Offer no change in terms for a more extended period of time
14. Do you think the government would sign Deal 1?
Yes
No
15. If yes, why? If no, why not?
16. Do you think the government would sign Deal 2?
Yes
No
17. If yes, why? If no, why not?
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Interviewer: “Thank you. Now I am going to read two other investment scenarios to you,
again you will can also look at them yourselves after. I would like to hear your opinion on
these two deals afterwards.”
(Interviewer: Please read both scenarios, then hand them over to the respondent)
Interviewer: “Please take as much time as you need to look at these two investment
scenarios.”
Time needed to read through the deal pairs: ________
(Once the interviewer looks up) Interviewer: “Do you have any questions? (Pause) Let’s
proceed to a few questions regarding your opinion on these two deals”
1. You want to maximize the chance of an agreement between the government and the
company. If you were confronted with one of these two deals in your daily work, which one
do you think would both the state government and the Chinese company be more likely to
sign?
3

4

2. In scenario 3, how likely do you think would the government and the company be to both
sign the deal?
Why?
3. In scenario 4, how likely do you think would the government and the company be to both
sign the deal?
Why?
4. Given your experience, which deal would the government be likely to prefer?
3

4

5. Why?
6. How likely on a scale from 0-3 are you to recommend to the state governor to push Deal 3
forward?
0

1

2

3

Why?
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7. How likely on a scale from 0-3 are you to recommend to the state governor to push Deal 4
forward?
0
1
2
3
Why?
8. Do you think the company would sign Deal 3?
Yes
No
9. If yes, why? If no, why not?
10. Do you think the company would sign Deal 4?
Yes
No
11. If yes, why? If no, why not?
12. How many of the following changes would you make to maximize the chances of the
company side signing Deal 3?
a. Get rid of local participation requirements
b. Offer more tax incentives
c. Get rid of license fees
d. Offer more attractive property rights regulations
e. Reduce facilitation payments
f. Reduce environmental regulations
g. Offer no change in terms for a more extended period of time
13. How many of the following changes would you make to maximize the chances of the
company side signing Deal 4?
a. Get rid of local participation requirements
b. Offer more tax incentives
c. Get rid of license fees
d. Offer more attractive property rights regulations
e. Reduce facilitation payments
f. Reduce environmental regulations
g. Offer no change in terms for a more extended period of time
14. Do you think the government would sign Deal 3?
Yes
No
15. If yes, why? If no, why not?
16. Do you think the government would sign Deal 4?
Yes
No
17. If yes, why? If no, why not?
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(Interviewer: Please read the following text to the respondent and show them the graph
attached to this survey package. Please then take notes on the interviewee’s response)

Studies show that Nigeria is the #1 investment destination on the continent for small and medium
private Chinese firms. Chinese firms like the cheap land, labor and the large market size in Nigeria
that is unparalleled on the continent. Naturally, the most common response in a survey conducted by
us among Chinese manufacturers in Nigeria was along the lines of “Labor is so cheap here, I would
stay under any policy regulations”. (+show graph below from Chen, Dollar and Teng (2015) This
shows that Chinese companies really want to invest and operate in the Nigerian market.
Knowing this, would you want to impose stricter local participation requirements on them, or not?
Why/Why not?
Interviewer: “We have almost reached the end of the survey an only have a few last questions
again regarding your personal experience and opinion.”
1. How many individuals are usually involved on the Nigerian side in negotiations with foreign
investors in your government? Can you name their positions?
2. How do these actors concretely work together?
3. Would you describe them as well-coordinated or poorly-coordinated teams? How would you
describe the relation between federal and state governments in negotiations with foreign
investors?
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4. How does information sharing work within your government office? Across government
offices?
5. Do you think electoral cycles change politicians’ incentives and demands to gain access to
information about bargaining power?
6. Has your minister/state governor ever delegated negotiations to more decentralized actors?
(e.g. Nigerian companies, banks etc.)? If yes, how did that work out?
7. Does your government office have third-party advisors? If yes, from what organizations are
they?
8. Have you completed trainings in the West? If yes, when and what topics were covered?
9. Have you completed trainings in China? If yes, when and what topics were covered?
10. If there were a book or person you would recommend whose advise you found inspiring for
Nigeria’s own development path, who/what would it be?
11. What country, if there is one, do you think Nigeria should aspire to imitate in their
development approach?
12. How would you describe the attributes of a “skilled” negotiator?
13. How would you describe the attributes of an “experienced” negotiator?
14. "How do you think have falling oil prices and the devaluation of the naira affected Nigeria’s
relations with China? With the rest of the world?"
15. "How, if at all, has the Covid-19 outbreak changed your image of China?"
Interviewer: “Thank you very much for your time!”
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CHINESE COMPANY SURVEY
(All interviewees were shown a Mandarin Chinese version):

Survey number:

Investment Deal
Numbers (4):

Interviewer:

Date:

Please introduce yourself using the following script:
Good morning/Good afternoon, my name is [insert research team member’s name] and I am from
CitronTechGlobal, a Nigerian consultancy company for Chinese businesses. We are working
together with Christina Seyfried, a PhD candidate affiliated with Yale University on a research
project concerning the needs and preferences of foreign companies that are running a business in
Nigeria.
Participation will involve answering some questions about your experience in Nigeria and rating
some hypothetical investment deals. You are not obliged to answer any questions you would prefer
not to, and your involvement would require 20 minutes of your time. The results of this survey will
only be used for Ms. Seyfried’s Ph.D. dissertation.
There are no known or anticipated risks to you for participating. The answers are completely
confidential, anonymous and will only serve the research project. No personal or company names
will be recorded. Your responses will be handwritten [if conducted via Whatsapp or WeChat – will
be written down on a piece of paper and all chats will be deleted immediately after the chat ends]
and not shared with third parties.
The anonymous survey forms will be stored in a locked cabinet and will be immediately destroyed
once the study is completed.
Participation in this study is completely voluntary. You are free to decline to participate, to end
participation at any time for any reason, or to refuse to answer any individual question. Your
decision whether or not to participate in this study will not affect your relationship with
CitroTechGlobal or Yale. We hope that the results will help us to learn more about the role of
effective policies to attract foreign businesses.
If you have any questions about this study, you may contact the investigator, Christina Seyfried,
christina.seyfried@yale.edu.
If you would like to talk with someone other than the researchers to discuss problems or concerns,
to discuss situations in the event that a member of the research team is not available, or to discuss
your rights as a research participant, you may contact the Yale University Human Subjects
Committee, 203-785-4688, human.subjects@yale.edu. Additional information is available at
https://your.yale.edu/research-support/human-research/research-participants/rights-researchparticipant
Do you have any questions at this time? Would you like to participate in the study?
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Note: The person must give his or her informed consent by answering positively. If
participation is refused, walk away and record this here:
Reasons for Unsuccessful Meeting:

If consent was given, please proceed to the questionnaire. If a respondent firmly refuses to
answer any question, write “refused” in the answer space and continue to the next question.
I.

SURVEY: (BACKGROUND)
Interviewer: “Let’s begin by recording a few background characteristics about your
company.”
1. Is your company a private of state-owned enterprise? (please circle one)
Private

State-owned enterprise

2. What sector are you working in?
3. What industry are you working in?
4. Would you describe your industry as very competitive (there are a lot of competitors
in the same market), or are you one of the only players?
5. How many employees does the company have?
6. How many years has your company been operating in Nigeria?

Interviewer: “Thank you. I am going to read two investment scenarios to you, you will can
also look at them yourselves after. I would like to hear your opinion on these two deals
afterwards”
(Interviewer: Please read both scenarios, then hand them over to the respondent)
Interviewer: “Please take as much time as you need to look at these two investment
scenarios.”
Time needed to read through the deal pairs: ________
(Once the interviewer looks up) Interviewer: “Do you have any questions? (Pause) Let’s
proceed to a few questions regarding your opinion on these two deals”

306

1. Which one of the two deals presented above would you prefer to sign?
1
2
2. How likely on a scale from 0-3 are you to sign deal 1 (0 = definitely not sign, 3 = definitely
sign)?
0
1
2
3
3. Why?
4. What would you like to change about deal 1 if you could?
a. Get rid of local participation requirements
b. Offer more tax incentives
c. Reduce license fees
d. Reduce facilitation payments
e. Offer more attractive property rights regulations
f. Reduce environmental regulations
g. Offer more assistance in setting up and running the business in Nigeria
h. Offer no change in terms for a more extended period of time
5. How likely do you think the government would be to agree with your changes and sign the
new deal?
6. How likely on a scale from 0-3 are you to sign deal 2?
0 1
2
3
7. Why?
8. What would you like to change about deal 2 if you could?
a. Get rid of local participation requirements
b. Offer more tax incentives
c. Reduce license fees
d. Reduce facilitation payments
e. Offer more attractive property rights regulations
f. Reduce environmental regulations
g. Offer more assistance in setting up and running the business in Nigeria
h. Offer no change in terms for a more extended period of time
9. How likely do you think the government would be to agree with your changes and sign the
new deal?
10. (Only ask if they ranked deal 1 and/or deal 2 low) – If you are very unlikely to sign deal 1/2
and you can’t operate in Nigeria, where else are you going to go where you think business
operations will be better? In Africa? In the world?

307

Interviewer: “Now I am going to read two other investment scenarios to you, you will can
also look at them yourselves after. I would like to hear your opinion on these two deals
afterwards”
(Interviewer: Please read both scenarios, then hand them over to the respondent)
Interviewer: “Please take as much time as you need to look at these two investment
scenarios.”
Time needed to read through the deal pairs: ________
(Once the interviewer looks up) Interviewer: “Do you have any questions? (Pause) Let’s
proceed to a few questions regarding your opinion on these two deals”
1. Which one of the two deals presented above would you prefer to sign?
3
4
2. How likely on a scale from 0-3 are you to sign deal 3 (0 = definitely not sign, 3 = definitely
sign)?
0
1
2
3
3. Why?
4. What would you like to change about deal 3 if you could?
5. How likely on a scale from 0-3 are you to sign deal 4?
0 1
2
3
6. Why?
7. What would you like to change about deal 4 if you could?
8. How likely do you think the government would be to agree with your changes and sign the
new deal?
9. (Only ask if they ranked deal 3 and/or deal 4 low) – If you are very unlikely to sign deal 3 or
4 and you can’t operate in Nigeria, where else are you going to go where you think business
operations will be better? In Africa? In the world?
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Interviewer: “We have almost reached the end of the survey an only have a few last
questions again regarding your personal opinion.”
1. How many employees work for the company, and how many of them are Chinese?
2. What kinds of roles do your Chinese employees have within the company?
3. What made you come to Nigeria? Did you come from China or another African market?
4. (Only if the respondent came directly from China) Why did you decide to come to Nigeria?
5. (Only if the respondent lived in another African country first): What did you do there, and
why did you decide to leave and come to Nigeria?
6. How important was Lagos as a business location for you?
7. Can you imagine running the same business outside of Lagos? For example in North
Central? What about in the North East? Why? Why not?
8. How did you open a company here? What was the process?
9. What did your interaction with government offices look like?
10. Were you asked to make facilitation payments?
11. Were you asked to contribute to any local community projects, or hire locals?
12. Did the Chinese embassy assist you in the process?
13. What do you find the most attractive about the Nigerian environment for your business
operations?
14. What do you find the least attractive about the Nigerian environment for your business
operations?
15. What solutions have you come up with to solve these issues, or at least to make them more
bearable?
16. On a scale from 0-10, how important were taxes/tax incentives for your decision to enter
and stay in the Nigerian market?
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

17. On a scale from 0-10, how important were local participation requirements for your decision
to enter and stay in the Nigerian market?
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0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

18. On a scale from 0-10, how important were license agreements for your decision to enter and
stay in the Nigerian market?
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
19. On a scale from 0-10, how important were facilitation payments for your decision to enter
and stay in the Nigerian market?
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
20. On a scale from 0-10, how important were environmental regulations for your decision to
enter and stay in the Nigerian market?
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
21. On a scale from 0-10, how important were land right regulations for your decision to enter
and stay in the Nigerian market?
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

22. Are there no, a few or a lot of competitors in the market that your company is operating in?
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

23. Does the presence of a competitor affect your willingness to comply with stricter
government rules, or are you indifferent about it?
24. Are you concerned about political risk for your business and personal safety? If yes, how
have you tried to mitigate these risks?
25. Are there any markets you considered before entering Nigeria? If yes, which ones and for
what reasons?
26. What would have to happen so that you take the decision to leave Nigeria; and where else
would you go?
27. How, if at all, has the Covid-19 outbreak affected your business in Nigeria?
28. Do you consider changing anything about your business operations in response to the
Covid-19 outbreak?
Interviewer: “Thank you very much for your time!”
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